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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

NOTICE TO READERS: The "Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT" covers the same geographic area as the former "Soviet Union DAILY REPORT." The sections within have been reorganized. The "International Affairs" and the "Interregional Affairs" sections have been reduced, while the individual republic sections have been expanded. Much information previously found in the "International Affairs" and "Interregional Affairs" sections will be found under "Russia: International Affairs" or "Russia: Federation Affairs."

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NATO Urges Membership for Ex-Republics

LD0801021292 Moscow TASS in English
2151 GMT 7 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels January 7 TASS—NATO countries proposed on Tuesday [7 January] to admit former Soviet republics into the Council of North Atlantic Cooperation set up to develop contacts and cooperation (CNAC) between NATO and Eastern Europe.

The council hopes its next session to be held on January 31 in Prague after a meeting of CSCE foreign ministers will be attended by its new members.

The proposal has yet to be approved by other council members—Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Estonia.

A NATO official said invitations to the session will be sent only to those independent states which have been recognised by NATO. So far only Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Georgia have not been recognised.

CIA Cited on Korean, Vietnam War MIA's

PM0701185192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 3

[IZVESTIYA PRESS SERVICE report: "CIA Questions Kalugin Statement"]

[Text] REUTER and AP reported that the U.S. Administration has handed to a number of former Soviet republics a list of Americans who were missing during the Korean War or in Vietnam and who are being sought.

According to one official the list was compiled by the State Department in conjunction with the U.S. Defense Department and contains about 50 names of U.S. servicemen. They include MIA's who were crew members of U.S. B-52 strategic bombers shot down during the Korean war near the border with the USSR. The list also contains the names of U.S. servicemen taken prisoner in Vietnam, who, the administration believes, could have been moved to the Soviet Union.

According to AP, State Department officials also intend to meet with retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, who will be visiting the United States very soon and who once headed Soviet external counterintelligence. In an interview published by a number of U.S. press organs the other day he claimed that his people had interrogated three captive U.S. officers in Vietnam in 1978. Both Vietnam and the Pentagon claim that all the remaining U.S. prisoners who were still alive were sent home in 1973, when the United States withdrew its forces from South Vietnam.

The CIA also took the unusual step of publicly denying the Soviet general's statement that the Americans interrogated in 1978 included a staffer of the U.S. espionage department. A CIA statement for the press claims that it "possesses no data to the effect that the particular event took place at that time."

According to the CIA statement, one of its staffers who was taken prisoner in South Vietnam in 1968 was subsequently moved to North Vietnam. "On at least one occasion this CIA officer was interrogated in Hanoi by an individual who could have been a Soviet intelligence officer," the statement points out. However, the officer was released along with the other prisoners in 1973.

Another U.S. intelligence officer was taken prisoner in April 1975 during the fall of the South Vietnam regime. The CIA states that during his interrogation by the Vietnamese "there were some indications that the questions could have been drawn up with the assistance of Soviet officials, but none participated directly in the interrogation." This CIA staffer was released in October 1975, the U.S. espionage department claims.

Impact of Afghan Conflict on CIS Viewed

PM0801102792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Vladimir Skosyrev report: "The Afghans Will Have To Economize on Shells: On 1 January Moscow and Washington Ceased Arms Supplies"]

[Text] The conflict in Afghanistan goes on but now the warring sides will have to use their shells and rockets economically. This is because on 1 January 1992 an accord between Moscow and Washington went into force ending military supplies to Afghanistan.

What will this mean for a country which has been at war for the past 12 years? I am afraid that neither experts on the Middle East nor astrologists are at present able to give a sensible prediction. The horizon remains cloudy even though the Soviet-U.S. accord reached last fall in Moscow is having a deterrent effect both on the Afghan groupings and on other states involved in the conflict.

However, it is also true that since 1 January the Kabul regime and the armed opposition have been in far from equal positions. Previously both the former and the latter sheltered behind their "big uncles" from Moscow and Washington. Now they cannot count on them any more. Furthermore, the Moscow "uncle" seems to be leaving the game entirely. At least informed sources told me that it is not only combat hardware and shells that are no longer being supplied to Kabul—fuel and food supplies from the former USSR have also dried up.

On the other hand, aid to the armed opposition has by no means been fully stopped. Pakistan has not joined the Soviet-U.S. agreement, nor have Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's generals have certainly not abandoned the plan of their late leader, Ziaul Haq, to overthrow Najibollah and install a friendly Islamic regime in Kabul. That is why detachments from the fundamentalist G. Hekmatyar and other implacable enemies of "godless communism" continue to receive supplies from Pakistan. The question is, how long will Najibollah's government last under these circumstances?

It is certainly not supporters of democracy who are opposing the Kabul government on the battlefield. That is why it is necessary to anticipate the possible impact that an Afghan fundamentalist victory might have on Central Asia. It is no secret that democratic institutions in this part of the former Union are still weaker and less well-developed than in Russia. Who knows? Will the very numerous supporters of the revival of ways based on the sharia not see the downfall of the "procommunist regime" in Kabul as a signal to action? The wave created by such actions could engulf not only the turncoat party bureaucrats. The secular character of power in the young states will be under threat.

Admittedly, it is difficult to predict what kind of policy the mujahidin would begin to pursue toward their neighbors in the north if they were to prevail in Kabul. Their statements on this score are ambiguous. On the one hand, even G. Hekmatyar has said that he is ready to establish good-neighborly ties with the USSR. On the other, he has demanded the payment of reparations or our participation in the rebuilding of his country. Furthermore, when the subject of reparations came up, such colossal sums were mentioned that even if the entire Union had worked flat out it could not have paid them back for many years.

Now, when dealing with sovereign "Muslim republics," will the fighters for the faith perhaps be prepared to forget the past? Hardly. As for the borders, there is absolutely no need to expect hostile attacks from the Afghans. But who will guarantee that some hothead will not try to ship arms into our country across the Amudarya if the situation in one of the Central Asian republics worsens. In brief, external attempts at interference cannot be ruled out.

Hence it follows that Russia and other CIS members should help the Central Asian republics to protect the borders. It is naive to think that upheavals in one region of the Commonwealth would not affect other regions. That is why there is an urgent need for a clear and precise accord on the status and financing of the Commonwealth's common border service. Will the heads of the independent states be able to achieve that? There is no confidence on that score.

Fortunately, there is no direct threat to our borders. The various groupings in the Afghan resistance have not managed to turn the downfall of the Soviet empire to their advantage. They are continuing to settle scores with one another, often using weapons. But the Kabul regime, it is believed, having stockpiled enough ammunition for at least six months of war, has no intention of flying the white flag. "After 15 February 1989 (that is, after the Soviet troop withdrawal) they gave us just two weeks. Then they say that we would last two months," Najibollah recalled, stressing that the mujahidin cannot ensure a military solution to the problem.

Whether ultimately the president is proved right or not, it is clear that the search for a political settlement must go on. There are two encouraging signs here: First, the fact that Moscow established contact with the Afghan opposition leaders and is holding an active dialogue with them. Second, the United States is firmly advocating that fair elections be held in Afghanistan with UN assistance.

The immediate task is not to save the Najibollah regime. The aim must be different: To give the Afghans an opportunity by means of the free expression of their will to form a government of trust and carry out a well-ordered transfer of power without bloodshed. Otherwise, the chaos in the neighboring state will not stop.

Iran Seeks More Ties With Muslim Republics

*PM0701162892 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Vyacheslav Lashkul report: "What Does the New Alliance in Asia Offer?"]

[Text] It has been officially announced in Tehran that Iran is to open a consulate in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (NAR) and intends to establish most-favored-nation relations with it. Furthermore, during a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran, NAR Prime Minister Beydzhan Farzaliyev received a promise from the Iranian authorities that they would give their northern neighbor financial credits and send Nakhichevan food aid and experts to help promote the recovery of industry and agriculture.

An accord has been reached on the development of trade with the Iranian province of Eastern Azerbaijan. Tehran is examining the possibility of the use of Iranian airspace to give the people of Nakhichevan links with the outside world in the near future. The Tehran government has also pledged to help with the construction of a railroad which is to link Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan, bypassing Armenia. Electricity deliveries have already begun, as well as the construction of a gas pipeline by which Nakhichevan will receive Iranian gas later this year.

What has prompted this benevolent attention by Tehran toward the NAR? Let us recall that the NAR has a 137 km border in common with Iran. The inhabitants of the NAR speak the same language as the neighboring Iranian population and profess the same religion. The two neighboring peoples are linked by historical ties and a common culture. It is no accident that the Iranians soon intend to embark on the joint construction of new cultural and theatrical centers in the NAR.

The deepening of mutual relations with the NAR is in conformity with Tehran's general strategy of establishing political and economic relations with the new independent states in which the population is predominantly Muslim. 'Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian foreign minister, and Mehdi Karrubi, speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Iranian parliament), have come out in favor of an all-round widening of ties with them. Iran has already adopted a decision on recognizing Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Vaezi recently visited Turkmenistan to discuss questions of mutually beneficial cooperation. He has now begun a visit to Azerbaijan, where the official opening of the Iranian Embassy is to take place. Iranian embassies will also be opened in the capitals of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

The birth of a new economic and cultural center in the Asian region could lead, observers think, to profound changes in the Near and Middle East. For the moment a struggle for influence in the Central Asian states is developing between Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

Turkey Expands Ties With Independent Republics

PM0701121592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jan 92 First Edition pp 1, 5

[Unattributed report: "Is Specter of Ottoman Empire Abroad?"]

[Text] As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of six new independent Islamic republics, Ankara has acquired a real opportunity to implement the ideas of pan-Turkism and to revive the dream of the revival of the Ottoman Empire. That is the conclusion of the Cypriot newspaper HARAVGHI.

The article speaks of the very strong rivalry between Turkey and Iran for the spread of their influence to the territories of the Turkic-speaking republics of the former Union. Ankara, the newspaper writes, is acting exclusively on the basis of its own interests and in accordance with the recommendations elaborated by specialists from government centers. The "association" to Turkey of the former Soviet republics, slightly intoxicated by their first taste of freedom, is being implemented in several directions. In particular Ankara has spent considerable effort to introduce the Turkish alphabet to their territory. Turkey is prepared to literally inundate the republics where Muslims, especially Sunni Muslims, are living, with books, journals, and other publications of nationalist content. Turks, HARAVGHI notes, have displayed the readiness to open up to 30 new higher educational establishments (mostly in Eastern Anatolia) to train students from the Transcaucasus, the Central Asian republics, Tatarstan,and Bashkortostan.

In addition, the Greek newspaper NIKI notes, citing "reliable sources," Turkey is now making efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear technology from the republics of the disintegrated Soviet Union. According to the newspaper's information, Ankara's actions are directed primarily toward four republics of the former USSR: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, on whose territories there are tactical nuclear weapons and with which Turkey maintains close ties. Turkey thus hopes to become a nuclear power, NIKI writes.

The growth of Ankara's authority in these four Islamic republics, NIKI writes, is borne out by the fact that Turkish state television has finished a study costing $5.5 million for broadcasting its programs to these four republics, for which a special satellite station will be constructed in Ankara.

G-7 Threatens Measures for Defaulting Republics

PM0701152592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 5

[Correspondent Vladimir Bolshakov report followed by TASS report: "Debt Deferred, But...Western Sanctions Threaten Those Heirs of the USSR Which Ignore the Former Union's Commitments"]

[Text] Paris—A conference of representatives of 17 countries which granted credits to the Soviet Union has ended on the banks of the Seine. It was convened on the initiative of the French Ministry of Finance. The problem of Soviet debts to the West was discussed at the conference.

Of the $65 billion that constitutes the foreign debts of the former USSR, the 17 countries participating in the Paris conference account for $32 billion. Under the existing regulations the USSR should have paid out precisely $3.2 billion, starting 5 December 1991, before the end of this year in payment of the debt under long-term and medium-term loans made before 1 January 1991.

Following the breakup of the USSR, eight former Union republics have acted as its juridical heirs and agreed to repay these debts. They are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

In Paris the responsible approach of these member states of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to the Soviet debts was welcomed and a promise was made to grant them a deferment of payment of the $3.2 billion on condition that they will continue the economic reforms in the area of creating a market, as well as the other reforms recommended to them by the IMF. However, the deferment does not concern short-term loans.

The 17 creditor countries will meet again in March of this year to check on how these pledges and the payments on short-term loans are being fulfilled in the eight CIS states. They decided in principle in Paris that there is no need to reconsider the payment deadlines on the sum total of the loans contracted by the Soviet Union, as the CIS states have great export potential.

It was noted with regret in Paris that the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have refused to follow the example of the former "Soviet eight." Western creditors warn that this "stubbornness" will entail corresponding measures, particularly a denial of trade credits to those former republics of the USSR which refuse to participate in the repayment of its debts.

The Paris conference's decision is an important step in implementing the earlier adopted recommendations of the "G-7" countries to defer repayment of the Soviet debt. As regards the former Soviet republics' participation in fulfilling the financial obligations previously adopted by the Soviet Union, it was bluntly stated in Paris that it will be impossible to simply renounce them without running the risk of acquiring a reputation in the world as a fraudulent bankrupt.

It was made clearly understood here that the West will meet halfway only those CIS countries which are prepared to pay the promissory notes which they inherited, with regard to giving economic and other assistance. A meeting of the finance ministers and governors of central banks of the "G-7" countries will be held in the United States 25-26 January to discuss these problems and, primarily, assistance for the CIS.

In the Final Hour

Paris, 6 Jan (TASS)—Commenting on the situation in the former USSR following the price liberalization, T. Alibegov, first deputy chairman of the board of the Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity], declared that "initially this liberalization will accelerate inflation, and strikes and demonstrations will begin—maybe even larger than before, since the situation is grave." "However," according to him, "this will not lead to a general social explosion." T. Alibegov also emphasized that, when store shelves were full, "there were no interethnic conflicts." These phenomena, he believes, have been caused, above all, by the fact that certain politicians locally were removed from power in the past.

Gorbachev To Write Regularly for YOMIURI

PM0701114192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 92 Union Edition p 6

[Sergey Agafonov report: "Japanese Newspapermen's Find: Mikhail Gorbachev and YOMIURI"]

[Text] Tokyo—The major Japanese newspaper YOMIURI reported in this morning's issue that Mikhail Gorbachev has signed a contract to cooperate with the newspaper in the coming year. The contract was signed in the Kremlin last Friday [27 December] and was one of the last documents "ratified" by Gorbachev within the Kremlin walls.

According to the agreement reached, Mikhail Sergeyevich will participate in a special YOMIURI rubric, whose debut will take place in January, and will prepare a number of articles for publication. It will be a weekly rubric, and very well-known and influential figures in the world will contribute to it in addition to Gorbachev. It will be opened by Czechoslovak President Havel and will be continued by Jacques Attali, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Gaishi Hiraiwa, chairman of the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren); Henry Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state; Yasuhiro Nakasone, former Japanese prime minister; Theo Sommer, chief editor of the German weekly DIE ZEIT; Georgiy Shakhnazarov, assistant to Gorbachev himself, and others.

YOMIURI's authorial "find" has caused a furor in Japan and plunged the competing publications into deep mourning. Taking advantage of the fact that IZVESTIYA has long-established good ties with this Japanese newspaper, I inquired about the theme of Gorbachev's article and its time of publication. True, I did not receive a clear-cut answer—it was explained to me that consent to cooperate was received unexpectedly, and so the sides have not yet elaborated the details for realizing the contract. To judge from the list of contributors to the new rubric, not one but several articles under the signature "Mikhail Gorbachev" are to appear in YOMIURI during the coming year.

Comparison of Report on CIA Assessment

CM0701180992

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 3 January 1992 carries in its Morning Edition on page 5 a TASS report entitled "CIA Report." Comparison of the IZVESTIYA item with the Moscow TASS English version published in the 3 January Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 1, reveals the following variations:

Column two, second paragraph of item, sentence one reads: ...of making them, the television company's Pentagon correspondent pointed out. Soviet scientists rendered... (adding passage)

Sentence three reads: ...Libya, Iran or North Korea. According to... (changing "South" to "North")

Last paragraph of item, sentence one reads: ...arsenal. Theoretically it really is possible to... (adding "really")

Last sentence reads: ...CIA experts fear, the correspondent pointed out in conclusion. People live for a long time and remember for an equally long time what they did in their job. Moreover, it is far harder to control people's movements than the movement of missiles. Administration spokesmen admit privately that a certain proportion of Soviet military scientists and engineers "will inevitably get out of control." (adding passage)

Commonwealth

Documents Signed in Minsk Meeting Reported

92UN0572A Moscow TRUD in Russian 31 Dec 91 p 1

[TASS-BELTA report: "Minsk: Documents Signed"]

[Text] A meeting of the heads of state of the members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] began at 1100 hours local time in the capital of Belarus, which has been chosen as the location of the Commonwealth's coordinating bodies. Ayaz Mutalibov, president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, president of the Republic of Armenia, Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet, Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Askar Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, Rakhmon Nabiyev, president of the Republic of Tajikistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan, Islam Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, took part.

Heads of government of the sovereign states, ministers, and other officials took part in the negotiations.

The meeting was opened by Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet. He proposed that a chairman be elected for the meeting of heads of state of the CIS. In accordance with the proposal of Boris Yeltsin, Stanislav Shushkevich was unanimously elected chairman.

All the documents presented for consideration by the participants in the meeting of heads of state of the CIS in Minsk were signed, Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet, declared at a news conference on the results of the meeting.

The heads of state signed nine documents:

A Provisional Agreement on a Council of Heads of State and a Council of Heads of Government of the CIS;

an Agreement Among the Participants in the CIS on the Strategic Forces;

an Agreement of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS on the Armed Forces and Border Forces;

an Agreement on Joint Activity in the Exploration and Use of Space;

an Agreement of Heads of State of the CIS on Property of the Former Union of SSR Overseas;

a Protocol of the Meeting of Heads of the Independent States on Preparation of a Special Agreement on Problems of the Aral and Also on Problems of Elimination of the Effects of the Earthquake in Spitak;

a Protocol of the Meeting of Heads of the Independent States on the Preparation of a Special Agreement on Preservation of the Fish Resources of the Caspian Sea;

a Protocol of the Meeting of Heads of the Independent States on Measures To Eliminate the Effects of the Catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station To Be Implemented in 1992 and the Procedure and Extent of Their Financing;

a Protocol of the Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the CIS on the Development of the Name, Structure and Sources of Financing of a Working Group for the Organizational-Technical Preparation and Execution of Meetings of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth.

The meeting concluded its business.

Protocol on Economic Relations Published

PM0801010192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Jan 92 First Edition p 2

[Text published under the rubric "Official Section": "Protocol for the Coordination of Measures Being Taken To Preserve Economic Ties in the First Quarter of 1992 Between Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations Located on the Territories of the Commonwealth of Independent States"]

[Text] The governments of the Commonwealth's independent states, bearing in mind the need for coordinated actions to create favorable working conditions for enterprises, associations, and organizations located on their territories and the need to implement the interstate agreements on the principles of trade and economic cooperation for 1992, have agreed:

1. In order to prevent the shutdown of production facilities enterprises, associations, and organizations—irrespective of their forms of ownership—which are located on the territories of the Commonwealth's member states are to ensure that the economic relations operating in 1991 are preserved in the first quarter of 1992 and that contracts for delivering raw and other materials, components, and finished products are concluded and met on a scale of not less than 70 percent of the volumes of deliveries in the first quarter of 1991.

2. Before 1 February 1992 enterprises, associations, and organizations are to submit data to the state statistics organs on the volumes and destinations of deliveries under contracts concluded for the first quarter of 1992. Administrative organs of the Commonwealth's member states are to summarize the data submitted for consideration in determining quotas and issuing notices of pairing arrangements for deliveries made under the interstate agreements for 1992.

3. In the period up to 15 January 1992 the administrative organs of the Commonwealth's member states are to

furnish suppliers and consumers with plan documents specifying pairing arrangements for the delivery in 1992 of goods according to quotas (attachments No. 1 and No. 2 to the agreements), and in the period up to 15 February 1992 they are to make the necessary adjustments taking account of the concluded contracts for the first quarter of 1992 under established economic ties.

4. Licenses for the export of output above the prescribed quotas are issued only by decision of the states' governments states or by organs authorized by them.

The organs regulating deliveries of goods for state needs are to be made responsible for determining the specific suppliers and consumers in accordance with the quotas and for monitoring the conclusion and fulfillment of goods delivery contracts between enterprises.

The sides undertake to inform each other of the license issuing procedure operating in each state.

5. Economic entities are to be assisted in maintaining and developing reciprocal goods deliveries, including by intersector and intrasector cooperative arrangements, taking account of prevailing production volumes without making additional demands for reciprocal deliveries of other goods.

6. A mutually coordinated procedure for making settlement transactions for licensed goods allowing financial control over their export to be exercised is to be elaborated and approved. Manufacturing enterprises and broking organizations make settlement transactions for licensed goods in accordance with the approved procedure.

When output is dispatched without licenses 90 percent of the money received by the supplier from the purchaser is transferred to state budget revenue and 10 percent to the relevant central (national) bank.

7. It is to be agreed that all settlements by the states' enterprises and organizations for reciprocal goods deliveries are made in rubles at free or regulated prices taking account of the states' existing normative acts.

8. Incentives and sanctions are to be applied to enterprises and organizations in order to realize goods deliveries under interstate agreements in accordance with the states' existing legislation. The specific terms of delivery and responsibility for meeting them are stipulated in the contracts concluded by enterprises.

9. It is to be ensured that a coordinated statistical accounting methodology is utilized in the states in order to monitor the progress of the fulfillment of reciprocal deliveries of the output stipulated by interstate agreements.

Questions which arise in the process of recriprocal deliveries are to be perdiocally reviewed.

10. The organs for managing transport (rail, water, air, road, and other) of the Commonwealth's member states are to ensure that transport resources are allocated in the first quarter of 1992 on presentation of the freight by the senders.

11. The leaders of the governments undertake to issue the necessary normative acts ensuring that the commitments ensuing from this protocol are met.

[Signed]

For the Azerbaijan Republic

Azizbekov

For the Republic of Armenia

Arutyunyan

For the Republic of Belarus

Kebich

For the Republic of Kazakhstan

Tereshchenko

For the Republic of Kyrgyzstan

Iordan

For the Republic of Moldova

Chebuk

For the Russian Federation

Gaydar

For the Republic of Tajikistan

Khayeyev

For the Republic of Turkmenistan

Charyyev

For the Republic of Uzbekistan

Sharipov

For the Ukraine

Masik

Member States' Views on Armed Forces Reviewed

PM0701114792 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by A. Krayniy under the rubric "Forecast": "Does Kravchuk's Course Coincide with the Mannerheim Line?"]

[Text] As the saying goes: What did we fight for... While the presidents of the independent states were assuring each other and the world community that unified strategic forces would be retained, in Ukraine—to quote Mikhail Sergeyevich—"processes were under way." And under way in the opposite direction.

By no means all the 70,000 Russian officers serving in Ukraine are prepared to swear an oath of loyalty to a people that may be fraternal but is still not their own. In early January, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, sent a directive to Ukraine accompanied by the text of a new oath for the strategic deterrent forces coordinated with the Commonwealth defense ministers.

Now Ukraine is stating its right to the Black Sea Fleet. Not to a small part of it, as President Kravchuk said a month ago, but to the whole caboodle, since it allegedly does not carry nuclear weapons and therefore cannot be considered part of the strategic forces.

Yet at the Minsk meeting all Commonwealth participants agreed that the strategic forces are, namely, large strategic formations, combined units, units, institutions, and military training establishments of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Air Defense Forces, the command of the chief of space-based systems, airborne assault troops, strategic and operational intelligence... as well as the forces, systems, and other military installations intended to provide command, control, and support for the former Union's strategic forces.

The Navy is unambiguously part of this definition, as is the Black Sea Fleet. Although it is not armed with nuclear weapons, it is on permanent combat service in the world's oceans. I would reiterate that in Minsk all the Commonwealth states agreed to this, but now Ukraine is not only suddenly claiming the fleet for itself, but is also demanding that the personnel take the oath forthwith.

Despite Marshal Shaposhnikov's exhortations, the Commonwealth leaders agreed that each state has the inalienable right to its own Armed Forces. Only Russia talked of a unified army. Joint armed forces were mentioned by Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The rest took the Ukrainian position—that they should each have their own armies.

This stance prompted a sharply negative reaction from those whose fate is actually being decided by a stroke of the leaders' pen—the Army and its officers. I will quote an extract from just one appeal—from an officers' meeting at a long-range aviation command dated 4 January: "We cannot understand why it should be, at a time when U.S. President Bush is telling Congress that the numerous and diverse threats to stability should convince Americans again and again that only strong armed forces are a source of confidence and a firm guarantee of security—both regional and global—that many independent republic parliaments are deriding the likelihood of a threat to the Commonwealth's security from its external borders?

"...We fail to understand for what purpose and against whom republic armed forces are being set up in this case. For what reason are the personnel on these republics' territories being forced to take an oath of loyalty to serve their interests? Against whom will our brothers in arms be forced to use these weapons in the future?..."

The pilots' alarm is not misplaced, incidentally: Too many negative points have built up over the years with regard to relations between certain republics to be sure that their leaders will be able to overcome the temptation of resolving all interethnic problems by tank attacks against their neighbors' rear lines. Given Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia, this is no laughing matter.

The Army is worried. You can say that Marshal Shaposhnikov, as the only representative of the old center, is keeping his job and his power. You can say that this is the work of the military-industrial complex. You can refer to the officer corps' imperial ideas and even quote Aleksandr Kuprin [who criticized army life and officers' shortcomings in his 1905 novel "The Duel" (Poyedinok)]. But the Army is indeed worried.

Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, was probably right when he said the following in an interview with KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA the day before yesterday: "In the context of the collapse of the Union we should not be talking about any unified structures. But my main task is to solve all the problems without suffering, bloodshed, or damaging the Army. And we need a transitional period to achieve this. Around two years, or perhaps longer. During this time, without infringing each state's right to have its own armed forces, we need to resolve all the social issues worrying the Army and review all the acts of legislation adopted by the former Union and the Defense Ministry. The haste with which Ukraine is acting is destructive. We must not divide people up again into 'ours' and 'not ours.'"

Strangely, it seems that nobody is taking the trouble to think about the dangers of dividing up the Army at this particular time, when the social problems—above all, of officers and their families—have not been resolved. People who have served 10 or 15 years without even getting an apartment should not be faced with the dilemma of taking an oath or being dismissed. It is dangerous to drive even a cat into a corner—it may scratch. Yet these are living people who are virtually without social protection and are tired of uncertainty. People who have weapons and, incidentally, know how to use them.

The Army's last hope is the all-Army officers' meeting. It will be held 14 January at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. All the sovereign republic presidents and defense ministers have been invited to it. This time, perhaps, they will listen to what the Army thinks.

Worldwide Concern Expressed Over Strained Ties

PM0701162392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Jan 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 4

[Article by Maksim Yusin: "World Worried by Mounting Contradictions Between Russia and Ukraine"]

[Text] The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is calling into question the future of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], of which they are the backbone. That is the conclusion reached by foreign commentators as they observe the events of the first week of the new year.

Relations between Moscow and Kiev, already strained because of the introduction of free prices in Russia, were tested even more severely after Ukraine took the first steps to create a republic army.

Many people in the world see the actions of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk as a challenge to Russia. This applies primarily to the decision by the Ukrainian authorities to establish control over the Black Sea Fleet, which is based in Sevastopol. "The loss of the fleet will be a blow to Russia's national pride," an AP commentator notes. For Russians, Crimea and Sevastopol have always been associated with the time of Catherine II and with the defense of the city during the Crimean War and World War II. Despite the Russian leadership's official statements regarding recognition of Ukraine's integrity, few people in Russia regard Crimea as Ukrainian territory.

Nevertheless, Ukraine's authorities unilaterally decided to hoist yellow and blue flags over all the ships of the Black Sea Fleet. Russia will scarcely tolerate this. AFP notes that Sevastopol was the Soviet Navy's only warm-water base. It was of strategic importance in Moscow's eyes. With the loss of the port and the Black Sea Fleet, the entire "southern flank" of the CIS' defenses will collapse, the agency's commentator believes.

Russia is accusing Ukraine of violating the Alma-Ata and Minsk accords, which envisaged retaining centralized control over strategic armed forces, including the Black Sea Fleet. Kiev has its own interpretation of the term "strategic." In the opinion of Ukrainian Defense Minister General Morozov, only nuclear forces can be regarded as strategic, therefore the Black Sea Fleet does not come into this category and comes under the republic's jurisdiction. REUTER, however, recalls that many ships based in Sevastopol can be fitted with nuclear weapons.

AP cites International Institute for Strategic Studies figures regarding the strength of the Black Sea Fleet: 45 large surface ships, 28 submarines, over 300 small and medium-sized ships, and 151 aircraft and 85 helicopters based on ships. All agencies have highlighted the fact that, foreseeing an undesirable development of events, Russia managed at the last moment to move the pride of the Soviet Navy—the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov—from the Black Sea to Murmansk. This evoked a painful reaction in Ukraine.

Explaining the reasons for the deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations, agencies recall that Kravchuk—formerly a leading ideologist in the Ukrainian Communist Party—is under constant pressure from the national movement, especially "Rukh" [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroyka]. In order to retain the image of a defender of Ukrainian independence in voters' eyes, he is occasionally forced to make ostentatious gestures calling into question Russia's dominant position in the CIS, even at the price of exacerbating relations with Moscow and Yeltsin. The frantic haste over creating a national army is one such instance.

However, so far neither of the parties to the confrontation has used the trump cards that both Moscow and Kiev are holding in reserve. Kravchuk has not hinted at the possibility of revising the republic's nuclear strategy. Ukraine is not abandoning its intentions of becoming a nuclear-free country. Kravchuk (unlike Nazarbayev) does not link this question with similar status for Russia. For his part, Yeltsin is not returning to the September threats to raise the border question. The confrontation between Kiev and Moscow has still not reached crisis point. And this gives grounds for hoping that a mutually acceptable solution will be found.

In this connection agencies are paying great attention to Marshal Shaposhnikov's visit to Kiev, which began 6 January. Besides the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, the talks will center on the future of the officers from Russia who are serving in the Ukraine and are refusing to swear allegiance to the republic.

Baltics

Claims Advanced for Equipment, Armaments

OW0701190692 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1843 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] An adviser of the presidium of the Estonian parliament, Arno Almann, has told BF [BALTFAX] that the Baltic republics are claiming not only high-tech equipment of the Soviet Army but also part of conventional armaments.

The acting Chief of the General Staff of the Estonian Defense Force Ants Laaneots has spoken of the great need for defense weapons. He said the republic is especially interested in anti-tank and air defense weapons, coastal guard ships and mine trawlers. The Estonian Armed Forces also need one or two squads of fighter-interceptors (there are 12 planes in a squadron) as well as helicopters. According to Laaneots, the head of the Estonian Parliament Arnold Ruutel intends to hold talks in the nearest future with the Russian leadership on the purchase of armaments.

As BF has reported, on Sunday [5 January] the Baltic leaders adopted an appeal to the leaders of the Commonwealth demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Baltic countries and asking to leave part of Soviet Army weapons to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Columnist Considers Possible Developments

PM0701132792 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 91 p 5

[Article by Viktor Shirokov under the rubric "The Coming Year—Our Forecast": "I Would Like to Be Proved Wrong..."]

[Excerpts] "A terrible, troubled future lay ahead of Estonia..."

These were the concluding words of a book I wrote a year ago on the Baltics, where I have lived and worked for the last six years. The book was called "Estonia the Unexpected." Well, there have certainly been quite a few political surprises since then in this blessed corner of the world, perched on the eastern edge of the Baltic Sea. [passage omitted]

What does the future hold? I am not an oracle or even a proper forecaster, but I shall nevertheless try to consider the various ways in which events could develop—without claiming infallibility, of course.

So, the first possibility. The Baltics will be rapidly integrated into Europe, update their industrial and agricultural technology with the aid of foreign capital, engage the mechanisms of a free market, and start to flourish, using their geopolitical position as a "bridge" between East and West.

Tempting? Certainly. It was on the basis of these ideas that the People's Front won popularity in Estonian-speaking circles and came to power. However, reality has proved to be more pessimistic. Moneyed Westerners have visited Estonian enterprises and... refused to invest capital in their hopeless technology or even to buy these dilapidated enterprises. Nearby Scandinavia, so generous with its neighborly assurances, is nevertheless in no hurry to cultivate a rival for itself. Moreover, Western democrats are taking a guarded attitude to the obvious human rights violations in the Baltic states, especially to the appearance of political prisoners and tough laws on citizenship. In short, the "soft" option of integration into Europe is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future.

In theory, there is another possibility. The Baltic states' economy, waning before our very eyes, could make business circles look to the east, to the countries in the emerging commonwealth. Of course, with current separatist trends, the Baltics are unlikely to want to become fully-fledged members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]: They will probably try to join this process as associate members, in order to secure acceptable prices for petroleum and gas products and raw materials. The powerful planetary gravity of the CIS could also attract the Baltic "asteroids" if they start to conclude treaties and agreements with each individual former Soviet republic. One way or another, these crisscross threads could prove stronger than the rotten rope of political opportunism.

There is also another possibility, however. The more rapidly the former Soviet economy crumbles, the stronger the isolationist trends will become. Closing borders to prevent food from disappearing to St. Petersburg and other regions of the CIS, urgently introducing a national currency (according to forecasts, this will happen in the first six months of 1992), and going cap in hand to the West—these moves are also a very real possibility. Some steps have already been taken in this direction, incidentally: Estonia will be introducing a system of entry and exit visas in the middle of January, for example.

In that case, blatant, "unrestrained" capitalism and a merciless market system will strip bare the working people and average-paid intelligentsia, and also the peasants, who by that time will have been kicked out of their collective and state farms in an attempt to privatize farming completely. But there is no money for this, so there simply might not be anyone to do the sowing next spring. I do not think there is any need to explain what hunger would mean to the usually prosperous Baltic.

Whatever happens, social and political tension may reach such a pitch that, in order to stand firm, the regime will take on certain aspects of a military-police state. This is a very real prospect: It is planned to use more than 15 percent of the national income on "defense" needs next year. It must be assumed that the powerful repressive apparatus will earn its increased wages. It will not be left idle, if only because—according to the forecasts—the number of unemployed will rise to 100,000 in the first months of the year. Obviously this mass of people will not remain silent. Admittedly, it is already clear that the majority of these unemployed will be from the Russian-speaking population, and they can be treated unceremoniously: If they put a foot wrong, they will be expelled from Estonia.

None of the above scenarios for the development of events in the Baltics inspires optimistic expectations and, when I think of 1992 just around the corner, that phrase—"a terrible, troubled future lay ahead of Estonia..."—comes to mind again. Not only Estonia, but the whole of the Baltic region. However, to be honest, I would dearly like to be proved wrong!

Military

Situation Taking Shape Within Army Discussed

Shaposhnikov Meets Journalists

PM0701173092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jan 92 Single Edition pp 1, 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain First Rank V. Chupakhin: "People in Uniform Are Not Pawns for Political Games. Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov: 'I Appeal to the Peoples, Parliaments, and Leaders of the Sovereign States...'"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Following the Minsk meeting involving the heads of the sovereign states many questions regarding the future of the Armed Forces were left open. The way in which events went on to develop showed that so far the disagreements here are not only becoming no less acute but, on the contrary, are becoming more acute. The position espoused by the leadership of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and how it assesses the situation taking shape over and within the Army was discussed at a recent meeting between Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, and journalists.

The meeting started with a brief, vigorous, and at the same time fairly disturbing statement from the commander in chief of the Armed Forces. Since the formation of the CIS began, he stressed, we have sought and, one would have thought, found mutually acceptable ways of resolving the most important questions of defense development. There was confidence that the process of reforming the Armed Forces would switch to a civilized channel. Without denying every state's right to set up its own armies, we hoped that these questions would be resolved in a consistent and phased manner on the basis of accords, but not on a spur-of-the-moment basis as is the case today.

We brought problems pertaining to servicemen and their family members to the fore: People in uniform have, after all, won the right to respect and a solicitous attitude. At the same time the Armed Forces leadership has endeavored to preserve the combat capability and combat readiness of our units, forces, and formations as far as possible.

However, the leaders of a number of states, above all Ukraine, have been observed to be hasty and lacking in mutual understanding in resolving highly important and complex issues. In particular, it has been announced that three military districts and the Black Sea Fleet, which includes establishments and units that form part of the strategic forces' establishments and auxiliary units, are being transferred to Ukrainian Defense Ministry jurisdiction. The Ukrainian defense minister has issued an order for troops' command and warning systems to be disconnected from the General Staff. Some Ukrainian leaders stress unequivocally that anyone who does not swear loyalty to Ukraine is to leave and serve on other states' territory or be discharged into the reserve. I want to ask, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov said to those present, is this really showing concern for people? Is this really a civilized approach?

Some 75,000 Russian officers, along with thousands of Belarussians, Tatars, and representatives of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are serving in Ukraine today, he stressed. Officers serving in Ukraine, as in other regions, represent all nationalities of the former USSR. They are not to blame for the fact that they have been scattered over one-sixth of the globe. If this does not worry the politicians, it very much concerns the leadership of the Armed Forces and, needless to say, the personnel.

Today, the commander in chief said, I am receiving hundreds of letters asking and demanding that servicemen's interests be taken into consideration when defense matters are decided and humane conditions created for the lives and service of officers and members of their families. These appeals come not only from Ukraine, but also from the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic, and Moldova. I do not think, Ye. Shaposhnikov stressed, that it is in our peoples' interests to break up defense and the Armed Forces, although these decisions are being adopted on behalf of the peoples. I am convinced that all the Commonwealth states need reliable defense.

Since I, as commander in chief of the Commonwealth Armed Forces, am responsible for the future of people in uniform and their families, the state of the Army and Navy, and the security of the Commonwealth states, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov said in conclusion, I ask the peoples, parliaments, and esteemed leaders of our Commonwealth's states to display as much reason, consideration, and temperance as possible when deciding the future of the Armed Forces. I am hoping for mutual understanding.

Journalists naturally had plenty of questions following this statement: Most of them were devoted to the most acute problems—interstate disagreements over defense issues. One of the key questions here is what is meant by the strategic forces under joint command. One would have thought that the Minsk agreements gave a fairly clear notion of this. But, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov noted, at present by strategic forces the Ukrainian leadership means only the strategic nuclear forces. The fact that everything that ensures the strategic stability of both the strategic forces and the Armed Forces as a whole must be regarded as part of the strategic forces is not being taken into consideration here. In this respect Ukraine's position, in the opinion of the commander in chief, is not entirely in line with the Minsk accords.

What in principle is inciting the Ukrainian leadership and the leadership of certain other sovereign states to force the question of their own armed forces and harden their position to such an extent? I spent a very long time trying to grasp this, Ye. Shaposhnikov acknowledged, during a conversation with the leaders of the sovereign states. The main argument behind this is their desire to preclude the possibility of another State Committee for the State of Emergency. I swore an oath and told the whole world that our Armed Forces would never be used against the people, or to resolve political or national problems. Obviously this is not enough for the leaders of some states. Well, they are entitled to set up their own armies. But, at the same time, the marshal of aviation commented, you sometimes get the impression that not all the leaders have a full idea of what problems they will encounter if they do this.

He cited the following example by way of an illustration. Ukraine is laying claim to the air forces on its territory. However, it does not have a single aircraft building plant for combat hardware. In three months, six at most, the aircraft will simply be unable to take to the air: There will be no engines, spare parts, components, equipment assemblies, or even wheels. There has been no decision as to whether Russia will supply these things and how, and the necessary mechanism has not been finalized. So is it not better, the marshal of aviation remarked, to start with these problems rather than destroying right away everything that we have now.

The commander in chief noted that, in his opinion, a transitional period of 2-3 years is needed in order to consistently resolve the whole series of questions relating to the reorganization of the Armed Forces in that time, including resolving the social problems of those servicemen affected by the changes, moving officers from one sovereign state to another, if necessary, and so on.

In the opinion of the commander in chief, the Armed Forces may quite well be structured in such a way during the transitional period that there may be both national armed forces and general-purpose armed forces under joint command on the territory of a single state—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and so on, say. There is a precedent for this kind of organization—NATO. There are both U.S. and British troops stationed on German territory, for instance. And even our troops. And everyone gets along somehow.

So above all, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov believes, we need to think about how to get along together and how to direct the processes into a normal channel and find mutual understanding.

There are examples of this kind of mutual understanding. Thus, describing his talks in the Republic of Belarus, the commander in chief noted the constructive stance espoused by the Belarussian side. Although Belarus has also stated its intention of creating its own army, it is displaying understanding that this will take time. At present Belarus is not laying claim to the Belarussian Military District, much less to the nuclear weapons. It has been said that Belarus may have its own armed forces somewhere around 1995.

The subject of the military oath was brought up several times during the meeting. Many points were not clear here. One journalist even asked: Should the leadership of the CIS Armed Forces take an oath to each sovereign state if things go as far as a "parade of oaths"? Ye. Shaposhnikov spoke of a compromise way of resolving the question, which has been agreed to pro tem. The text of the oath which it is thought should be in force during the transitional period for servicemen in the CIS Armed Forces will contain three main positions: A serviceman swears loyalty to his people, swears to observe the Constitution and laws of the state on whose territory he is serving, and pledges to conscientiously perform his official duties, the requirements of the regulations, and obey orders from commanders.

Journalists asked the commander in chief to give his opinion of the sentiments of servicemen serving in units in the Ukraine who are already facing the dilemma of whom should they swear an oath to, and of morale and the state of troop discipline in the Army as a whole.

The sentiments of servicemen in Ukraine are highly varied, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov said: There are those who will swear the Ukrainian oath. That is their right. There are also those who do not want to and cannot do that. People are depressed that they are being presented with a fait accompli and effectively deprived of a normal choice.

As for the Army as a whole, in Ye. Shaposhnikov's opinion the state of vagueness and uncertainty is having an adverse effect here. In present-day conditions, the commander in chief said, it is hard to talk about sound troop discipline. Although it is not cause for serious concern in most units. There are even some positive elements. For instance, the number of deaths among servicemen has decreased somewhat. At the same time desertion, which is becoming a mass phenomenon in some areas, is causing great concern. For the same reason, so are the hasty decisions being adopted by a number of sovereign states on military matters.

Another painful and complex matter is funding for the Armed Forces. At the moment, the commander in chief said, several options have been suggested for the CIS countries to take a shared part in it. Depending on the area of their territory, the size of their population, the number of troops, the length of the border, their GNP, and so on. Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov reckons that definite consensus was reached at the last meeting of the heads of government on this matter in Moscow. We are currently insisting, the commander in chief said, that these questions be settled within the first 10 days of January. Each state will be given an agreed quota. This has not so far caused any objections.

But how will Armed Forces management structures change? The USSR Defense Ministry no longer exists. What is there in its place? The former Defense Ministry is now the Main Command of the CIS Armed Forces, Ye. Shaposhnikov explained. As for the future, that is precisely one of the questions to be studied within the two months allotted by the participants in the Minsk meeting. The heads of the CIS countries are to decide the nature of the CIS Armed Forces management structures.

Over the last few days press and television have on several occasions raised the question that there may be the threat of some sovereign states' selling nuclear weapons and large consignments of conventional weapons as a result of the breakup of the Army and Navy. This issue was also raised at the meeting. Ye. Shaposhnikov denied very heatedly the possibility of any sell-off of nuclear weapons whatsoever. The CIS countries, he stressed, confirmed their loyalty to all the international treaties concluded by the former Soviet Union, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty among others. He described as nonsense suggestions that the question of selling nuclear weapons might have been raised during Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy's visit to Iran and Pakistan.

As for conventional arms, Ye. Shaposhnikov does not preclude the possibility that the present claims to arms might be due, in particular, to the intentions of some states' leaders to break into the weapons market in the future. But one must bear in mind, he stressed, that groups of forces were to a considerable extent set up in outlying regions when we formed part of the USSR, that is in Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus. Any questions pertaining to sales of weapons abroad cannot be decided separately, but only on the basis of special agreements.

It would be altogether better, the commander in chief noted, to resolve economic problems by boosting the economy rather than by selling off weapons. If the division of the Armed Forces improved the peoples' lives, I would not just agree to divide them up: I would agree without a second thought to divide myself into 11 parts.

It was on that fairly unexpected and emotional note that the meeting ended. Needless to say, it by no means proved possible to obtain answers to all the questions. But by and large I think that the position espoused by the Armed Forces leadership was expressed in a fairly clear and precise way. How far the leaders of the sovereign states, parliamentarians, and public will accept it is another matter. Will they understand that the Army is a very complex and delicate organism. That haste and pushiness, which may bring success in some other matters, are extremely dangerous in resolving defense issues. That the opinion of professional military men should be taken into consideration in any situation. And last, that military men are not pawns for political games.

Will they understand that? Will they take it into consideration? I would very much like to think that they will.

Negotiations To Resume

LD0801121792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] According to Air Force Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces, there must be no rush to split up the Army, because this affects people first and foremost. In an interview with the RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY, he spoke disapprovingly of moves by the Ukrainian leadership regarding the Armed Forces located within its borders and also the Black Sea Fleet. We are in constant contact with the Ukraine, Marshal Shaposhnikov said. He added that official negotiations with the Ukrainian leadership probably will be resumed tomorrow, with the aim of resolving military matters in a civilized fashion.

Ukrainian Challenge for Fleet Continues

Relocation Rumors Denied

LD0801114292 Moscow TASS in English 1025 GMT 8 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Palagutin]

[Text] Vladivostok January 8 TASS—The Pacific Fleet of the former Soviet Union received no instructions on a possible relocation of the Black Sea Fleet to Vladivostok, Gennadiy Khvatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet, told TASS on Wednesday [8 January], denying rumours the Black Sea Navy may leave the shores of the Ukraine in protest over the republican government intention to take it over.

Pacific Fleet officers firmly believe the fleet of the former Soviet Union should not be split. The Ukrainian Government has no right to decide the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, which was created by a joint effort of all former Soviet republics, Khvatov said.

He added the officers voiced this opinion at their meetings and will press on it at an all-Army officers' meeting to be held in Moscow on January 14.

Navy 'Indivisible'

PM0701163592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by A. Ryabushev: "God and the Flag of St. Andrew Are With Us!"]

[Text] Sevastopol—That was the decision reached at a military council session by officers of the Black Sea Fleet who refused to swear an oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

"As is well known," Rear Admiral Stanislav Alekseyev, deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet recounts, "at the recent meeting in Minsk the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], Ukraine included, signed an agreement to the effect that the Navy and all its structures—the Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern Fleets, and the Caspian Flotilla—is indivisible and forms part of the strategic forces. However, contrary to the agreements, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry has started staking claims to ships and submarines and is demanding that we take an oath of loyalty to the Ukraine in the very near future. Most officers and admirals are opposed to this decision.

If they fail to take the oath, then, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry believes, they will have to be discharged early to the reserve or move to another Commonwealth state. But where? Nowhere do officers have either housing or good pay. Everywhere they have just one privilege—to steadfastly endure all the sufferings and privations of the service.

Representatives of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry are now heading for Sevastopol, trying to influence the Black Sea Fleet command, and playing on Ukrainian servicemen's national sentiments.

Incidentally, sailors from 44 ethnic groups serve with the fleet, and it is based on the territory of five independent states—Russia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Georgia. But so far none of them has spoken out on its fate apart from the Ukraine. Even Boris Yeltsin, who has never once visited the citadel of the Russian Navy's historical pride—Sevastopol—has been silent.

"The Black Sea Fleet should protect the interests of all independent Commonwealth states," its commander, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, believes.

Ukrainian leaders are now trying to persuade the commander of the Black Sea Fleet to take the oath. However, the admiral refused to go to Kiev for talks. "I have sworn an oath once in my life and will continue to obey only Defense Minister Shaposhnikov and the commander in chief—the people who appointed me," the admiral believes.

Units Arrive From Ukraine

LD0801022592 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] From Military Unit No. 36-41, which is formed of internal services troops stationed at Sofrino near Moscow, a report has reached our editorial office today and was immediately confirmed by Unit Commander Colonel Vasilyev. Last night more than 300 servicemen of 15 nationalities arrived at this unit from operational militia units in Ukraine. Most of the servicemen are originally from Uzbekistan. When they were sent off, they were told that they should continue their military service in their home state. No one was expecting them in Sofrino. The Uzbek servicemen announced a hunger strike. They are demanding to be sent to their homeland, Uzbekistan. Tomorrow the incident will be sorted out with the participation of representatives of the permanent representation.

[Begin recording] [Reporter V. Vinogradov] What is the situation that has taken shape in the Armed Forces today?

[Nikolay Stolyarov, chairman of the Commission for Work With Personnel of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) Armed Forces] The situation is complicated, uncertain, and in many ways alarming. The Army should not be a pawn in the political game. One should not break into pieces the unified Army mechanism, which of necessity is a strictly centralized mechanism. We have decided to consult the opinion of the servicemen in an officers' assembly within the framework of all the CIS Armed Forces. On 14 January they will assemble in the Kremlin, where we will discuss the situation and will try to work out some recommendations for adopting an optimal decision and the only correct decision in this situation. We are sending an invitation to all the leaders of all the sovereign independent states, including Russia.

[Vinogradov] Recently demands have emerged that in the situation that has taken shape the Armed Forces located on the territory of the sovereign republics, in particular Ukraine, be placed under the command of Russia. What is your position?

[Stolyarov] You know, I do not exclude this possibility.

[Vinogradov] How will the situation in the Black Sea Fleet be resolved?

[Stolyarov] The fleet should not be divided.

[Vinogradov] Do you exclude the possibility that the Black Sea Fleet will make a spontaneous departure for Vladivostok?

[Stolyarov] Naturally, I do not exclude this. One has to take this into consideration. You can not joke around with the Army in this alarming and complicated time. The consequences may be extremely dramatic. We are not striving for that at all. We do not need any authoritative powers. We have enough problems of our own. [end recording]

Problem of Allegiance Addressed by Officers

Concern Cited

PM0701171192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jan 92 pp 1,3

[Unattributed report: "We, Officers in the Armed Forces, Ask and Demand..."—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Officers assemblies have been held just lately in the combined units and [military] districts located on the territory of the states that have joined the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Their participants appeal to the presidents of the CIS, defense ministers, and the commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, expressing their profound concern and alarm at the emergent disintegration of the unified Armed Forces.

We offer readers extracts from some of the documents that the editorial office has received.

[Extract 1] We are convinced that, in our specific conditions, the collective solution of military issues—given the existence of unified armed forces—will provide greater guarantees of ensuring the security of every Commonwealth state. The position espoused by the leaderships of Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan and in part by the Republic of Belarus, however, is aimed at dividing up the Armed Forces.

We believe that this is economically ruinous, threatening a long-term fall in the level of security and defense capability of all states and of the Commonwealth as a whole...

We—professionals in military affairs—believe that it is still not too late to adopt a responsible, well-considered decision. We propose the consideration of the possibility of concluding an agreement between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics on unified armed forces for the CIS, while not ruling out the possibility of Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan joining this agreement subsequently.

We ask you to take our opinion into consideration on the concept of defense. We also insistently demand that legislative acts be adopted as soon as possible to determine the status of officers and the procedure for the performance of their service and guarantee observance of servicemen's civil rights on the territory of the Commonwealth's independent states, along with interstate accords on social guarantees for when they are discharged into the reserve.

From an appeal adopted by Turkestan Military District officers.

[Extract 2] Leningrad Military District—Given the emergent collapse of the unified Armed Forces, we are not calling for but demanding that an extraordinary all-Army officers' assembly be held in whose work we invite the participation of the presidents of all states formed on the basis of the former Union republics in order to resolve problems involved in the functioning of the unified armed forces and ending the setting up of national troop formations that may become an attack force in resolving problems of interethnic conflicts.

From an appeal adopted by officers of an air defense formation.

[Extract 3] ...The unified organism of the Armed Forces—the former state's last institution that offers stability to our society—is being carved up alive. The next step is to set troop collectives against one another and then a bloody civil war, the sounds of which already can be heard in the Caucasus and Moldova.

...We do not want to interfere in politics and resolve the question of the state's system and authority—that is up to the people. Our business is to defend the people's interests. But we have the right to voice our opinion and must do so.

We oppose military conspiracies and coups d'etat. We favor the truly democratic and independent path of development.

We want to avert bloodshed and social explosions. We want to be heard.

From an appeal adopted by a number of General Staff officers' collectives.

[Extract 4] ...We appeal to all servicemen who once swore loyalty to all our peoples not to take another oath.

We also appeal to officers' assemblies to defend against humiliation and social tyranny every servicemen who has remained loyal to his previous oath and duty.

The Army and Fleet are still organized, disciplined, and fighting fit, and are still performing their combat tasks of safeguarding and defending the borders and peoples of the CIS.

We ask the peoples and their leaders to come out in favor of keeping the Army and Fleet under unified command until normative acts are brought into force that guarantee the security of every state and the Commonwealth as a whole and the defense of servicemen's rights and personal dignity.

We believe that the preservation of unified Armed Forces guarantees the stability of the transformations being implemented within the CIS.

From an appeal adopted at an Air Force combat training officers' assembly and backed by representatives of officers' assemblies of Air Force directorates and services.

More From Southern Sector

PM0701181192 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 2

["Defend the Defenders. Appeal to Generals, Admirals, and Officers of the Armed Forces" adopted 3 January at a general assembly of officers of a Directorate of the Main Command of the Southern Sector Forces]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Despite numerous assurances and promises by politicians of different rank concerning the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the provision of social protection for servicemen, no specific decisions have been made on these issues to date.

Instead hasty decisions are being made to disband command organs and military units and discharge officers without first solving the questions of their social protection. The majority of generals and other officers serving outside Russia are having to resign from the Armed Forces without housing provision or firm guarantees of pension provision. However, many of us have devoted the best years of our lives to defending the fatherland and have found ourselves in the Transcaucasus—not through our our own will, but through official duty. Instead of a political solution of ethnic conflicts, the Army has been thrown into the worst trouble spots. Now, however, instead of a decent appraisal of all the hardships and depivations of military service, officers and the members of their families have become outcasts of their own society, shorn of basic human rights.

Today we are being forced to swear an oath of allegiance to the presidents of one state or another; however, we have taken an oath of allegiance to serve the fatherland

and have no moral right to betray our convictions. But the state should bear responsibility toward its defenders. We want to return to our homes and hope that the motherland will not deny us this. We demand that specific decisons be made to protect our rights and personal dignity as enshrined in law. In addressing the officers of the Armed Forces we ask for our demands to be supported, because tomorrow this could affect the life of every officer and his family.

Decision adopted at a General Assembly of Officers of a Directorate of the Southern Sector Forces Main Command on 3 January 1992.

Commander Cited on Baltic Troop Withdrawal

LD0701132492 Moscow Teleradiokompanii Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] As has already been reported, at the Baltic Council which took place in Jurmala the heads of parliament of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia appealed to the heads of Commonwealth states to start withdrawing their troops from the capitals of the Baltic republics, and also from their territories as a whole, without delay. Our correspondent asked Colonel-General Mironov, commander of the North-Western Group of Troops, for his opinion on this problem.

[Begin recording] [Mironov] What we are observing today is essentially a process of the Armed Forces being carved up along national lines. Furthermore, this carve-up and the decisions being taken by a number of state leaders are taking place without any account being taken of the basic opinion of men in epaulets, men who once and for all, I would say, have sworn their oath to their people. And it is this I consider to be the most terrible thing. If I were to be asked for my personal opinion in this regard, I would say that one must recognize the fact that it is Russia that is today in the greatest degree the successor of the former USSR, including in matters relating to the USSR's armed forces.

[Correspondent] Does it not turn out that the Army has been abandoned by its country?

[Mironov] The predicted adoption of laws on citizenship in practically all the republics, especially in Estonia and Latvia, puts into doubt the welfare of those families which do have apartments at the moment, but who will be compelled to quit them and move to other regions of the former Union. This can hardly fail to be a matter of concern. In our view, therefore, responsible political decisions are needed, which should be taken in the course of intergovernmental negotiations—in the case at issue, between Russia and the governments of each of the Baltic republics respectively. [end recording]

Economic & Social

Impact of Food Price Changes Investigated

PM0701144892 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Valeriy Konovalov: "People Await Goods and Protection"]

[Text] Free prices have not led to many changes in the range available in the food stores of Kursk, our correspondent V. Kulagin reports. In one of the city's biggest food stores, there is nothing but primordial purity and emptiness on the counters. Only some low-fat curd cheese appeared toward evening, at a price of 4 rubles [R] and 20 kopeks a kilogram. Full-fat curd cheese in the "Diyeta" store cost R26 a kilogram. After some thought, the customers bought up even that. At the "Urozhaynyy" company store in the state trade network, even the things that they were doing a roaring trade in as the New Year approached—onions, cabbages, mandarins—had disappeared. There were only jars of tomato juice and pickles. In another company store, that of the consumer cooperative system, "Niva," only the smell of meat was left. But semi-smoked sausage at R56 and cooked sausage at R45 a kilogram were freely available. The panic buying of bread, which now costs between R1.5 and R3 a loaf, has stopped. Only ration coupons have fallen in price; they still exist for the majority of products, but there are fewer guarantees of being able to exchange them.

The range of food products in the stores of Novosibirsk is still meager, though the prices are unfamiliar. But whereas the cost of a loaf—R3.45—does not frighten the customers, R32 for a kilogram of sour cream is not in everyone's price range. Milk is being sold by the jug here—there are not enough bottles for packaging. Because of this the price of glass packaging is also increasing: A milk bottle costs a ruble, a vodka bottle two.

There is a special situation regarding prices in Tatarstan, our correspondent A. Sabirov reports. Republic President M. Shaymiyev has promulgated measures for the social protection of the population in the conditions of price liberalization. Meat will be sold here two to three times more cheaply than the average for the Russian Federation. And sour cream, for instance, will not be affected at all by liberalization for the time being; it will be sold without coupons at R7.50 a kilogram. Nor have prices for potatoes, fresh cabbage, beetroot, onions, and carrots been "set free." This should not hit the producers, since the republic budget will subsidize the support for the population. In January alone this will require R406 million. Pensions and grants have been increased and concessionary terms have been set for catering in schools, colleges, technical schools, and institutes. Tens of thousands of lone pensioners have been granted the right to free meals in any canteen in Tatarstan.

The question of price liberalization in Checheno-Ingushetia remains open. President D. Dudayev has declared his desire to maintain the existing level of prices at least for output produced in the republic.

The population's hopes that the Ukraine, unlike Russia, would delay the price liberalization collapsed before the new year, when the new price lists arrived in the Donbass stores, for instance, our correspondent N. Lisovenko reports. Bread now costs about R2 a loaf, milk R1.50, but there are waiting lines of hundreds of people, because the products are scarce. The meat situation is very difficult. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes and those oblasts of Ukraine that used to supply the Donbass with meat delayed shipments in November and December, hoping to profit from the price increases. In response people in the Donbass suspended deliveries of their own industrial output. As a result meat products started arriving in the Donbass, but at prices three or four times higher. There is no more food in the stores than before, and people still have to form lines.

In Zaporozhye the food stores were not ready for trade at the new prices, and closed doors greeted the customers. The local food market did not react at all to the changed situation. As in the days before the new year, a kilogram of pork was for sale at R30 here, a liter of milk at R7-10, and a pack of untipped cigarettes at R4.

In Uzbekistan, for the population's social protection and the protection of the internal consumer market, a system involving the sale of goods to the population in exchange for coupons denominated in rubles is to be introduced from 10 January. Coupons are to be issued on a scale depending on the average monthly wage. The minimum fixed income is set at R500, and at this level 100 percent is paid in coupons. Flour, pasta, rice, butter, tea, sugar, eggs, meat, vodka, soap, galoshes, cotton textiles, medicines, books, flowers, and a number of goods for children are to be sold without presentation of coupons, but on strictly established rations, on the basis of a document.

Coupons are being introduced in Belarus too. They will make up 40 percent of the wages of the republic's population. Both food and industrial goods will be able to be purchased with them.

In Turkmenistan price liberalization will begin 6 January. Prices for the majority of industrial goods delivered to Turkmenistan from other regions will be free, but prices for meat, butter, milk, baby food, salt, bread, and a number of other products are to be regulated.

In Moldova, from 2 January, the prices of some types of bread, milk, kefir, and low-fat curd cheese trebled, the price of sugar increased 4.5-fold, and the price of vegetable oil 4.4-fold. In addition, prices increased sharply for domestic gas—fivefold, and for thermal power—fourfold, while tariffs for basic communications services increased 4.5-fold. Apartment rents, including the rates for hostel accommodation, remained unchanged.

The new year brought innovations in the sphere of commodity supplies and pricing not only to the people of Russia, but to the inhabitants of Lithuania too. Here the customs rules have changed. By government decision, every inhabitant of the republic may now export from Lithuania without payment of customs duty goods worth not more than R1,000, our correspondent N. Lashkevich reports. If this norm is exceeded, duty is payable at 300 percent of the declared price, unless, of course, a different duty applies to the product in question. The export of butter, vegetable oil, sugar, and cheese is completely banned. For meat products there is a small exception—you can take 1 kg, for the road. It seems that Lithuania has seen the end of not only the old pricing system, but also the coupon system for the supply of goods, introduced last summer. Formerly each inhabitant received general-purpose ration cards or coupons (the so-called "Vagnorkas," of which the maximum number was 340 coupons a month). From 2 January the payment of part of people's wages in these coupons has ceased, and trade in consumer goods in exchange for the coupons is banned from 20 January. However, in January 80 general-purpose coupons per person will still be issued for the purchase of food products, mainly for the purchase of meat at the cheaper, "ration" price. Special food coupons will come into operation for the purchase of sugar, flour, salt, and butter.

Judging from the population's outwardly indifferent reaction to these innovations, the government has every chance of realizing these initiatives painlessly. Incidentally, people in Lithuania take a very philosophical view of Russia's price liberalization: "We have already been through that..." But in general Lithuanian prices for food products are much lower than Moscow's. However, this is doubtless a temporary phenomenon.

Energy Crisis Presages Difficult Winter

PM0801101092 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Petr Slezko: "Without Light and Heat. One Month of Winter Behind Us. But Two Still To Go"]

[Text] I do not think that during the whole postwar period the country has ever gone into winter so unprepared as it was this year. The rapid fall in the production of energy sources and the gaps in the supply of heating and motor fuel are alarming us most of all.

The machine building enterprises of the Western Urals are on starvation rations: There is not enough metal. One of the main reasons for this is the sharp reduction in the supply of coking coal.

The disruption of economic ties is causing the fuel and energy complex's enterprises to stop. Due to the sharp reduction in the pumping of crude oil from Russia to Lisichansk and the ending of diesel fuel deliveries from Groznyy, work in hundreds of enterprises in a number of Ukraine's oblasts, including the Donbass, is paralyzed.

There is no support timber, so coal extraction and digging of mine workings in Chelyabinsk Oblast's mines has ceased. The reason for this is that there was a shortfall amounting to tens of thousands of cubic meters in the delivery of timber to the miners of the South Urals by the lumberjacks of Tyumen and Irkutsk Oblasts and Khabarovsk Kray, which incidentally is now suffering from the cold more than other regions.

You can only regret that preparations for the winter have proceeded in a haphazard manner. Yet this is precisely the kind of case in which the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg and the premiers of all the sovereign republics, or should I say states, had a duty to put their differences of opinion to one side and act in a coordinated manner in the spirit of the well-known proverb "Prepare your sledge in summer, and your cart in winter."

The main repository of energy resources for our state was until very recently Siberia. It was Siberia which was the guarantor of a reliable supply of energy sources to six union republics, now sovereign states, which do not possess within their borders liquid hydrocarbons, gas, or hard coal. It goes without saying that this took place on condition that efforts were combined to open up this bleak but richest of lands.

It would be irresponsible for the new sovereign states' political and economic leaders to forget that when its capacities were at their greatest, Western Siberia provided the national economy with 1.1 million tonnes of oil and more than a billion cubic meters of natural gas every day. But this is all in the past now. The arrogance which has arisen as a result of the republics' gaining their sovereignty has prevented them from sending their sons and daughters to Siberia's construction sites any longer. The result is a reduction in oil output in this region over the past three years by almost 100 million tonnes. Where will the gasoline, furnace fuel oil, hard coal, and natural gas come from?

Everyone knows that even an individual peasant's house, heated by a stove or oven, if it does not have at least a minimal stock of fuel and a cellar full of potatoes and other garden produce, is like a lost soul in the village. So what about settlements of many thousands and even cities of millions of inhabitants that have embarked on the winter with no assurance of heat, and moreover with half-empty food storehouses?

Even in a warm apartment in the capital you do not feel very cozy when nearly every day you hear on television about how regions populated by millions of our fellow citizens are without fuel. In this sense the position Muscovites are in is somewhat preferable to that of the inhabitants of St. Petersburg and the Kuzbass. True, this winter they are also threatened by a "small" power shortage. According to the specialists' calculations it will amount to the sum output of only two or three power stations the size of the Dneproges. The fact that Muscovites have no one to complain to about the worsening of the city's energy and heat supply provides some reassurance. The whole country knows how one and a half years ago the Moscow City Soviet, headed by G. Popov, stopped of its own accord, to spite the center, the construction of the Northern Heat and Electric Power Plant—a powerful source of heat using natural gas. For some time after this, the mothballing of the plant was presented to the capital's population as a major victory for the democratic forces. Fortunately the prolonged euphoria over this "success" is, it seems, passing.

In a number of other regions the heating supply situation is developing in a much more dramatic fashion than in the capitals. According to a statement by the Armenian head of government the republic was on the brink of a catastrophic energy crisis even before the cold winter weather set in. Due to the railroad blockade and the gas pipeline being shut down on Azerbaijani territory, it has become impossible here not only to build up a guaranteed reserve of hard coal, fuel oil, natural gas, and other energy sources for the winter, but even to satisfy the population's most urgent fuel requirements. The Razdanskaya State Regional Electric Power Plant and the Yerevan Heat and Electric Power Plant are on the brink of shutting down. Hundreds of industrial enterprises have stopped work due to the electricity being switched off. The lack of motor fuel has placed aviation and motor transport in the most serious position. Even the Armenian parliamentarians sat without taking off their winter overcoats.

Neighboring Georgia is also experiencing the serious consequences of the chronic electricity shortage. It therefore seems all the more incomprehensible that people here have chosen to blockade transport routes and cut off power supplies to their "enemies" as a means of exerting constant economic and moral pressure on their recalcitrant neighbors.

Such an extreme measure as the statutory banning of anyone at all using transport, communications, and power supplies as an instrument of pressure in a political struggle appears to be logical and urgent in the developing commonwealth of sovereign states. Premeditated actions intended to destabilize the economy of this region or that by means of blockading transport communications and decommissioning the life support systems of population centers should be seen everywhere as criminal offenses.

By leaving this or that region without coal, oil, gas, and electricity, the "radical thinking" politicians are depriving it not only of heat and light, but also of the opportunity to organize the normal working process—the main guarantor of society's life and people's prosperity. But winter's most difficult months still lie ahead, which we must all get through, and yet retain the strength at least to sow something in the spring. So surely it will be better for the cause if the reformers who are now manning the bridges of the sovereign ships of state set about restoring a normal working process in the country, without which there will soon be nothing to share out and balance with monetary income even though there is a package of laws on reforms.

No Word About Gosbank or Possible Successor

PM0801085292 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Ivan Zhagel: "Financial Freedom or Financial Madness?"]

[Text] The announcement by the Russian Federation Central Bank, published in yesterday's issue of IZVESTIYA, on the abolition of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] and the work of the relevant liquidation commission was in effect an official recognition that there is no longer a unified credit and monetary system in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. In fact, this was already clear after the conference of Commonwealth heads of state in Minsk, where the documents said not a word about the former Gosbank or its possible successor.

This therefore amounts to effective recognition of the right of each republic, in the context of the single ruble, to have its own banking system, and that what Russia does on its own territory does not concern anyone else. To be honest, this is a strange interpretation of sovereignty and financial freedom, which could more accurately be called financial madness.

There are two possible explanations for this general lack of interest in resolving the question of the Gosbank's future: Either the parliaments and governments of the independent states have absolutely no idea, if I may say so, about the problems of money circulation, or else some kind of political game is being played. We will, of course, assume the latter.

Russia, say, which is sick of its partners' sluggishness, is trying to take the strategic heights and is therefore deliberately avoiding the question of the Gosbank's successor. A discussion of this problem, as the recent past shows, could develop into endless, futile debates and wreck the implementation of reform. But the whole point is that Russia's Central Bank, having "swallowed up" the USSR Gosbank, will still not be able to implement an effective credit and monetary policy over the entire territory in which the ruble circulates.

To see this you only have to look at the experience of 1991, when each republic bank independently issued credits, while attempts by the Gosbank to take control of this process were regarded as an encroachment on national independence. Russia will encounter the very same problem this year, especially since technically it has virtually no possibility of restricting credit emissions. After all, it is not planning to move bank notes, say, from Moscow to Kiev. The additional issuing of money into noncash circulation can be carried out merely by a stroke of the pen on a piece of paper.

Therefore the resolution of the problem is possible only if the parliaments and governments of independent states voluntarily renounce control of credit emission and hand over that right to someone else. Naturally, that someone else cannot be the parliament or Central Bank of Russia. In that case, in the Ukraine the parliament will frankly go crazy. The only solution here is an agreement on the creation of an interstate banking organ, which, I repeat, was not even mentioned at the Minsk meeting.

But in view of the shortage of cash, the possibility of replacing rubles with reusable coupons was agreed. All the CIS members therefore have a completely free hand in the contest to boost the money supply.

And so regardless of sympathy toward Russia's attempts to take the initiative, in the sphere of finance and money supply it is hardly likely to achieve anything useful without accords on an interstate bank and a single banking system. Every day that the decision is postponed means a postponement of economic stabilization in general. And indeed, the reform becomes a fiction: To whatever extent Russia reduces the budget deficit and cuts military spending, the ruble still is not going to harden, because of the uncontrolled credit emission in other republics.

Further on Gosbank

PM0801094392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Dec 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by I. Zhagel: "V. Gerashchenko Has Resigned, and the Russian Liquidation Commission Is Working at the State Bank"]

[Text] It has become known that V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the country's Gosbank [State Bank] has resigned. His resignation has not yet been accepted, but this is obviously a matter of a few days or even hours. In any case, the liquidation commission authorized by the Russian parliament and the Central Bank is already working at the Gosbank.

Not many people know that the day before the meeting of the independent states' leaders in Alma-Ata, where, among other documents, an agreement to preserve the ruble as the single monetary unit throughout the territory of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] was signed, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a resolution on the practically immediate liquidation of the Gosbank and the transfer of its premises, documents, and specialists to the control of the Russian Central Bank.

Meanwhile, if the Commonwealth is to have a unified currency, then there must also be a unified supranational organ to regulate all questions of monetary policy. This alone can be the USSR Gosbank's legal heir. Other options could be regarded as an attempt on the rights of other CIS members.

Incidentally, I telephoned V. Matviyenko, chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian National Bank, and inquired whether he knew that the liquidation commission authorized by the Russian parliament had been working at the USSR Gosbank since 23 December. V. Matviyenko replied that no one had agreed such a step with the Ukraine. In his opinion, this could lead to a whole series of "piquant" situations. For example, there is now a catastrophic lack of ready money in Ukraine. Hitherto such questions have been resolved at the USSR Gosbank. If it is liquidated and not replaced by a jointly created supranational banking organ, then Ukraine and all the other republics will have to turn... to the Russian Central Bank for additional bank notes.

However, we should not be in a hurry to accuse Russia and its parliament of creating a "piquant situation." The question of creating a unified banking system and an interstate banking organ as the legal heir to the USSR Gosbank has already been placed on the agenda repeatedly. The Russian Central Bank has, as a rule, been the initiator of this. True, its proposals have not always seemed attractive to the others, but, instead of seeking ways to a compromise, the former republics have sent representatives not endowed with powers to discuss the draft. No wonder the question of the Interstate Bank has still not been resolved.

The absence of even a mention of an interstate banking organ in the documents signed in Alma-Ata seems a mistake which can and must be eliminated at the next meeting in Minsk. Otherwise the collapse of the economy cannot be halted.

All the independent states are now preparing their budgets for next year. It is natural that under the present complex conditions these budgets will, as a rule, end up with a deficit. It will be possible to stop the financial holes only by means of credit emission. But who will be able to give permission for this and to decide the size of the increase in the money supply?

In principle there can be two options here. In the absence of an interstate organ the Russian Federation Central Bank will regulate credit emission. At the same time, however, all the other members of the CIS must virtually get their budgets approved... in the Russian parliament.

With the second option the central banks of each state will independently carry out credit emission. But this is nonsense! Such a path will lead not only to a rapid devaluation of the ruble but also to the erection of barriers on the borders which will cancel out all the Alma-Ata accords in the economic sphere.

In short, the question of the Interstate Bank is overdue. And it cannot be resolved unilaterally, even by liquidating the USSR Gosbank.

Final USSR Goskomstat Statistics Said 'Sly'

924B0187A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Krotkov: "USSR Goskomstat Reports—for the Last Time: Death Sentence in 'Sly' Figures"]

[Text] This often happened in the war: A person died, but letters from him continued to arrive—even after the "killed in action" notice. Is the post office to be blamed or thanked for the few lines "from the world beyond?" So, today as well, I would like to protect everyone's right to hail or ridicule the appearance of data in the last days of 1991 from the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics]. They also arrived at the editorial office only after the Union was officially abolished, and after it yielded its place to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. And one could have calmly tossed these sheets into the waste basket, if straight off they had not become of historical value, and a kind of summary document of the passing epoch of the "indestructible Union." A document by which, better than many others, it is possible to judge the agony of a superpower...

On the first reading, the summary arouses sharp irritation. The kind of impression that the processes of decomposition have also spread to the brain (that is to say, the accounting center) of the Union, depriving it of the ability to look truth in the eyes and to perform elementary mathematical actions. But who, in fact, will believe in the reliability of such figures, for example: In January-November 1991, meat was produced by a total of 13 percent less than in the corresponding period of the last year, sausage items—by eight percent less, confectionery items—by 10 percent less, cheeses—by 14 percent less, but bread—by four percent more. If the decrease is so insignificant, then one asks, where has everything disappeared? But, on the whole, the production of foodstuffs dropped by 8.6 percent, and nonfood items—by three percent. But as for alcoholic beverages, then their production increased by five percent. The pre-new year holiday counters were almost "crammed" with vodka!..

Import supplies, which according to data of the USSR Goskomstat dropped in the past year by 35 percent, look a little more realistic outwardly. But even if a reduction of one-third occurred in this vitally important sphere, then the remaining two-thirds could not have jumped past the noses of consumers so inconspicuously. I know that it will be objected that the lion's share of imports in some miraculous way moved from state trade to the cooperative stalls. It seems so. True, Goskomstat is remaining silent about precisely what this portion is. But it is a pity.

On the other hand, there are data that the monetary income of the population increased by 81 percent. But inasmuch as the summary index of retail prices and rates for goods and services jumped to approximately the same level (by 82.3 percent), then it turns out that in the last year we became somewhat poorer. Well, perhaps by a little more than one percent.

And, again, the reader certainly would like to know not the average data on the growth of income of the population, where brokers and pensioners, cooperative workers and invalids, presidents and the homeless are lumped in one pile, but by groups. And again he will not find an answer to his seditious question in the summary of the State Committee for Statistics.

The unemployed are the only "privileged" group of the population that received separate mention here. "At the end of November, all of the republics registered more than a million citizens who were not engaged in work activity and who were looking for work, or by one-third more than before the implementation of the Principles of Legislation on Employment of the Population (1 July of this year)." If it is assumed that this figure is correct, then it turns out that there are no unemployed at all in Russia, Belarus, Moldova, the Transcaucasus, and Ukraine. Because one million of these social outcasts were counted at the end of last summer in the republics of Central Asia alone, according to some data.

It is impossible to say that the successes of individual members of the Union—now sovereign states—were not reflected in the summary at all. Just the opposite—those who wish to can find out from the press release how much a given republic produced in the way of meat, butter, milk, cheese, sausage, and confectionery items. Naturally, the more political instability there was in a republic, the worse were its earnings according to the results of 11 months. Thus, by comparison with the same period last year, Armenia produced only 19 percent of the fatty oil, 48 percent of the cheese, 55 percent of the sausages... Georgia—44 percent of the meat, 45 percent of the sausages, and 48 percent of the confectionery items. On the other hand, Kazakhstan, in comparison with last year's index, produced 107 percent of the vegetable oil, 98 percent of the sausages, and 96 percent of the cheeses.

And more... The general impoverishment would not have been so swift, if it were not for the breakdown in interrepublic economic relations. This idea is repeated so frequently in the press that it has already become boring. But here are the figures: The volumes of interrepublic supplies of sugar, tea, margarine products, and confectionery items were reduced for the nine months of 1991, by comparison with the same period in the past, by a factor of 1.3-2.9; knitted ware, stocking-sock articles, and leather and rubber footwear, by a factor of 1.5-2. The nine-month plan of supplies of meat products of the subsidized republics is fulfilled by 30-82 percent, and dairy products, only by 24-60 percent. Have we not "read the last rites" for state orders too soon?

I am convinced that here is one of the main reasons for many of our deficiencies and shortages. The newly-fledged sovereigns interpreted their political and economic independence as freedom from economic obligations, and as a result they ended up big losers. Life is so constructed that generosity (do not confuse it with extravagance) will bring wealth, but you end up paying double for stinginess.

Polled Readers Evaluate 1991; Hopes for 1992

PM0701102992 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 2

[Report by Vyacheslav Gerasimov: "Results of Poll of Readers. Time of Mistakes and Seeing the Light"]

[Text] The year 1991 has ended. It has been a year of unexpected changes, cataclysmic events, and paradoxes. What has it given the people, and how do our contemporaries evaluate it? The results of a PRAVDA postal poll carried out in December of last year give the answers to this question. (Some 6,000 questionnaires were sent out to all regions, of which 28 percent were returned.)

Several observers characterize last year as a year of the most important achievements on the road to a civilized and democratic social system.

However, in the opinion of the majority of those asked, the past year is by no means an auspicious one in the history of the fatherland. On the contrary, it is more reminiscent of the period of the principalities' fragmentation and internecine struggles, of disasters and extortion, and of poverty and shame than the beneficent Petrine reforms. The majority of representatives of all age-groups and professions are united in their negative assessment of the past year. Women are the most critical in assessing the given period, as well as people of the older generation, pensioners.

The readers' assessment of 1991 (in percentages) is as follows:

year of great positive changes	0
year of positive changes	0
normal year	1
year of negative changes	29
year of extremely negative changes	51
other	19

When describing this period as a time of the most important changes, people add unflattering phrases to this. These most of all include negative pronouncements on issues pertaining to the state system (72 percent), their attitude to the leadership (19 percent), and the people's position (11 percent).

In noting that the country has been brought to the brink of disaster, participants in the poll describe 1991 as a year of "betrayal of the people's will which the referendum expressed," "of disruption, chaos, and impoverishment," "of national tragedy," "of the Union's collapse," "a time of troubles," "of lurching from one side to another," and "of destroying the cultural heritage from the past."

With respect to the government, the past year is thought of as a year of "manipulation by promises," "victory for the ignoramuses," "domination by stopgap leaders and plunderers," and of "overstepping all bounds," etc. At the same time as far as the people are concerned, they associate the past year with the "beginning of a fresh round of new utopias," "party mafiosi and democrats ordering the people about," and the "beginning of the people's struggle against the next in a series of the leaders' stupid actions," etc.

While reflecting on the results of this difficult year of 1991 which has passed into history, participants in the poll expressed their wishes for the forthcoming year of 1992. What are they?

The wishes which were expressed most often were about stabilizing the situation, regenerating the country, guaranteeing normal human life and the leadership's functioning. People want the new year to be a "change for the better" so that we can avoid civil war, that we have during the year sufficient patience, courage, self-possession, honesty, nobility, self-respect, and reason to emerge with dignity from the time of troubles.

The poll's participants who have been worried by ever-worsening conditions, wish that everybody not only "survives," but also has a "normal human life," "a modicum of industrial goods and food," simple human happiness, peace, and order.

But most frequent of all there were such wishes as for people "to wake up as soon as possible from their hibernation," "see the light," "grow wiser," "pull together," and "not let the country finally collapse."

Yes, the past year has been a difficult one. But the new year will clearly be no easier. But everyone wishes to believe that last year's mistakes will not be repeated and that all their good wishes will come true.

We thank all those who participated in the poll.

Legal

*Territorial Claims Against Former USSR

92P50074A Moscow TRUD in Russian
21 Dec 91 p 4

[Reader's letter and comment in response from I. Yakovlev: "And Is Zmeiniy Island Added Into the Bargain?"]

[Text] **What territorial claims do foreign states have today against the former Soviet Union? [signed] B. Filippov, Pskov**

I. YAKOVLEV, chief of the International Law Administration of the USSR Ministry of External Relations, answers.

In land area, China's claims are still the most significant: thousands of square kilometers. True, contradictions along the eastern sections of the frontier (in particular, near Khabarovsk) have been settled by a recently signed bilateral agreement; this is about half of the disputed territory. The agreement has not yet been ratified. Japan's well-known claims on islands remain in force; this impedes the signing of a bilateral peace treaty.

As for the western part of the country, here also not everything has been settled. Thus, Romania claims Zmeiniy Island in the Black Sea and Northern Bukovina; Finland claims Karelian territory; Estonia claims part of Pskov Oblast. The delineation of territorial waters with Norway (the Barents Sea) and the with United States (the Chukchi and Bering Seas) has not been completely settled.

Scientific

Problems With Space Program Financing Viewed

927Q0043A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Dec 91 pp 1,3

[First installment of an article in five installments by Yaroslav Golovanov: "Just Where Are We Flying To?"; under the rubric "'IZVESTIYA' Investigation"—first paragraph is introduction from page 1]

[Text] **Perhaps the rubric ["IZVESTIYA" Investigation] is not quite appropriate for what I am about to tell you. This is not the kind of investigation that Andrey Ilyich conducted on the unfortunate Korean "Boeing." There are no timers, no radio intercepts. My investigation is an attempt to do some discussing, some comparing, some analyzing, and, thus, to investigate—more from the standpoint of logic than from the standpoint of criminality—the problems associated with the extreme degree of misfortune that has befallen our space program. For 30 years I was a "space journalist" on the pages of our own KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, but this time I am betraying it, inasmuch as I must admit that of all our newspapers, IZVESTIYA is the newspaper that pursued that topic with the most consistency and with the most critical eye, to the great credit of Boris Konovalov and Sergey Leskov. That is why is was a pleasure for me to accept IZVESTIYA's offer to conduct this investigation.**

I.

On the ramp from the Yaroslavl Highway to the main administrative building, at one end of the second story of which was his office, Sergey Pavlovich Korolev had installed a so-called mousetrap, which was outfitted with photoelectric cells. The car would approach the gates, and, as if in a fairy tale, they would fly open silently. As soon as the car had gone through, they would immediately slam shut, and you would be in a fairly small courtyard enclosed on all sides, with two small entrances from which the republic internal security guards were already smiling at you. The "mousetrap" was for the chief designer, his closest associates, and important guests, on whom all this silent technology made the proper impression—and Sergey Pavlovich loved to impress his guests.

On the morning of 16 April 1985, the "mousetrap" gates were working especially hard, letting in black Volgas and

Chaikas every minute. Academician Valentin Glushko, chief designer of the NPO [scientific production association] Energiya, was assembling some highly placed guests for a top secret, highly important meeting. At a long table in a room next to the small office of the academician were seated Grigoriy Romanov, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; Leonid Smirnov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission; the minister of general machine building (i.e., rocket building—by the way, who thought up the idiotic name "general machine building" anyway? That is like saying "general animal husbandry"); the future putchist Oleg Baklanov; a large set of people from the Central Committee, the military-industrial complex, and various ministries; and business people, namely, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member Gleb Lozino-Lozinskiy, the general designer of the NPO Molniya, and Vladimir Lapygin, the general designer of the NPO for automatic equipment and instrument making and the heir of the deceased patriarch of rocket instrument-making, Academician N. A. Pilyugin.

Glushko, after bowing his already gray head of neatly combed hair, reported in a monotone voice in his customary passionless manner that the launch of "item 11K77" (in plain language, the Energiya rocket) had gone successfully. Preparations were under way for the leak tests of the second stage on the universal test stand/launch unit, as well as the...blah, blah, blah.

A very experienced administrative in-fighter, Glushko knew that Romanov had only a vague idea of what the leak tests were, and the intentional monotonality of his report was intended to suppress any possible outbursts of indignation among the leadership. This time, however, he had made a mistake. Despite the upbeat coreport given by Lozino-Lozinskiy, who solemnly assured those at the meeting that the horizontal flights of item 11F35 (in plain language, the Buran orbiter) would begin on 28 May at the airfield at Ramenskoye, Romanov said in a stern, if not angry, voice that a bundle of money had already been spent and virtually the entire industrial potential of the country had been activated, but none of the deadlines had been met, and that meant that we could not match the American expansion into space with their space shuttles—never mind that the military was complaining about the payload shortfall. All that was really worrying the Central Committee and the Politburo, and, obviously, the issue needs to be taken up at the forthcoming meeting of the Defense Council...

Since ancient monarchal times, we in Rus have had this rule ingrained in us: the last word goes to the most important person. The most important person is the most intelligent and the most knowledgeable. And that rule is so deeply ingrained that we would not think of it being any other way. How could it be possible for anyone but the most important person to "sum things up?" Is it acceptable for someone, after the "sum up," to interfere, not to mention object? Why, it is well beyond understanding even when someone just adds something! Why is that absurdity so tenacious? Is is possible to eliminate it?

What Romanov said was true, but they were things that were absolutely banal. In that room, there was not a single person to whom he had just reported anything that was not already known. It was absolutely irresponsible prattle at the highest level with individuals who were merely pseudoconcerned. As he departed the "mousetrap" in his long, black ZIL, Romanov was satisfied: "The specified work has been done" (that kind of pedestrian apparat formula had existed for many years). He would report everything to the Politburo, he would tell how he had given them all orders, and now he imagined the smile that would come to the general secretary's face, and the smiles that would soon follow on all the other faces. However, he would propound a strict "summing up," and in doing so he would remove from himself any responsibility ("I *told* them, I *warned* them...")—it would have to be discussed at the Defense Council, a draft of a decree would have to be prepared... How many times now would it be that he had done something like that?

Napoleon advised that one should never give out orders if it were not absolutely certain that they would be carried out. No one here has listened to the emperor's advice. Worse than that, our Bonapartes were certain ahead of time that their orders would not be carried out. Let us perform a small chronological investigation.

On 17 February 1976 a decree was signed in the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers concerning the creation of the reusable Buran space system. I was not able to ascertain who fathered the idea or who inspired it, because the father of an idea is announced only if his brainchild is an obvious success and offers every possbile kind of encouragement; but if things start to go wrong, the father certainly does not want to pay an alimony of billions of rubles. The overwhelming majority of the people close to the problem say that one must look for the roots of Buran in the Ministry of Defense. Indirectly, that is confirmed by two other decrees dated May 1977 and December 1981. Those decrees mention the tactical-technical specifications required by that very ministry for the vehicle in question. Many years later, Academician Roald Sagdeyev would say, "We traveled the path of the old stereotype that had come about—a symmetrical response."

Venomous tongues say that, after becoming familiar with the American shuttle, the leaders of our armed forces became very afraid and ran to Marshal Grechko to try to talk him into building the same kind of airplane. The minister of defense very sanely decided that that would hardly be necessary. So then, going around Grechko, they began to use the shuttle to frighten L. I. Brezhnev, and they explained to him that that damned shuttle could zoom down on Moscow at any minute, bomb it to smithereens, and fly away. And they are all hoping that Leonid Ilyich himself understands how much responsibility rests on his shoulders, the shoulders of the Marshall of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Defense Council. Brezhnev understood. Yes, of course, an alternative weapon is necessary. And the work on Buran got under way. What is meant by "work?" Primarily, it means they gave money over for it.

Thus, Buran in its initial study was that very alternative weapon. How effective the shuttle is, how capable it is of bombing Moscow, we will leave for the military specialists to judge. But even if all that were so and Buran were needed as a response to a potential aggressor, a somewhat ticklish question arises.

In September 1969, right after the first landing of an American on the Moon, a long-range planning group at NASA released a report titled "The Next Decade of America in Space," which spoke pointedly about the shuttle. At that time, NASA had signed the first contracts for a study of versions of an "integrated vehicle for launch and return." The question arises, why did we wait a whole seven years? In the past, the United States had passed us in the production of nuclear weaponry, but within four years parity was reestablished. Such a brief period could in part be explained by the valuable information that we obtained illegally from abroad. With the shuttle, no spies were necessary. We had entirely legal data on what the Americans were thinking of doing. And those who say that we copied Buran from the shuttle are wrong. The external similarity is a tribute not to reconnaissance, but to aerodynamics. For similar problems, aerodynamics provides similar answers whether for communists or for capitalists—it just does not give a damn somehow. However, the first piloted flight of the shuttle took place on 12 April (on the very day we designated International Day of the Space Program) 1981, before a single Soviet cosmonaut had ever gone aloft on Buran. So we are already behind by more than 10 years. If a reusable spacecraft is regarded as a weapon (and that is exactly how we regarded it at its birth), then that lag is monstrous and, for that reason, renders the weapon senseless.

Some examples of inspired, creative paperwork:

In December 1981, on the basis of suggestions made by the Council of Chief Designers—which at the time included, besides those who are still alive and well, the very experienced Valentin Glushko, Nikolay Pilyugin, Mikhail Ryazanskiy, and Viktor Kuznetsov—the CPSU Central Committee, and the USSR Council of Ministers made it mandatory that all departments support putting Buran into service by 1985. The chiefs were representatives of the various departments, and it turns out that they were giving themselves an order, and that order was made into law by higher offices. Within just two months, however, advocates of the Stakhanov movement from the USSR Council of Ministers Commission for military-industrial issues were asserting their own general timetable for Buran, according to which the vehicle's first, pilotless flight tests were to be performed in the fourth quarter of 1984. But everyone knows that, for example, the volume of full-scale holddown tests of a launch vehicle constitute no more than 10 percent and without them the rocket cannot be tested on the ground or in flight, and, in turn, without the rocket how can one speak seriously about a Buran flight? And even 1985 was a totally unrealistic deadline. By that time, the project had "gobbled up" nearly 6 billion rubles (R), and barely half of the total volume of all the necessary operations had been performed. What has to be done in such situations? You guessed right! What else but issue a new decree!

The 2 August 1985 decree No. 750-222 of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers and the 25 August order No. 00100 of the Ministry of Defense set a date for the start of Buran flight tests—the fourth quarter of 1986. And that deadline was also pure "eyewash": the electrical tests of the orbiter did not start until May 1986, and everybody knew that they would not be over until the middle of December. And that is when Buran was sent to the production site, but not for launch—for assembly. Only 85 percent of its instruments had been installed, and only 25,000 of the 38,000 thermal-protection tiles needed for the design had been glued in place. Of the total flight-software structure, which contained 15 standard flight operations involving 198,000 commands, only three standard operations had been developed and were in place on the integrated unit.

So 1986 rolls around—the "year of the tiger" on the Eastern calendar—but the long-awaited leap still has not happened. On the other hand, a program of experiments on Buran up to the year 1995 appears and is approved by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. For pity's sake, they are talking about experiments, and the vehicle has not even flown yet! I mean, let us just see first what it can do, and then come up with some experiments for the first two or three flights. But not plan 10 years ahead before we even have anything! Who gave the order to build 10 Burans right away? For what purpose? Would not it be better to build two or three, "take them for some spins," and identify the flaws, find the mistakes, and *then* build the others? And do we really need 10 Burans? The United States built four, and they have all been in space. Or is it just more of our go-get'em desire to outdo everyone and surprise them?

Korolev had an iron rule: criticism, discussion, and redesign were allowable up to a certain point. But after that, just do it. All the brilliant ideas were "for later," but an engineer who risked approaching the chief designer with a request to change the design felt as if his task were equivalent to trying to navigate across the Volga when it was completely frozen over. Between 1979 and 1987, more than 32,000 changes were made in the design documentation for Buran's airframe alone! Can we talk about quality here? And can we manage to explain why the building of such a unique design as our first space plane was assigned to the NPO Molniya and the Tushinskiy Machine Building Plant (TMZ)? I am not trying to insult those renowned, talented collectives, but everyone knows that the NPO Molniya came about in the consolidation of two small design offices, Molniya and

Burevestnik, who not only never had anything to do with the brainstorming about a space plane but also had no experience in developing ordinary airplanes from start to finish. I am sure TMZ will forgive me for saying so, but you can hardly call it a leading enterprise of the aviation industry in terms of its equipment, its production capacity, or its production know-how. That became crystal clear when the heat-resistant tiles were being glued onto Buran's airframe. Between 30 percent and 50 percent of the tiles had to be reglued. During the assembly, as well as for other reasons, tens of thousands of tiles were ruined, and each of them cost 150-400 rubels [R] apiece. Ultimately, TMZ did not do well with the tiles: a great many had to be glued in place at Baykonur, at improper facilities, without the proper supervision of specialists, and, what is more, in a hurry, in a hurry, in a hurry. The main thing was to get it done!

Where to? For what purpose? Deadlines for the sake of deadlines, for the sake of getting praised? And in fact, that whole race was not just confined to Molniya and TMZ. If in the early 1980s nearly 500 contractor-enterprises took part in the development of Buran, that number was nearly 700 as the mid-1980s approached and more than 1,500 by 1985, etc., etc. And the greater the number of people involved, the harder it became to assign blame. Add-ons, misrepresentations, and out-and-out fraud seemed to come about on their own, generated by the environment itself, by the nature of window-dressing itself. The horizontal flight tests of the first Buran, for example, in which the airfield landing had to be perfected, were set for the fourth quarter of 1981. It was not until November 1983 that the unfinished space plane—the airframe, essentially—was hauled from TMZ to the test airfield at Ramenskoye, supposedly to be prepared for flight. But it could not have flown, no matter how skilled its remarkable testers were: Buran had not been finished yet. As the machinists said, it was being finished practically "by hand."

In December 1985 Buran was taken to Baykonur but it was not until the spring of 1987 that a new timeframe was assigned for its first flight—July-September 1987. And as we known, that deadline was not met either. Buran was not really ready for another year.

On 26 October 1988 the State Commission named a final date for the first launch of Buran: 29 October 1988, at 0622. At 51 seconds before the launch, the automatic equipment gave a "System down": a platform with one of the attachment system components was moving away too slowly. Buran lifted off on 15 November 1988 and completed its first and only flight, in unmanned mode. And now what? *(To be continued)*

Second Installment

927Q0043B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 3

[Second installment of an article in five installments by Yaroslav Golovanov: "Just Where Are We Flying To?"]

[Text]

II.

The principal difference between the Buran-Energiya system and the American Shuttle—a difference we are very proud of and have emphasized in a multitude of articles—is that the booster rockets for the shuttle cannot be used for anything else, whereas our Energiya rocket, which lifts Buran, is an all-purpose rocket. You can put Buran on it if you want, or you can put a satellite on it, or a lunar craft, or a Mars rover—whatever your heart desires. And that is all true. The Energiya rocket—item No 11K25 (a typo snuck into yesterday's issue)—is in fact an advanced, all-purpose vehicle, but it is not without a number of flaws that we, guided by the longstanding traditions of rocket-and-space propaganda, have preferred to keep quiet about. That did not do us credit then, and it does not do us credit now.

Let us begin with the fact that the solid-fuel boosters of the shuttle are more practical and less expensive than the oxygen-kerosene engines of Energia's strap-on boosters. The durability of the shuttle's boosters, which is needed for solid fuel, is much greater than that required for parachute descent—that is a truly reusable part of the system, which, without any special expense, can be prepared for a subsequent flight. The thin-walled units of Energiya would hardly stand up to multiple use. In one very serious document, I read this sentence, which can be taken in only one way: "in the reusable Buran space system, the expensive control system, as well as the expensive oxygen-hydrogen engine of the second stage of the launcher, is unrecoverable, and it is doubtful that the problem involving reuse of its first stage can be solved." I cannot corroborate what I am about to say, and time will tell, but it seems to me that the only thing reusable in our "reusable" system will be Buran itself, and it will mean a lot of fuss (and that means money!) to get it back out on the launch pad.

But if such difficulties attend the recovery of the units of the first stage, the question inevitably arises, Why did we choose liquid fuel over solid, which is what the Americans chose? It's hardly likely that they made the decision in what we call a "muddle-headed fashion." Liquid fuel is known to be more troublesome, servicing rockets that use it requires great skill, and keeping liquid-fuel units in a fueled state is incomparably more complex and expensive, never mind the fact that a solid-fuel rocket is simpler in its configuration, which means it is more reliable and more obedient to controls. Answering that question is rather difficult. There were subjective reasons for our choice: the recent General Designer of the NPO Energiya, Academician Valentin Glushko, was a confirmed opponent of solid-fuel rockets (which is entirely understandable to those familiar with his biography), and solid-fuel research, which grew to its height under S. P. Korolev—thanks primarily to the labors of Igor Sadovskiy—was (how can I put it a little more intelligently?) gently smothered. But there were also objective reasons. Liquid fuel is more energetic than solid fuel, and rocket thrust is greater. However, when it came down to a specific design, it turned out that liquid stages require more weight in the recovery systems, and that weight "addition" eats up the energy advantages of liquid-fuel engines. That is, it is exactly as Lomonosov said: "If you increase something in one place, you take something away in another place."

Finally, in terms of payload, Energiya still has not delivered what it promised. Newspapers have vaguely written that the payload the super rocket will deliver into orbit is "more than 100 tons." Let us get a little more specific: Energiya can lift, according to the calculations, 102 tons. But it will not. Tiny overruns in the mass of the structure and the individual assemblies—sometimes measuring just grams—combined to make tens and hundreds of kilograms during assembly. As a result, the overweight rocket can lift 7.5 tons less than planned. What is 7.5 tons? The launch weight of the fully fueled Gagarin spacecraft, with the cosmonaut, was 4,745 kilograms. The maximum weight of the shuttle with payload, in orbit, is 117 tons. The estimates of the payload that our space plane can lift also put Buran behind the shuttle. In an orbit with an inclination of 97°, the shuttle can "haul up" 29.5 tons into space, whereas Buran can take 16. The maximum figure for the Shuttle is 36 tons (or in low orbits, as much as 45 tons); the figure for Buran is 30.

Nevertheless, for all those critical remarks, I want to note that both Buran and Energiya represent a success for us, an unquestionable achievement, movement ahead. They were the school we needed to improve ourselves. We were incredibly late with it, we did worse than we could have, we replaced the objective with the subjective, we put the interests at hand behind parochial and short-term interests, we displayed a certain laziness of thought and an atrophy of the will. But by God, we got the thing built!

The fact that Energiya went up right away, on the first launch, represents a great success and a great achievement, without a doubt. Even with the great Korolev, such was more the exception than the rule. The TASS report said that the rocket "took a mockup equivalent in size and weight to a satellite up to the calculated point." That was a lie. It was not some sort of cheap mockup, but an intermediate, partially equipped version of the Skif-DM space vehicle, which, on the one hand, served as a test payload and, on the one other, was intended for perfecting the design and onboard systems of a future military space complex with laser weaponry. Skif did not go into orbit. It fell to Earth and sank, or in the language of TASS, "that mockup and the second stage touched down in the designated region of the waters of the Pacific Ocean." (Such reports, in which "sinking" was called "touching down" and in which the salty abyss was called "the waters," would better have been given as poems in hexameter.) The joy attending the successful launch of Energiya was so great that it was somehow awkward to mention Skif. As for the bungling, the TASS report said: "The aims and objectives of the first launch were fulfilled completely." Does that mean that sinking Skif was among the aims and objectives of the first launch?

But let us put an end, once and for all, to all that carping and nipping. It is not dignified against the backdrop of what we have accomplished. The second flight of Energiya (also successful!!) lifted into space an unpiloted Buran, which later made a precise instrument landing. Joyfully, Oleg Baklanov, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, began to try to prove that the second flight of Buran should be piloted, but nobody listened to him, and it was decided to follow the program thoughfully and precisely. The program of 1985 called for performing 10 (!) flights over roughly three years, with the last eight carrying a crew of two or three people. But then three years went by, and not a single cosmonaut flew aboard Buran. In fact, the second pilotless flight never took place, either.

But suppose everything had gone well, even wonderfully. Suppose they had gotten the money they needed for the unfinished things, and all 10 launches had taken place without a single emergency situation, which would violate the laws attending the development of modern technology. Suppose the Mint had stamped out new gold stars and laureate medals, and candidates of science had become doctors of science, and doctors of science had become corresponding members [of the Academy], and corresponding members, academicians. There would be problems in the cosmonaut settlement with housing, and new homes would have to be built to accommodate everyone. In short, suppose everything had gone as well as it could have. Then what? What would we do after the tests had come to an end, and the stars had been hung around the necks, and the apartments had been given out? Just what would we need to do? What?

All of the history of technical progress shows that any machine, apparatus, or instrument that is created is created to solve a specific problem. Which problem was Energiya created to solve? IZVESTIYA has already published the sad story surrounding the creation of the N-1 super rocket. The disputes about the N-1 appear at first to be primarily scientific-technical disputes. But if you dig a little deeper and look a little more carefully, you see that they are not disputes that involve concepts—they are disputes that involve ambitions. Locked in hand-to-hand combat were several academicians—Korolev, Glushko, Pilyugin, Viktor Kuznetsov, Nikolay Kuznetsov, and high officials of the military-industrial complex and the army. The unfulfilled dream of Sergey Korolev, who died on the operating table—a dream that was decimated by Valentin Glushko, that was undefended by Vasiliy Mishin, and that took years of labor by Nikolay Kuznetsov—vanished in the gulf of ministerial paperwork and the flames of failed launches that turned billions of rubles into ashes. That is old hat, and I will say once again, it has already been written about, and we will not discuss here whether the N-1 rocket was good or bad or whether Korolev was right or wrong in his endeavor to pass the Americans on the road to the Moon. But

Korolev knew full well what he needed the N-1 for—to fly to the Moon and land there. But for what purpose was the Energiya created? Yes, of course, our fleet of space rockets had clearly become out of date. Their developers were no longer even alive—S. P. Korolev, V. N. Chelomey, M. K. Yangel. Suffice it to say that the primary space rocket for manned flights—the Soyuz—was a modified version of Korolev's R-7, which was first launched in 1957. Like any other piece of equipment, a rocket requires not only updating, further modification, improvement of its most important characteristics, and increase in power, but also—and this is foremost and absolutely necessary—new scientific-technical thinking, improvement of the organizational techniques for solving the problems that are assigned, and comprehensive economic justification of the designs being chosen. In other words, operations that are performed on the modern level of the development of the world scientific-technical revolution. Today, other General Designers have taken over the director's chairs of the deceased pioneers of the space program, but they have shown no desire to replace the organizational structures they have inherited, which in our rapidly changing times grow old faster than any structures could, because the new general designers did not inherit from their teachers a clear idea of what they all—TOGETHER—are doing, when they are to do it, or what it will give them today and, what is more important, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. That is why Korolev's "No. 7" has been flying for 35 years now, and Energiya is still trying to get some momentum.

Imagine if the BelAZ motor vehicle plant were assigned to build a 700-or even 1000-ton truck. Would they be able to do it? After spending oodles of money and endless labor, they could, I think, do it. But who would buy it? Who would want it to trample and destroy their roads, burning tons of fuel all the while? And most important, what would the buyer haul with it?

The general designer of NPO Energiya (read: Korolev's design office), Yuriy Semenov, says this: "The development and operation of a new launch vehicle opened a new chapter in the exploration of outer space." That development got under way 15 years ago, and the operation of the launcher (if indeed it can be called "operation") got under way three years ago, but we have yet to see a single line from that new chapter. But then we are bound to see it sometime in the future. Nevertheless, I would like to ask what might seem a completely absurd question: What will we be "hauling" on Buran? What specifically?

Some will object and say: What do you mean "what?" The shuttle hauls things up, and we will be hauling the same kinds of things...

The history of the shuttle is tragic for more than just the Challenger accident. One flight after another, it became increasingly clear that the shuttle craft is not capable of performing the tasks charged to it. A schedule that left the head spinning—60 flights a year—became, in reality, nine flights. But most important, the "reusability" of the shuttle is not lowering the spending to anything less than what it would be with expendable rockets. For shuttle modifications, the Americans have spent an additional sum of more than $2.4 billion, not counting the $1 billion spent for modifying it after the Challenger accident. The cost of a shuttle flight is some 10-20 times higher than people initially thought it would be. Of course, our Buran, still in the embryonal stage of of its own development, is infected with the same disease. In the opinion of the very authoritative space specialist Konstantin Feoktistov, using Buran to lift payloads to satellite orbits and to deliver them to orbital stations will be 10-40 times more expensive than using expendable Soyuz and Proton rockets. According to other data, the Buran launch cost roughly R170 million. Calculations show that that puts the cost of lifting one kilogram of payload of Buran at R6,000. If that payload were launched on a Soyuz rocket, it would cost a sixth as much. We do not have to get exact figures for this much to be clear: for now, sending cargo into orbit with Buran and Energiya is not economical.

I read that Buran will make it possible to return from orbit very valuable satellites—for example, complex, expensive extra-atmospheric telescopes. And here is what Aleksandr Dunayev, chairman of USSR Glavkosmos, suggests: "Nor should one forget that at present, certain satellites that are very expensive must remain in orbit after their service life runs out—and reusable ships can bring them back to Earth." Fairy tales for simpletons. And Aleksandr Ivanovich himself knows full well that not a single one of our "puny" satellites is so valuable that its return via Buran would not be wasteful. And as far as I know, we are not going to have, in the foreseeable future, any satellites that would be valuable enough for that. By the way, General Designer Yuriy Semenov also feels that bringing satellites down from orbit with Buran would be economically unprofitable. But what other little jobs are being thought up for Buran? "We do not hide the fact that our plans include the docking of the Buran orbiter with the Mir station," says Dunayev. (Why would that in itself need to be hidden?) Surprisingly, however, he quickly adds: "But we feel that delivering a two- or three-man crew to the Mir complex is best done with expendable rockets." Pardon me, Aleksandr Ivanovich, for taking you at your word, but then it would turn out that Glavkosmos's plans are inadvisable, right? And here is another "by the way": Former rocket minister Oleg Shishkin has said that using Buran as a transportation craft is uneconomical.

Finally, the effectiveness of the military use of Buran—something our press is not "taken" to talking about—also raises some big doubts. Many specialists feel that the space plane does not fit tactical and technical needs, especially in terms of weight of the payload being launched, and is not capable, as had been hoped, of solving applied military problems on a fundamentally new level. When those military specialists began to compare the shuttle and Buran in terms of a number of very important characteristics, things did not turn out in our favor. You do not have to be a military specialist at all to understand that the length of time required for prelaunch preparations, the gigantic launch complex that is needed and that is simply impossible to camouflage, and the rather limited selection of azimuths for Buran keep it from being a "quick-response" weapon, and it is absurd to regard it as any other kind of weapon. But even if Buran could be regarded as an advanced weapon, such a weapon would have still been obsolete many years before its own birth.

In summing up everything that has been said, I would like to ask a simple question: Who can explain to me and to the millions of my countrymen—people whose money has been used to build that star plane—why we need it if none of the space systems that has been created or is actually under development can be put into orbit via Buran and Energiya or brought back down from orbit? There are eight individuals in the detachment of Buran pilots. Why do we torture those courageous test pilots with all those wearisome years of waiting? Anatoliy Levchenko died. Rimas Stankyavichyus perished. In the summer of 1984, Igor Volk was tested in space, and it was predicted that he would get the seat for the first Buran commander. When the great, now-deceased flier Sergey Nikolayevich Anokhin introduced me to Volk, he said, "Remember this man. If I am a better flier than Petr Nesterov, that is how much better a flier Igor Volk is than I am." Think of how much that brilliant test pilot could have done in the past seven years! His flight on Buran would be, for me, a personal holiday, because here feelings prevail over reason...

And so, in looking at Energiya and Buran, we cannot help but acknowledge that there are grounds for us to have a pessimistic view of our space future. But we do not have to be upset—after all, the huge Mir station is in orbit... *(To be continued)*

Third Installment

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[Third installment of an article in five installments by Yaroslav Golovanov: "Just Where Are We Flying To?"]

[Text]

III.

The late 1970s and the early 1980s saw the rocket designers, the engineers, and the manufacturers loaded down with work. In addition to the giant projects involving Energiya, Buran, and Mir and its modules, plus the orbital spacecraft that delivered crews to the station and the transportation craft that kept them supplied with everything they needed, there were operations involving the creation of the special satellites Raduga, Meteor, Nadezhda, Okean, Foton, Resurs-F, and Gorizont and the unmanned observatories Gamma and Granat, as well as the new Interkosmoses and the endless number of satellites in the so-called Kosmos series, under which name we chose to hide our spy satellites, plus the unmanned interplanetary probes that "went off track" and some honest-to-goodness innovations that we did not want to report. Such a concentrated effort on the production of all that equipment could hardly have been sustained by any other country. However, others, of course, cannot tell us what to do, and the communists could handle any problem (I remember well hearing songs on the radio that said that we had to work until our "hearts bled"). And so there was the race, the unmet deadlines, the things not well thought through, as we chased after two, three, or even 10 rabbits at the same time, with results that are familiar to everyone. Even the mighty America, which is a thousand times more organized than we are, would not do several major space programs at the same time: Mercury was replaced by Gemini, Gemini was replaced by Apollo, and then Skylab, and then the Shuttle.

Without a doubt, we raced ahead in the creation and operation of orbital stations. But in analyzing the programs attached to those stations, you often come across things that are hard to explain. I am not talking about the trips involving cosmonauts from the former socialist countries. Those purely political acts have nothing in common with science or technology. In light of the time it takes to adapt to weightlessness, the foreign socialist cosmonauts simply did not have the opportunity to so any kinds of more or less serious work in the timeframes allowed for "visiting expeditions." It was clear-cut squandering of systems and technology for all the world to see. And it would have been OK if, politically, we had gained anything at all from it. But then we did not gain any such thing, because our whole "policy" was built on the primitive belief that, for example, we would send someone from Poland into space, and Poland would love us for it. So we sent someone from Poland up, and he returned, and he donned the star we awarded such people, but for some reason Poland continued to not love us. We could throw barbs and snicker about it for a long time, but why do that? It is water under the bridge. And yet, echoes of it still bounce around today, and so we will talk about it a little longer.

Many space specialists agree that some of the launches were performed merely for the sake of performing a launch. Launch, and then report about it. Demonstrate SIA—that is an abbreviation born at Baykonyr and translated as an "Simulated Intense Activity." The Salyut-7 station was operational in orbit when we launched the Mir station on 20 February 1986. How does one explain such impatience? Was Salyut-7 obsolete and physically too old? Could we no longer work on it? No, that was not the case. How would you then explain the flight of Vladimir Dzhanibekov and Viktor Savinykh, unparalleled in its daring and its mastery?

The organized transfer of Leonid Kizim and Vladimir Solovyev from the Mir station to Salyut-7 on 5 May of that same 1986 appeared to be very effective. They had virtually nothing to do on Mir, and we kept stubbornly repeating that they were "the first people in the world to fly from one station to another." The farthest thing from my mind is to reproach Kizim and Solovyev, wonderful masters of their profession, for anything. But what was the purpose of that "first ever" flight? To tune up Salyut-7? I mean, it was clear that Ground Control did not have the capacity to control two orbital stations, change crews, and dispatch cargo supply craft. In the newspapers, we proudly wrote that, after completing its principal program in 1986, the Salyut-7 station continued to serve people for a long time. But we had nothing to be proud of: we were giving ourselves some insurance, because we had incorrectly calculated the service life of a huge, expensive vehicle. (If you remember, the same thing happened with our Lunokhod-1. It was supposed to last three months, and it lasted nine, and we also rejoiced about that.) In launching any space vehicle, we should have a clear, accurate idea of how long we will be able to work on it, what we will receive for that work, and by how much our income will exceed our expenditures. But there is no mention of that. We were unable to correctly estimate even the lifetime of Salyut-7 after the station was transferred to a higher orbit, our calculations being off by several years.

The Mir stations is called a third-generation station. It would seem that we have garnered some amount of "experience of the generations" that diminishes the probability of egregious errors. Yes, there are six docking ports on Mir, but just what is the sense of that? The station can operate productively and turn an economic profit only if all the scientific-research modules created for it are docked to it. But the station, which was launched in February 1986, has been flying "incomplete" for almost six years already. Because Mir's engineers miscalculated the weight of the station's cable system and made it heavier by 2.5 tons, many instruments had to be left on the ground and sent up later in cargo supply craft. At first, the science program for the cosmonauts was minimal, since there was no equipment there. But later, in April 1989, we interrupted the manned operation of the entire Mir complex, because the modules were not ready and there was nothing for the cosmonauts to do on the station. And at that very same time, there was a lively discussion in NPO [scientific production association] Energiya of a project involving a Mir-2 station with a 100-ton base unit. Clearly, six years is a long time for a space-based structure. Today, many of Mir's instruments and systems have been in operation two and a half times the service life set for them. The onboard computer broke down, which made it impossible to control attitude, which means impossible to conduct astrophyical experiments. The "metallurgy" units of the Kristall module have broken down. Kristall would obviously work more effectively in unmanned mode, since any movements made by the cosmonauts inside the station produce a change in the local gravity field, which does not facilitate the growth of high-quality single crystals. Over the time that has gone by, irreversible processes have taken place in the aging and wear of parts that are either very difficult or impossible to repair or replace: the cable system, pressurization seals, viewports, etc. It could happen that by the time the last brand-new module is docked to the station, the station itself could need to be replaced. Where on earth is there any real proprietary accounting here? Where is there even a weak attempt to produce maximum profit with minimum spending? The evidence points to chaos, a lack of coordination in what is being done, and a total lack of responsibility in all the programming.

The lack of automation, the unreliability and endless breakdowns of the equipment, and the dispatch aboard cargo supply craft of ever newer instruments and assemblies that require installation, checking, and adjustment all make the crewmembers of orbital stations freight handlers, riggers, assemblers, repairmen—whatever you want to call them—but not researchers! And if you consider that they live the lives of Robinson Crusoes, with nobody to look after them but themselves and that returning to Earth in proper physical shape requires training sessions that take a great deal of time, it becomes clear that cosmonauts simply do not have enough time to do research. Specialists estimate that nearly 80% of the time a station crew spends working is spent on measures that involve life support for the crew.

The most memorable episodes in the work performed by cosmonauts aboard space stations do not involve sensational scientific discoveries, or the detection of some previously unknown laws of nature, or the discovery of new objects in the universe, or the unlocking of mysteries of our own planet. They involve the correction of all sorts of malfunctions and failures. What really makes our cosmonauts true heroes is the imperfection of their space home, and stellar characters are forged in the crucible of the malfunctions that are constantly being found. Everyone remembers how Vladimir Lyakhov and Valeriy Ryumin, by performing an EVA, were able to free one of the docking assemblies of the Salyut-6 station from the KRT-10 radiotelescope antenna that was snagged on it, but who knows why the antenna got snagged on the assembly or which "hero" it was who made that snag possible. L. Kizim, O. Makarov, and G. Strekalov found themselves in what they knew to be an "emergency" situation when they were forced to change the panels of the hydraulic pumps in the heat regulation system of that same station. That same L. Kizim and V. Solovyev made several EVAs to repair the Salyut-7 propulsion system. Finally, there is the unprecedented flight of V. Dzhanibekov and V. Savinykh to the dead Salyut-7 station. Everything there—from the severe conditions in the icy, uncontrollable station to the complex repair operations that required exceptional ingenuity and initiative and some unusual decisions—everything there was truly, without any newspaper embellishment, a feat. But a feat placed on the altar of someone else's incompetence, thoughtlessness, and lack of discipline. Who was punished, and how, for having forced our cosmonauts to perform those feats? I do not want blood, I want a fair glasnost. Person A and person B were in charge of the communications. A disappeared somewhere, and B left to have a smoke, and C, remembering that energy was supposed to be conserved, in muddling fashion disconnected the orbital station's receiver, and it was not able to receive any kinds of commands from Earth. So I would like it if everyone knew who A and B are. Out of purely pedagogical considerations, for the edification of whoever is in charge of communications today and whoever will be in charge tomorrow.

In this age of scientific-technical progress, true scientific work requires a high degree of specialization and skills. Genuine discoveries are rarely made by dilettantes. A cosmonaut, no matter how smart he is, no matter how much you train him, cannot be an astronomer, and a physicist, and a chemist, and a biologist. In the span of 30 years of manned flight, we have never once launched a scientist into space! During Voskhod, we wrote that a scientist, Konstantin Feoktistov, was part of a crew. For all the many years of respect I have for Dr Konstantin Petrovich Feoktistov, I have to say that he is, first of all, a brilliant project planner, designer, creator and tester of space hardware, engineer nonpareil, and only after that is he a scientist.

In the initial stages of the development of the space program, when every flight was in its own way an experimental flight, choosing spacecraft commanders from among fighter pilots was justified. And it was from among just such pilots that S. P. Korolev recommended the commander of the first Vostok be chosen. But Korolev, in fact, was organizing a group of civilian cosmonaut-engineers in his own design office. The years have gone by. And even today, of course, any space flight is, to some extent, an experimental flight. But who can explain to me why fighter pilots are spending months at a time on the station, instead of ecologists or astronomers? I want to be clear about this. The majority of those pilots are renowned, intelligent men. I have ties with many of them through many years of friendship, and I have nothing against any one of them in particular. But can it really be that the Air Force, which got a mortal grip on our space program 30 years ago, does not understand that state interests do not always require the presence on the orbital station of someone in shoulder boards?

Every cosmonaut, whether military or civilian, has always been genuinely attracted to one scientific experiment or other, and it has turned out that they all have come up with some interesting results. But in actuality, no serious scientists (I am not referring to physicians) have worked on orbital stations. Perhaps that partially explains the fact that research projects have never been completed and have never been done on time. That is true of peaceful and military programs alike. Over the entire existence of the Salyut-6 and Salyut-7 orbital stations, all the applied military experiments have been confined primarily to visual and instrument observations that accounted for only a very small percentage of the program itself, because, if we are to be absolutely frank, those observations were, you can be sure, not so necessary for either the KGB or the Ministry of Defense. Suffice it to say that 11% of the day-to-day requests for reconnaissance involving the locations of American aircraft carriers and warship detachments were fulfilled, as were 2% of the requests by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff and the Center for Space Reconnaissance for monitoring the "hot spots" on our planet. Plans called for Salyut-7 to be the base for important, long-term experiments involving, among other things, the observation of land and maritime objects (Kontrast-KRT), communications with submarines travelling at great depths in the ocean (Model-2), and space-based photo reconnaissance (Parus), but none of that was done. Even though there was certainly quite a bit of time and quite a few people: 26 crews worked on Salyut-6 and Salyut-7, and there were almost 50 months of manned operations. I should note that the American space-based unmanned reconnaissance vehicles Aquacade and Chalet, just before the start of combat operations against Iraq, were switched to round-the-clock operation, and on the eve of air assaults by the U.S. Air Force, they provided a complete picture of possible activity of Hussein's air defense system and eavesdropped on staff orders and even conversations among tank crews.

But imagine the ideal situation: the station has managed not to age, all the research modules are docked to it, everything is in good order and is working well. We actually have an orbital, multipurpose laboratory. It is clear that the staff of such a laboratory must be bigger than what is usual for a station crew today (two or three people). How much bigger? Would five or 10 people be needed? How would that affect the life-support system? More raw materials would be needed for the experiments. More food would be needed. But more by how many kilograms? How many additional cargo supply craft would need to be sent? By how much would that increase all the operational expenses, and what would be the cost of the research that is conducted? I was unable to find the answers to any of those questions. Perhaps they exist, and I just did not search very well. But that is not likely. I think that we just have not had time to come up with the answers to such specific questions, because today we cannot even find the answer to a more general question—what, in general, is our space-based science program like? *(To be continued)*

Fourth Installment

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[Fourth installment of an article in five installments by Yaroslav Golovanov: "Just Where Are We Flying To?"]

[Text]

IV.

World statistics show that all the "space" powers are continuing to expand their outer space programs and to increase the appropriations for them. In our country, the "caravans of rockets"—beautiful words from the favorite song of Yuriy Gagarin—have stopped at dried-up financial wells: appropriations for space dropped by roughly 10% and were, in 1990, some 12.4 billion rubles (R), as compared with $10.9 billion in the United States. Based on recent exchange rates, our country is spending roughly 100 times less (!) on space research than is the United States. According to foreign data—precise data is not published in our country—as much as 75% of that money goes to defense projects in our country. Other figures sometimes appear. For example, in 1989, we spent R1.7 billion on space science. Why 1.7, and not 0.7 or 3.7? The answer, which seems very logical, is this: because that is the very sum that is needed to execute the Soviet science program for space research. But that answer is false. We do not even have such a program!

That may seem like some sort of nonscience fiction, but it is exactly how things are. And there has not been such a program for several years now! The Interdepartmental Scientific-Technical Council for Space Research is headed by the president of the Academy of Sciences, Guriy Marchuk. The variety of his scientific interests is so great that the polyhedron is virtually degenerating into a smooth sphere of theoretical indifference, which is particularly noticeable with regard to the space program. In 1988, Marchuk chaired a meeting of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences that discussed a draft of the science-oriented space program. At the meeting, Marchuk voiced the opinion that our country "is among the leaders" in space research. What that meant, no one knew. Either you are the leader, or you are not the leader. There is no such thing as being "approximately first." That is how the president disguised the fact that our country has lost preeminence in the world in space.

Two reports were given at the meeting. Academy astronomer Aleksandr Boyarchuk spoke of the successes of astronomers working in ground-based observatories. Unquestionably, there were successes, but they had absolutely nothing to do with space research. In the wake of that report, Academician Roald Sagdeyev, who was still the director of the Space Research Institute at the time, spoke of the victories achieved in extraatmospheric astronomy. With fervor, Sagdeyev sought to persuade those in attendance that the main part of our space program should be devoted to "an in-depth study of Mars"—obviously, the theoretical base was underpinned by launches of the two Foboses.

The study of Mars is something we need to do. But it is not *the* space program, just one of the branches of the space program. Mars is romantic and beautiful, but Mars cannot replace the Moon, or the other planets, or biology and space medicine, or the very alarming global ecology problems. It cannot replace technological, physical, or chemical research in the world of weightlessness or the enormous number of applied problems in remote sensing of the Earth. Sagdeyev did not talk about any of that. His report evoked a rather lively discussion, out of which it became clear that "an in-depth study of Mars" is not a space program for a great space power. That did not put off Marchuk, who announced that the presidium was approving that program and that it merely needed to be modified in accordance with the desires that were expressed.

The echo of that discussion bounced around the pages of our press for a long time. Here, for example is what the scientists said.

The director of the Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry, Academician V. Barsukov: "For the first time in the entire history of this country's research, we, in 1990, have not had an approved program for two years already...We are replacing decision making that is carefully thought out and answerable to science with endless discussions and semantics...Instead of sorting out and approving a State Scientific-Technical Program of Space Research for the period up to the year 2005, the Academy of Sciences is creating a program solely for the study of Mars..."

Academician R. Sagdeyev (as of August 1989, Sagdeyev was no longer director of the institute, and the Foboses had already gone their own way—that is, Roald Zinurovich was at that point a personage with no responsibility for anything): "In any serious terms, we have no strategic policy for the exploration of space."

Dr K. Feoktistov: "I am convinced that we have no strategic policy and have not had one, even though we cannot do anything without plans or programs."

V. Postyshev, member of the International Institute of Space Law: "People are getting the impression that the USSR does not have a unified concept for the exploration of outer space...No one knows who bears the responsibility for realizing a given space project or cancelling it."

Nobody bears that responsibility! If people die, the person responsible is found. So, why do we need a program? In 1989, a total of 102 launch vehicles lifted off, and 136 satellites and two interplanetary probes were put into orbit, as was one manned craft. In 1990, a total of 75 launch vehicles went up, as did three manned vehicles and six Glonass satellites—for a global navigation system. (It does not matter that of 39 of our Glonass satellites, only four were in operation as of the beginning of 1990—we need to launch more.) And there were three new navigation satellites for the old Tsikada system, and a new satellite, Nadezhda, for the international emergency system Cospas. (Again, it does not matter that of the five of our rescue satellites, not one has saved or could save even one of our airline passengers, because our airplanes are not equipped with the emergency radio beacons. But that is small stuff. What is important is that the satellites are aloft, and the whole world is aware of our noble initiatives.) And satellites for optical and various types of electronic surveillance number in the dozens. And all that without any state-wide plans or programs! And—I say this with the data to back it up—that scandalous fact is known to all levels of authority. We do not have a program, but thousands (!) of industrial enterprises are fulfilling orders for rocket hardware and the space industry. How that can happen is beyond human understanding.

People might retort: "What do you mean, we do not have a program? We have one! Scientists have gotten together and have decided that studying Mars is of the greatest interest, that we should not spread our money out, we should focus it. We will do one job, but a very valuable one. What is so bad about that?"

What is bad, I would answer, is that no one has proven that Mars today is what we need the most. Nobody has proven the soundness of that decision in terms of science, or industrial base, or economics. What is bad, I would add, is that I and many other people better informed than me have no faith that that voluntaristic, albeit interesting, program will be completed. Back in 1987, when the 30th anniversary of the first satellite was being celebrated in Moscow, it was announced that in 1994 we would send to Mars an interplanetary probe that would make a detailed photographic survey of that planet, i.e., refine (or repeat?) what had been done 20 years ago by the American Mariner 9 probe and 15 years ago by the Viking probe. Then our probe is to acquire data on the chemical and mineral composition of the Martian surface and on the temperature distribution, which was also done by Viking. Then our probe is to release research and television gear. But Viking already showed Earth a Martian panorama back in 1976!

Again, some might retort: "The Soviet research will refine the American research and add to it, and even if it were to repeat the research, that would give it greater credibility."

Nothing of the sort will happen. Our equipment is no better than what the Americans had 15 years ago. In the summer of 1972, four years before the Americans, we made the first soft landing on Mars with the unmanned Mars-3 probe, but it was not able to show us anything. Its main achievement was that it delivered pennants bearing the Soviet Union insignia to the Red Planet. But the problem is not even with equipment. We are not going to be able to launch a probe in 1994, and, it seems, that is already clear to everybody. After announcing the launch date in 1987, we did virtually no work whatsoever on the vehicle until the end of 1989, although a competition did select the instruments for hefty sums of hard currency. Interest in the Mars program sagged after the Fobos failures. In 1990, no money was allotted for that program. People stopped writing about it, and survey articles about space did not even mention it. Nevertheless, in late November of that year, everyone again gathered, to confer with foreign colleagues (a special, warm friendship had already formed: sometimes they would come to confer with us, and sometimes we would go to confer with them, which was even better, because it was more nourishing). Again we discussed the program and the instruments. And the new RSFSR minister of science and technical policy, Boris Saltykov, assured everyone that the government of Russia would do whatever was necessary to have the flight to Mars take place right on schedule. God is with us. But wait, Vladimir Bulgak had been appointed minister of communications, information science, and space in July 1990. So why is Saltykov concerning himself with the Mars program? It turns out that Bulgak's job by now has been "cut back" to just the one "communications." It is nothing but a puppet theater.

I would like to note that since our system itself limits its leaders and forces them to look after the fate of only what they are in charge of, communications among chiefs, chief designers, and general designers are often unstable. That, and the absence of clear planning, results in the preparation of all scientific experiments in space taking place, without exception, in a very rushed environment. We are always hurrying and always being late. That cannot help but affect the quality of the equipment and the techniques used and, consequently, the number and quality of the results we get. We tried to get in a hurry even with the study of Halley's Comet, even though our grandfathers knew well before that Great October when it would be arriving.

The first director of the Space Research Institute, G. I. Petrov, complained to me that he had suggested direct radio transillumination of the core of the comet, which would have enabled accurate determination of its density. Petrov is very interested in solving the mystery of the Tungussk meteorite, and the data on the comet's density would be helpful to him here, on Earth. A Space Research Institute preprint on the subject was published, but the academician's idea was not even discussed in his home institute, and nobody had time for him, and the instrument was not installed on the probe. Halley's Comet visits us once every 76 years, and that, to some extent, may explain the hurry: "Well, if we miss it, what are we supposed to do—wait another 76 years?" But why are we always rushing around when it comes to the Moon, Mars, or Venus, when a launch may have to be moved not decades, but only days or, at worst, several years.

As you get closer to the heart of the problem, you see that there is actually someone who sets up our plans and the program. That working organ, created by M. V. Keldysh and S. P. Korolev, has in its past many years of experience involving very fruitful work. I am speaking of the Interdepartmental Council for Space Research (MNTS KI). Its job is to decide what needs to be done and to map out all the programs. After bringing all the programs together, it checks to see which points of the programs overlap, and it determines who gets what money from the budget and who will be invited to be coauthors from which plants and NPOs, and, if required, it determines where to place orders for production abroad and sets precise deadlines for implementing all the points of the adopted programs.

It is clear to everyone that the scientists should have priority. Today they do not have that priority and cannot have it, because they are not united by common goals or interests—each one is "hogging the blanket." Physicist K. Gringauz is concerned about a cutback in the number of satellites for research in near-Earth space. Astrophysicist R. Syunyayev is worried about high energy astrophysics. Geophysicist V. Barsukov does not want to wait for a 1994 flight to Mars and demands that it be launched in 1992. B. Chertok, a specialist in automatic equipment and control systems, understands that work has to be found quickly for the Energiya super rocket and, in trying to save the prestige of the firm to which he has given 46 of the best years of his life, is fighting for the giant communications satellite that would solve all the television, telegraph, and telephone problems in our country. (Boris Yevseyevich's proposal seems to me to be quite worthy of consideration.) And they are all probably right, but none of them can give up any of his own private problems, departmental obligations, collegial attachments, or nomenclatural preferences. None of them can "rise above" the whole of this gigantic system—the Soviet space empire that exists within the union of independent states. None can rise above and ponder the paths to progress for the entire space program in the foreseeable future.

When he came to the Soviet Union, the Nobel Laureate Professor Leontyev was asked what our country lacked most.

"Strong personalities," he answered.

President Guriy Marchuk is not, unfortunately, President Mstislav Keldysh, whose energy and authority actually put us in the lead—not "among the leaders"—in world space activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. General Designer Yuriy Semenov is 56 years old. His great predecessor Sergey Korolev was younger when he put together the grandiose plan for the exploration of space that we adhered to for many years after his death. I knew Korolev, and I cannot imagine him allowing a situation like the one in which this country has lived now for several years, with no science program for the exploration of space. And he would not accept any excuses of collapse and ruin, believe me.

But Korolev is not around any longer, and I do not think any such individual will appear soon: nature is thrifty when it comes to that kind of person.

But "a sacred place does not stay empty long." Once the Interdepartmental Council demonstrates complete scientific impotence, all kinds of replacements can be found that, more often than not, are less powerful, but are considerably more adept at concealing it. In late October 1990, the CPSU Central Committee Commission for Science, Education, and Culture was set up. The 35 commission members included 11 party apparatchiks, more often than not first secretaries of obkoms (as everyone knows, those are the most prominent leaders in science, education, and culture), and, for some reason, one electric welder from Kharkov. In his best king's speech, the chairman of the commission, Academician Ivan Frolov, said: "It is time we bade farewell to our scornful attitude toward apparatchiks. In performing difficult coordination and organizational work that often goes unnoticed from the sidelines but is very important, they have become the targets of attacks, often unfair." (How unfair those attacks are, we have already seen from everything that was said above.) The first of the named tasks that the new commission performed was this: "develop conceptual principles for the optimal use and further development of the intellectual potential of the country and for the top-priority development of science..." God is gracious: the commission had no time for "intellectual potential" or "top priority development." Just like the CPSU Central Committee as a whole.

But all kinds of "saviors of the Fatherland" are constantly appearing. Here is a quite recent document: "Order of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences" from 3 October of this year, on the creation of a consulting council "Space-Earth," signed by the president of the Academy of Sciences. After reading the order, I had no idea what the council was created for. To take some work off the shoulders of G. Marchuk and give it to the MNTS KI? Or to come up with the new position of "Consulting council coordinator" for Dr V. Shvarev? I could not find any other explanations for the existence of the new council: his work consists of knowingly duplicating the work done by other, existing organizations.

In a very direct way, the following organizations are involved in our space program and are deciding exactly which direction we will be flying in: MNTS KI, the Space Research Institute itself, the Ministry of Defense, the Central Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building (the head institute of the former Ministry of General Machine Building), the State Center Priroda of the State Committee for Geodesy, the NPO Planeta of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, and the All-Union Scientific Research Center Ekologiya of the Ministry of Natural Resources [Minprirody]. It is like having seven nannies for one child (in fact, there are more than seven!). So let us remember the old Russian saying and not be surprised that the Deputy A. Neumyvakin, the chairman of the All-Union Society of the Blind, is the one who defended the appropriations for the space program at meetings of the Supreme Soviet before any scientists or cosmonauts did.

Enough of this rousing and unnerving of the readers, though. The program was and is, but it is as if it does not exist, because it has never been discussed anywhere publicly, has never been published, has never been voted on at any of the Supreme Soviet sessions, and, until recently, was purely a departmental, almost private, affair, inasmuch only a few people—primarily the heads of the space centers themselves—were able to change it, change the deadlines, insert anything, or emphasize anything, whenever something benefitted them. It is my understanding that not even the president of the country was among the "decision makers." In answering a question about who would be the first journalist to go into space, for example, he publicly announced this on the pages of PRAVDA: "The question has already been decided. The first journalist will be one of ours, and he will go up before the Japanese journalist." But those who "put together" our programs did not listen to that, and the first journalist to go aloft was a Japanese.

Until very recently, the final decisions in matters of the development of our space program came out of the interior of the military-industrial complex, or to be more precise, out of the offices of the Ministry of General Machine Building.

The head of Glavkosmos, Aleksandr Dunayev, admits this: "The main tenets of the all-academy program 'Issledovaniya kosmosa' [Space Research] (*obviously, he is speaking of the notorious Mars—Yaroslav Golovanov*) have been coordinated with Glavkosmos (*which is simply a subdivision of the Ministry of General Machine Building*) and the 'Program for the Creation of Space Hardware for Science and Scientific-Economic Applications for the Period Up to the Year 2005,' which was developed by the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building." Working in Glavkosmos, I must remind you, are beginning businessmen. The ministry has been directing the plants. Thus, everything is upside-down: the scientists do not set the objectives for the manufacturers of instruments and equipment; rather the ministry, with its contractor-manufacturers, decides what the scientist-customers need. "You need a hat? Well, you will get a cap. And if you do not take it, you will walk around with your head uncovered." That is the formula for their relationship.

I would like to see the faces of NASA officials if, for example, the president of Lockheed announced that his company did not think it would make the Hubble telescope, but might rivet together an all-terrain vehicle for Mars instead. But now, God willing, everything will get right with our space program: after all, the Ministry of General Machine Building has been dismantled. And Minister Oleg Shishkin is no longer a minister. Elected by the directors of the enterprises that made up his ministry, he is the president of a special corporation. "Most probably, they saw me as a specialist. After all, I was involved in the development of the Energiya-Buran project," Oleg Nikolayevich modestly comments on the results of the election.

All they did was change the sign out front.

When you are thought of as a complete idiot, you get a very unpleasant feeling that is like some sort of internal itch... *(To be continued)*

Fifth Installment

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[Fifth installment of an article in five installments by Yaroslav Golovanov: "Just Where Are We Flying To?"]

[Text]

V.

It was roughly 1959, just two years after the triumph of the first satellite, that people began to say that space was not profitable, that it was dooming the people to beggary, and that it was basically time to close that office down. Then, when N. S. Khrushchev made the space program a powerful lever of his foreign policy and his internal ideology, they quieted down some. When times became a little leaner, they started up again. Our space program is like the Jews: it is to blame for everything bad that is happening around us. But those voices, especially loud and quite official, sounded out a new call from the rostrums of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "freeze" space!

Later, advice that was more moderate was heard: we do not need to freeze space, they said—we need to make it pay for itself: let them twist in the wind a little, and they will begin to be a little more lively about expanding conversion.

Everything I wrote in the previous installments in IZVESTIYA was permeated with caustic criticism sent out in many directions. 'Things are bad everywhere' might seem to be the conclusion of this investigation.

But despite all my negativism, I am firmly against any kind of clamp down or freezing of research in space. Making the space program pay for itself is economic nonsense. Lt General Vladimir Shatalov says that in 1990, from the one flight of the Japanese [journalist] we got as much money as was allotted the cosmonauts for all of 1991. Does that mean that after the flight of the Englishwomen and the flight of the Austrian, we are way in the black? In not one single country does a space program pay for itself, and ours could not, even if we were to become a lowly space "carrier" who did not give much of anything to science or technology, much less national prestige, but merely gratified the vanity and advertising ambitions of customers. The space program should provide us knowledge, technology, materials, and information in the broadest spectrum. Those things are valuable, and in no small way. We have to pay for them. That is why an unsubsidized space program is a fiction and a myth that we have got to part with once and for all.

"How can you say that?" some would retort. "Look at how much the space program gives our national economy!"

That is a very difficult issue to deal with, because no one knows what that figure is, and there exists quite a sound hypothesis that says that that figure is negligible.

Look at how much has been written about the work done on the Mir orbital station, for example! But did you know that Mir's orbit, because of requirements for radiation safety, has a low inclination, which enables the cosmonauts to view only about 20% of the former USSR? Even if we were to incline the orbit at 65°, a third of our country still could not be seen. Round-the-clock observations cannot be made, and the best observations are possible on only a small portion of each orbit.

The whole secret of the attractiveness of the numerous florid articles on the Space-Earth subject is that they give examples not of what is being used or has been implemented, but of what could be used and implemented. But then the question resounds, But what is hindering that use?

I discussed that topic with many people—the chairman of the State Committee for Environmental Protection, Nikolay Vorontsov, for example; his deputy, Aleksandr Bazykin; and the first deputy director of the Main Administration for Environmental Protection Information Systems, Viktor Kutsenko. Do they need space-derived information? Yes, very much so! *Very* much so! And they need all kinds of information! But you have to pay for the information you get, and they do not have anything to pay for it with—there is no money!

"The defense people are generous people," they told me. "They allotted more than 24 million rubles (R) for ecology, but none of it ever got to us. We did not get even 1% of all the money that was released for saving the Aral Sea. We are too poor to outfit the orbital station with our own equipment..."

Vorontsov showed me a large color image. It was the Kuznetskiy Rayon of Moscow. Clearly visible were the smoking dumps and the turgid flows into the reservoirs, and red threads of heat losses surrounded the residential buildings.

"This was given to me by Pavel Popovich because I am a deputy from the Kuznetskiy Rayon," says Nikolay Nikolayevich. "But we do not have the kind of money it takes to buy such images..."

We are at the Okean Center. Here is the head of the department for the development of techniques and equipment for remote observations of fisheries, Yuriy Zonov:

"Only the Meteor satellite can provide fishermen with daily information on the weather. We gather fishery information and send it to the fishermen once a week. The Okean satellite (it is actually Kosmos-1500, which in all our articles we call so proudly the "fisherman's satellite"!) gives us virtually nothing, because its orbits are such that it sees fishery regions that are of interest to us only once every 10 days. And if there is a wind, you cannot make anything out..."

The chief of the Scientific-Technical Administration of the USSR Ministry of the Fishing Industry, Sergey Dyagilev, says this:

"Let us talk frankly: there is no satellite for fishermen. The Okean provides a very rough location of schools of fish, measured from space not in minutes of arc, as we need it, but in degrees. What we need is a satellite with gear that is capable of pinpointing schools of fish and productive plankton areas and of promptly throwing that information down if not to our ships, then to our receiving centers in Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Vladivostok, Sevastopol, and Moscow. Three years ago, we did not have to pay the "space people" anything, because we got everything free of charge. Now we have to pay. But does not it seem logical that what we have to pay should depend on how much we catch?"

It certainly does! The fishermen should pay the space program for fish, the farmers should pay for harvest forecasts based on harvest prices, and the geologists should pay for a tipped-off deposit based on its yield and how easy it is to work. That is exactly how I think the relationship between the national economy and the space program should be structured in the context of the market.

A different argument, which also requires critical analysis, is also cited in defense of the space program.

"Moreover," they tell us, "look at how much we will learn in space. And then the work itself that involves space facilities and is performed here on Earth will create new technologies and materials and will raise the standard of labor. In short, it improves our lives here on Earth. Did you know, for example, that while working on the Energiya-Buran system, specialists created 581 variations of new materials? The names alone of the materials and the various units and assemblies of Buran, declassified and intended for use here on the ground, take up three fat tomes!"

It is that same old story: wishful thinking instead of reality.

"I do not know of one ruble that is been received for, say, the transfer of technology from that very Buran to the national economy," says Konstantin Feoktistov, cosmonaut and doctor of technical sciences.

Boris Olesyuk, from the Flight Control Center, says that not one thing has been transferred, and no one is even taking anything for free.

And again the question, Well, then, just what is preventing us from crossing the space program with the ground-based economy and producing a remarkably fruitful hybrid?

First and foremost is this: the conservatism of the very system that created the word "vnedreniye" [transfer], which is not even in the prerevolutionary dictionaries. The second thing is objective: the absence of the equipment and raw-materials base that are available to the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, but not to those who could use the technologies and the things that have been developed by those enterprises. The third is this: the secrecy is so rigid that it can change any new technology at the moment of its "transfer" into an obsolete technology. Every country has secrecy, but only in our country does it curtail state revenues instead of increasing them. The fourth thing is this: the need to retrain personnel, replace equipment, etc., which promises a slow-down of existing production. Such, in my view, are the things keeping the space program from helping the national economy and, consequently, from strengthening its own social authority, from convincing people of its economic capabilities, from proving its usefulness.

Now about conversion, in which the rocket-and-space enterprises themselves are changing over to "ground" production. Everyone welcomes the idea of conversion on paper, but when it comes to actually doing it, there is a sometimes clear, more often than not secret, but wholly explicable and, from my point of view, justified resistance to conversion.

People who yesterday were making atomic bombs, rockets, and advanced fighter planes do not want to be making chamber pots, kitchen appliances, or baby carriages, because they lose their salaries, their ratings, their sense of professional worth, and the pride they have in their "firm." In addition, everybody forgets that conversion takes some big spending, because a warhead with a handle welded on the side—it is not a chamber pot. Order will have come to our country when everybody is working in his profession: when the "bomb-makers" (as L. I. Brezhnev called them) will be making nuclear reactors that are as reliable as their bombs and will be bringing us closer to an understanding of controlled thermonuclear fusion; when the aircraft designers are building airplanes—not fighters, but passenger planes, and lots of them, so that people do not live in airports for weeks at a time; and when the rocket-makers are making rockets. But why do we need rockets?

If our space program cannot pay for itself inside the country, then it could make a pretty good living in the outside market. It could, but it will not. And here again, we must blame, above all, our system of secrecy: when we are ahead, we cannot talk about anything, because our "enemy" might catch up with us; when we are behind, we cannot talk about anything, because we do not want him to find out about it. It was not until 1985 that the "legal" offshoot of the "closed" Ministry of General Machine Building—Glavkosmos—was set up. Its first commercial success reminds one of the business that kids have cleaning windshields while cars are stopped at traffic lights: $7.5 million for the launch of the Indian IRS-1A satellite in March of 1988. OK, the first step is the hardest. But soon it turned out that a real misfortune occurred: we had slept through the alarm for the outside aerospace market. Sure, there are objective reasons that we use today to excuse ourselves: COCOM forbade the export of advanced technologies to the USSR. We are not allowed to launch a rocket if it has even one American part or if it uses U.S. technology in its application. And an agreement with Space Commerce Corporation for the launch of an American satellite atop a Soviet rocket was already signed. But it did not take place.

We and our partners suffer because of all that. After all, if our Proton rocket charges $35 million for putting a 2.2-tonne cargo into stationary orbit, the American Delta 2 charges $50 million for 1.5-1.8 tonnes.

Yes, there are objective reasons for our not being able to earn money, but they are outnumbered by subjective reasons. We do not understand the business conditions of the foreign market very well. We concluded a contract with the Japanese firm Pax Corporation, and in terms of certain points, the contract was unfinished, and it was signed without our trade representative specialists, and we advertised the firm all around. And then the firm went bankrupt, and now we have to file suit for $6 million, and we do not even know how to go to court over there. Why did we get $12-15 million (the exact figure is a trade secret) for taking a Japanese journalist aloft, when the Americans would have gotten $35 million? When Toyohiro Akiyama himself was asked about that, he answered in English, in a tone that makes me burn with shame: "You really do not see? They need the money."

It is an absolute mystery to me the soup we got ourselves into after we sent the Englishwomen Helen Sharman up into space. I mean, we were ready to collect $15 million, but we only got $5 million—that was just for training two Englishmen in Zvezdnyy Gorodok. But what about the money for the flight? For the use of the equipment in orbit? Or was it like before—we thought that now England would love us amd would send us sausages for free? I do not know of a single well thought out space program action that we have performed on the outside commercial market. Our being a space "carrier," which is feeding the Cosmonaut Training Center, is only reinforcing the suspicion that Glavkosmos is impotent. Last year, the Chinese rocket Chang Zheng 3 broke into the world market and put an American satellite into orbit. Why hasn't ours? The Chinese were allowed to launch nine American satellites three years ago if they kept the launch fees in the mid-range of world prices. They did not stick to the agreement, but on the first launch, they earned $30 million—much more than our entire annual space budget. The Japanese are selling the Americans engines for space rockets. And why are we not selling? All our attempts today to put our outside space business in order should be encouraged in every possible way and should be welcomed.

No matter what political and economic forms what we used to call the Soviet Union is remelted into, we will remain the great world power that opened the space age. Yes, in recent years, in my opinion, many mistakes have been made and there has been some outright bungling. But does anyone really think that it has just been in the space program? We speak of the "new thinking" in politics. We also need some new thinking in the space program.

We say that we have got to relearn economics. Basically, we need to relearn how to live. The space program needs a radical reorganization. A business involving billions and billions cannot be managed so inefficiently, so chaotically, in such an uncoordinated fashion, never professing in the process any general idea that consolidates socioeconomic and scientific-technical interests in the formulation, analysis, approval, and embodiment of all programs and projects. The space program needs a boss—an intelligent, educated (those are not the same thing!) individual who has been given the authority to make decisions and finance them and who is capable of justifying those decisions in a well-reasoned fashion, apart from all departmental interests, and of explaining them to the public.

Breaking is not building. If we destroy and financially strangle the space program, we will destroy one of the major areas of modern progress and one of the very few areas in which we have dignity and prestige in the world community. The calls to curtail the financing of the space program are calls against the state. We again risk showing the entire world our narrow-mindedness and our firmly entrenched habit of building our lives on the basis merely of concerns for the moment, without a thought for tomorrow. There is already much for which posterity will not forgive us. And it might also not forgive us for destroying the space program.

Media

TASS Carries Press Review for 7 Jan

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["Moscow Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 7 TASS—Moscow media, including the press, focus today on problems connected with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union's Armed Forces and plans for their distribution to separate republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The heads of the independent states "succeeded in toppling Gorbachev by pooling their efforts but have failed to cope with his heritage.... A few days have passed after his resignation and the Armed Forces are facing a choice of allegiance and discipline in deciding on their own whose orders to obey and whose to disobey. A military man has nowhere to retreat once he has disobeyed an order. It is enough to let the Army eschew unconditional obeyance once to see things begin to roll all by themselves," the newspaper NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writes.

Will the leaders of the newly sovereign states be able to understand that "the army is a very intricate and delicate mechanism, that the push and the haste that can be useful elsewhere are extremely dangerous in handling defence problems, and that in any case, what the professional military think has to be taken into consideration," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (THE RED STAR) says under the heading "People with Shoulder-Straps are not Chessmen for Political Games." KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes letters from officers reporting deep concern over the fate of the Armed Forces expressed at meetings held by them in different military districts across the country.

"The single organism of the armed forces is the last institution remaining from our former state capable of stabilizing society," a general staff officer says in a letter. "The next step may lead to confrontation between military collectives and a bloody civil war like the ones already ravaging the Caucasian region and Moldova."

"Too much negative material has been accumulated over the years in relations between republics for their leaders to rebuff a temptation prompting a tank-raid solution," KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA warns.

"We are not yet aware of the scale of problems, or rather the scale of the disaster which will be sparked off by the division of the Armed Forces," SOVETKAYA ROSSIYA says. It quotes unnamed officers as saying that "Russia's voice alone, its say can halt the division of the Armed Forces."

PRAVDA carries an interview with a co-chairman of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, Gleb Anishchenko, who calls for "the unity on the basis of enlightened patriotism and a return to the sources of our traditions. These sources are in Christianity," Anishchenko says.

Anishchenko urges a court trial of the Communist Party activities and stresses that no party or newspaper should ever be banned without a court ruling.

"The procurator's office has revealed that secret papers have been found indicating the KGB maintained surveillance over Gorbachev's political opponents. These papers have very tough resolutions written on them in the former president's own hand," RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA reports. "This must be an explanation of Boris Yeltsin's rash manner in literally driving Mikhail Gorbachev out of his office in the Kremlin a few days ahead of the earlier agreed schedule."

The newspaper says Gorbachev never took advantage of his knowledge obtained through illegal channels but suggests that information of this kind fed by the former KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov and the presidential staff chief Valeriy Boldin must have "created additional motives for confrontation with the Russian leadership and the overall power disintegration in the country."

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's editor-in-chief Anatoliy Yurkov says in his comment that these "information leaks" might have been engineered to undermine the authority of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Most newspapers report the fact of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia's flight from Tbilisi and the transfer of power to the opposition.

All Moscow newspapers today with their readers Merry Christmas—this religious holiday is marked in Russia on January 7.

International Affairs

Churkin Cited on Russian-Cuban Relations

PM0701184592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Gennadiy Charodeyev [G.Ch.] report: "Moscow and Cuba Will Continue Military Cooperation"]

[Text] Moscow—Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin gave a short briefing in the press center on Zubovskaya street. Answering a question put to him by your IZVESTIYA correspondent on the prospects of the development of Russian-Cuban relations, he noted that the Russian leadership intends to continue maintaining political cooperation with this Latin American state. Furthermore, relations will be constructed "on the basis of respect for the principles of freedom of choice, noninterference in internal affairs, and equality and partnership."

From what Churkin said, the leadership of both countries has a mutual understanding of the need to develop trade and economic cooperation too on a mutually advantageous basis, using world prices in all commodity turnover, including sugar and petroleum. However, in the reciprocal settlement of accounts the practice of using the clearing system in accounting dollars will be continued (this means that the former practice of "nonmarket" commodity exchange with the assistance of "notional" money will be preserved—G.Ch.)

As the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, the sphere of military cooperation, which will "be transferred to a commercial basis," will also be maintained in the future.

An Arab journalist wondered what was going to happen about the multilateral meeting on the Near East which was scheduled for the end of January in Moscow. Churkin confirmed that this meeting is to take place 28-29 January in the Russian capital.

A LOS ANGELES TIMES correspondent asked: What is Russia's reaction to J. Major's idea of holding a UN Security Council session at summit level at the end of January?

"In principle," the Foreign Ministry spokesman noted, "the Kremlin supports this proposal. As for the dates, agenda, and other questions arising in this connection, these are being discussed at present among the interested countries through diplomatic channels..."

Decree Issued on Commodities Exported to CIS

PM0801105792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Valeriy Konovalov: "Russia Determines Procedure for Export of Commodities to CIS"]

[Text] On 3 January the Russian Federation Government issued the text of its 29 December resolution which determines the procedure for the delivery of certain types of products and commodities from Russia to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states in 1992.

The resolution states that the export quotas for licensed commodities are fixed by the Russian Ministry of Economics and Finance and Ministry of Trade and Material Resources in accordance with a special list. The Russian Ministry of Trade and Material Resources will divide the quotas among enterprises on the basis of contracts concluded with them and proposals by ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, and organizations. Russian suppliers will be issued with licenses by Ministry of Trade and Material Resources republic and territorial wholesale and broking organizations and the latter have 10 days to inform the corresponding Commonwealth states' bodies of their issue. These licenses are the basis on which suppliers conclude contracts with consumers and are not transferable.

The Commonwealth of Independent States has not yet managed to revive on an economic, market basis the economic links between enterprises situated on the territory of the former Union that were almost totally destroyed. This was confirmed by the pre-New Year meeting in Minsk, which was unproductive in that respect. The intentions expressed there to keep the ruble zone are being refuted by practice. The introduction of coupons in Ukraine and Belarus is essentially a step toward separate national currencies. The lack of coordination among the CIS states on the liberalization of prices and economic reforms does not fuel optimism. Enterprises in different regions of the Commonwealth find that their economic conditions are not the same. Given this, it is idle to hope that their relationships will be determined by the normal market mechanism rather than barter and monopoly. Unfortunately, economic processes in the CIS are now dictated primarily by states' efforts to outstrip one another, and not by their desire to find a common salvation, a way out of the impasse for everyone.

In this situation the CIS countries are forcing themselves to increase the administrative influence on commodity producers' economic activity and introduce new restrictions and barriers in the Commonwealth's economic space. There are new examples of this nearly every day.

General licenses are envisaged for the export of listed groups of commodities for the year and one-shot licenses for individual types of commodities. Broking organizations are prohibited from making deals for the supply of licensed goods, irrespective of the form of ownership, without the relevant licenses. The Ministry of Trade and Material Resources can authorize Russian ministries and departments, concerns, associations, and other associations of enterprises to provide licenses for the supply of goods to CIS states.

The same resolution instructs the relevant Russian ministries to determine the procedure for charging for licensed commodities to provide for their inspection (customs inspection, essentially) when they are being transported out of Russia.

The penalties for those who violate the resolution and rules therein are pretty severe. Effectively, we are talking about confiscation of goods. Products detained by inspectors during shipment will be passed to Russian Ministry of Trade and Material Resources territorial wholesale-broking organizations for sale on the internal market. The proceeds will go to the Russian republic budget and local budget in equal amounts.

The Russian Federation Government's explanation to a TASS correspondent was that the resolution was urgently required because of the legal vacuum in the sphere of economic links and bilateral agreements between CIS members. While the mechanism of economic relations for cooperation between Russia and the CIS states is being set up, it said, every enterprise must know at the start of the year how it is supposed to ship products to related enterprises and at what price and what procedure to follow for the export of commodities to the Commonwealth countries.

The explanation is convincing inasmuch as it relates to the consequences, rather than the causes of the crisis in relations among the CIS countries. Hopes that the creation of the Commonwealth would bring us to the real market are visibly evaporating in the January thaw. The idea of the demonopolization of the economy is far more problematic than before, since the republics' positions are tending more toward the preservation and even intensification of the entire CIS economy on certain major monopoly enterprises. Customs barriers are not being removed, in fact they are being hurriedly erected. The economic independence of enterprises and brokers is limited. The producers' dependence on the center, or, to be more precise, the plethora of centers, is increasing. The export of goods from the republic is determined not so much by the law as by departmental decision.

Khasbulatov, Senator Discuss Price Increases

PM0701131992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Jan 92 First Edition p 1

[TASS report under the "News" rubric: "R.I. Khasbulatov's Reception of Senator K. Pell"]

[Text] On 30 December 1991 R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, received C. Pell, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Answering the question of whether there is a threat to sociopolitical stability in the period after price liberalization, the Supreme Soviet chairman stressed that such a danger should not be exaggerated.

"In recent days too many ill-informed, superficial judgments have appeared on this topic. There are no factual grounds for talking about 'a possible famine or catastrophic holdups in supplying the population.' Deputies have now gone out to their districts to attend meetings with voters. The deputies' corps will be together with the people in this most painful period of reforming the economy."

V.P. Lukin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties, participated in the discussion.

U.S. Oil Company To Expand in Tyumen Region

PM0801110392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Report over video from Tyumen Oblast]

[Text] The U.S. Pennzoil Company will take part in oil extraction in Russia. It is a question of joint development of the Mogutlorskoye oil deposit in Tyumen Oblast which was discovered in 1986. Its reserves are estimated at 40 million barrels. Taking part on the Russian side is the Agan Geological Prospecting Association which will take half of the profits from oil and gas sales. Experts note that the Americans will be operating in conditions of tough competition. The sector adjoining theirs will be developed by a joint venture with the participation of British and Swiss capital.

Employment Minister Meets Genscher in Bonn

LD0801021792 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1820 GMT 7 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Semenov]

[Text] Bonn, 7 Jan (TASS)—German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher held a meeting today with Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy chairman of the Russian Government with responsibility for social policy and minister for labor and employment, who is here on an official visit. The press service of the German Foreign Ministry reports that their talks focused on food aid from the European Community and Germany to Russia. According to the statement, this aid "must be delivered as soon as possible, primarily to the heavily populated areas of Russia."

Genscher stressed that the federal government is doing everything it can to start creating the required transport infrastructure for the flow of aid. He pointed out that it is highly important for German charitable organizations and government authorities to deal with competent partners. This way effective distribution of aid can be ensured.

On his part, Shokhin expressed gratitude to the Germans for the active way in which they have rendered humanitarian aid to Russia. On behalf of the Russian cabinet he thanked the federal government for its rapid moves to recognize Russia as the successor to the former Soviet Union.

Further on Bonn Meeting

LD0801040892 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 7 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Stepovik]

[Excerpts] Bonn, 7 Jan (TASS)—Three agreements providing for the expansion of Russian-German cooperation in the social sphere were signed today by Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation for social policy matters and minister of labor and employment, and Norbert Bluem, FRG minister for labor and social affairs. The deputy head of the Russian cabinet is in the Federal Republic on a working visit. [passage omitted]

The results of the talks and the documents signed during the visit, the deputy head of the Russian cabinet pointed out, indicate that the government, which is tackling difficult economic and financial problems, is not forgetting social matters. The delegations had to work extremely hard. The result is plain to see: In three days it proved possible to prepare for signing agreements that used to take years to draft.

Apart from talks in the FRG Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs, there were also conversations in the Federal Chancellor's office, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with representatives of other institutions.

The Russian delegation, the Russian Government's deputy chairman announced, delivered an invitation from President Boris Yeltsin to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to pay an official visit to the Russian Federation, the timing of which will be agreed subsequently. Particular significance is attached to this visit to Moscow, he emphasized.

In the opinion of the Russian delegation, almost all the expectations connected with the visit to the Federal Republic have been realized. Nevertheless, the results should be seen only as a first step toward developing Russian-German cooperation in the social sphere. Only the first page has been opened in relations between Russia and Germany.

The Russian Government, the minister said, intends to sign with Germany and other countries in the European Community interstate memoranda to settle matters connected with delivery of humanitarian aid consignments. He described as "a far from negative option" the proposals that part of the food arriving in Russia should be sold and the money thus obtained be channelled into social funds. Such a system would not only enable control over the distribution of aid consignments to be tightened, but would also make a contribution to the formation of market structures.

Answering a question about the fate of the former GDR leader Erich Honecker, the minister said that the stance of the Russian leadership remains unchanged. The government considers that Honecker's stay on Russian territory runs counter both to Russian law and to the law of the former Soviet Union. The question of Honecker's stay in Russia, he stressed, must be resolved soon, but by civilized methods.

Murmansk Authorities Accept British Beef

LD0701200792 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1700 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] The scandal involving British meat sent to Russia in the framework of humanitarian aid and rejected in Moscow, allegedly as defective, has ended happily in Murmansk. Now the meat is in the storehouses in the Arctic city where it was taken from Moscow. Unlike the Moscow veterinary service, local experts said the meat met all generally accepted standards. Still, in order to avoid difficulties, they decided to send it to a cannery.

Rutskoy Adviser on Russian Community in Latvia

LD0801094392 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] The Russian community in Latvia is in a disastrous state, Andrey Fedorov, an adviser to the Russian vice president, believes. Instructed by Aleksandr Rutskoy, he familiarized himself yesterday with the problems of the Russian-speaking inhabitants of this Baltic republic. Fedorov is convinced that if the opening of the Russian Embassy in Riga is to be delayed for another month or two, this will be a crime by the federation against the people who wish to be legally protected by Russia and have mutual relations with it.

The future of Sergey Parfenov, former deputy commander of the Riga special purpose militia detachment, was also discussed during the meetings that took place. The vice president's instructions also pertained to this issue. It is known that the vice president has appealed to Anatoliy Gorbunovs, the head of the Latvian Parliament, to take urgent steps to return Parfenov to his place of service. According to Fedorov, the best solution of the issue would be for the file to be handed over to the Russian procuracy.

Picketers Demand Release of OMON Deputy

OW0801031292 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Picketers outside the Latvian Embassy in Moscow on Monday [6 January] urged the Latvian authorities to make a gesture of goodwill for Orthodox Christmas and immediately release from Latvian jail Sergey Parfenov, former deputy commander of the Riga black berets [OMON, special purpose militia detachment], who was arrested in Surgut. The action was organized by the

Revival Party, the Russian Popular Front and the Committee for Political Prisoners.

From the embassy several hundred protesters carrying the old Russian flag and posters headed to the building of the Russian government where talks were under way with the Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis. They demanded that the Russian leadership guarantee respect for the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers living outside the Russian Federation.

Moscow Groups Urge Political Detainees Freed

PM0801105992 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Rallies at Permanent Missions"]

[Text] In the days running up to [Eastern Orthodox] Christmas, representatives of Moscow patriotic movements came to the Baltic and Moldovan permanent missions to demand the immediate release of illegally detained political prisoners, including the defenders of Dubossary and members of the Riga special purpose militia detachment [OMON].

I think that it is precisely the lack of indifference shown by thousands of inhabitants of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities in demanding the observance of basic standards of legality in the former Union republics which helped secure the recent release from detention of Igor Shepelevich, director of a plant in Estonia.

Federation Affairs

Yeltsin Itinerary for Russian Tour Detailed

LD0801012592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 2330 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin today will start his first tour of various regions of the republic since the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. From 8 to 10 January he will visit Saratov, Ulyanovsk, and Nizhniy Novgorod. On 14 and 15 January he will visit Bryansk and St. Petersburg. In the opinion of political observers, the tour is being undertaken in order for Yeltsin to personally familiarize himself with the socio- economic situation in the regions.

Comments on Black Sea Fleet

LD0801092592 Moscow TASS in English 0850 GMT 8 Jan 92

[By correspondent Vasiliy Titov]

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS— The main purpose of President Yeltsin's tour of the republic is "to get acquainted with the situation in various regions, to see how the liberalisation of prices is going and if there are any distortions of this policy. In addition, the trip will give an opportunity to see and evaluate the implementation of the economic reform and the land reform, as well as people's mood," Yeltsin told journalists before flying to Saratov.

Responding to a TASS question about the future of the Black Sea Fleet, Yeltsin stressed that the Black Sea Fleet is indivisible. It is part of the strategic forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. "The Black Sea Fleet cannot belong to any single republic. It should be under the allied command of the Commonwealth," the Russian president said.

Touching upon his possible visit to the United States, Yeltsin said that the date of the summit and, accordingly, of a meeting of the U.N. Security Council had not yet been fixed, but "it is being planned."

Many problems have accumulated that we should discuss, Yeltsin continued. They deal with security, bilateral cooperation, mutual support during the implementation of the economic reform in Russia, as well as promises to help us, given by G-7 countries, including urgent food aid.

Kozyrev Urges Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

LD0301132992 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Moscow January 3 TASS—"The purpose of Russian diplomacy in the coming years is to secure a radical reduction of nuclear weapons, to stop the arms race and find minimum nuclear sufficiency with an eventual complete liquidation of nuclear arsenals," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says in an article, published by the newspaper "IZVESTIYA" on Thursday [2 January].

"Equality does not rid Russia of its special, historical responsibility. This refers, primarily, to nuclear weapons. Establishment of unified and reliable control over nuclear weapons will ensure, I am convinced, reliable security both for Russia and for the other Commonwealth nations," Kozyrev believes.

The Russian foreign minister writes about the place of renovated Russia in a new world. "We are surrounded by a civilised international community, which has learned to prize human interests above all else, a community which is open for contacts and interaction," he writes. "This is why our reforms evoke favourable response throughout the world, receive broad international backing. Country after country are recognising Russia. We are regarded as a democratic, free and peace-loving state, which threatens neither its own citizens, nor other nations".

"The key priority of Russian diplomacy is to set up a Commonwealth of Independent States on the shambles of the former Soviet Union," the minister writes. "We have already found ideas to ensure the unity of our peoples, which are now being embodied in flesh," he notes.

"Our active foreign policy and our diplomacy are needed to ensure, through international recognition, our economic integration into the world community, thereby helping to meet Russia's domestic requirements," Kozyrev notes. "We rely on dependable partnership with foreign states in our effort to resolve many problems."

Kozyrev says he sees no reasons why there could be no fruitful cooperation between Russia and the United States. In his opinion, "the developed Western states are Russia's natural allies".

According to Kozyrev, Russia does not intend to turn its back to the developing countries. "We by no means intend to withdraw from efforts to surmount the difficult problems confronting this large group of states," Kozyrev notes.

The Russian foreign minister is sure that radical economic reforms are needed to make Western aid to Russia more effective, to get out of the chaotic spiral of credits, and that the received loans should be used to back these reforms. "We believe that one of our most urgent tasks is to join the International Monetary Fund, assuming a commitment to carry out macro-economic reforms," the minister stressed.

Shakhray on Military Oaths, Security Merger

LD0601223992 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1645 GMT 6 Jan 92

["Facing Russia" interview given by S.M. Shakhray, state counselor and deputy chairman of the Russian Government, to correspondent Oleg Ivanov]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Ivanov] The commanders of military districts in the Ukraine are currently being made to swear an oath of allegiance.

[Shakhray] I think that the question of the military oath requires a special regulation between the states participating in the Commonwealth, a special, very small, but specific agreement. I will give you my own personal point of view on this—this is not the official standpoint, but as it appears to me as a lawyer. I believe that a military oath, separately for the strategic armed forces, cannot exist in its pure form, because a serviceman takes an oath to his state, an oath of allegiance to his state and to his people. And so here, it has to be stipulated in an agreement that servicemen take an oath of allegiance to their people and state, and are sent to serve in the strategic forces, including outside the state where they have taken the oath. For such an event the oath should reflect in particular a commitment to observe the laws of that state on the territory of which they are going to carry out their oath, and also that during this period such servicemen carry out the commands and orders of their own government and of the Strategic Armed Forces Command. So, to reach such an agreement on the military oath and to resolve other matters, it is expedient to set up a state delegation of the Russian Federation. It seems to me that there should not be any tug-of-war here, a race to make the armed forces located on the territory of this or that state to first swear an oath. The strategic forces should now be singled out; for them, of course, the oath should be made under such an agreement, and those units which are going to form part of the conventional forces can be made to swear an oath in accordance with the legislation and agreements. [passage omitted]

[Ivanov] It is well known that the presidential decree on merging the security and internal affairs services into a single ministry has been passed to the Constitutional Court by people's deputies. What is your attitude to this decree, and to the situation that has arisen in this regard?

[Shakhray] The decree on the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs has indeed given rise to stormy debate in society and among professionals. On 14 January there will be a special open hearing by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, which will examine the appeal made by the people's deputies and the five committees. This appeal proposes dividing the activities of the state security organs and the internal affairs organs. I will give you my own personal point of view, because to appear at the Constitutional Court one has, of course, still to prepare and study a great deal of material, including international practice, which we are currently engaged in. I would like to say first that there should not be any of the fears that history has inspired in us regarding the earlier state security organs during the history of our country. [passage omitted] Even prior to its legal registration, certain key structures were removed from the merged ministry, such as foreign intelligence, government communications, the protection of the president and leadership of the Russian Federation, and the well-known fifth admnistration, which could be called political investigation, the administration for protecting the consitutional system. That is, the logic of removing duplication was, evidently, paramount in signing this decree. Nevertheless, in my view, a whole range of problems still remain unresolved regarding the merger of these departments. First it is evident that the internal troops—this matter has to be looked at—should be removed from the jurisdiction of this ministry, and either subordinated to the president or subordinated to the Security Council, which will be headed by the president of the Russian Federation, but not inside a single ministry, especially such a powerful ministry. We must—and these issues are still not resolved—ensure the autonomous existence of the security organs inside the ministry, because there is such a concept as professional incompatibility, and professionals from the state security organs will find it very difficult to work together with officers from the internal affairs organs. Here both psychological and professional...

[Ivanov, interrupts] That is, you already have such information?

[Shakhray] Yes, and both psychological and professional barriers have to be overcome. Will it prove possible to ensure such autonomy within this ministry? There are currently several projects, standpoints—but provision is being made there for this, that is, there will be a security committee, headed by a first deputy, and an internal affairs committee, headed by a first deputy. Then there will essentially remain just one problem, and when this is resolved it will be possible to say that such a ministry has a right to exist. How will questions concerning the fight against corruption be resolved, because it is no secret that the internal affairs organs, and partly the security organs, have been penetrated by the rust of corruption, and it is very dangerous to merge this at the present time. If there is no actual competing force, competing with any one subdivision for ensuring security, then it will be very difficult to resolve this problem. If it proves possible to resolve these questions, this ministry could, in my view, exist for a certain period. But we will see, it will not be long, we will learn the decision of the Constitutional Court, whose decision is binding. In any case, all parties, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Soviet and the president, have an interest in finding the best possible solution.

Coup Organizers Investigation Continues

PM0601121592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 91 Union Edition p 8

[By V. Rudnev: "State Committee for State of Emergency Case: Accused Are Sick. Investigation Continues, First Accused Already Released from Custody"]

[Text] For over four months the investigation has been continuing against the organizers of the August state of emergency in the country. Everything is as before: The investigators are investigating, the lawyers are there. Actually, new elements are emerging in the case. Perhaps for the first time RSFSR General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov's speech in the Russian parliament 27 December failed to meet with support. Yet by recent post-putsch yardsticks the prosecutor was not asking for anything: Just that permission be given to arrest Russian Federation People's Deputy Vladislav Achalov, USSR deputy defense minister.

In V. Stepankov's opinion the general took an active part in elaborating the plan to seize power and isolate the president of the Union and, operating on instructions from D. Yazov, compiled a plan to seize Russia's White House. I do not know what disturbed the deputies—whether it was the fact that Achalov is now in hospital or the unsubstantiated nature of the prosecutor's statement and the lack of proof of the general's involvement in the putsch—but they did not give their consent to the arrest. Although two months ago (in the same circumstances) they blessed the arrest of another Russian people's deputy, Geniy Ageyev, former deputy chairman of the USSR KGB. It is true that G. Ageyev "anticipated events"—he fell ill, was taken to hospital, and the arrest warrant was never implemented.

Thus the range of people involved in the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency has apparently not expanded in recent months and the investigation still has at its disposal in the "Sailor's Rest" prison the 14 accused arrested in the first days after the putsch. Or to be more precise it did have. There are now 13 members of the State Committee for the State of emergency left in the No 4 detention block. Valeriy Boldin, former leader of the USSR president's apparatus, has not been there since 18 December. First, in connection with a drastic deterioration in his health, he was moved to the No. 20 special hospital, where he was kept under the guard of submachine-gunners. Later the guard was removed, which means he has in fact been released from guard and the materials relating to V. Boldin have been assigned to a separate case since the end of the investigation regarding him within the framework of the single case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency has become impossible. Expert legal medical opinion has concluded that prolonged treatment and the ending of special actions with him are needed.

V. Boldin's state of health is described by doctors as very grave and according to other sources the former inmate of the "Sailor's Rest" is "incurably ill." He is now receiving therapy to maintain his health and surgery is being prepared. Doctors are recommending rest and a more nutritious diet and that he celebrate the New Year at home.

Constitutional Court Holds Session 26 Dec

PM0601113392 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Dec 91 p 2

[TASS report: "Judges Alarmed"]

[Text] A session of the Russian Constitutional Court at which all the judges without exception expressed extreme worry at the state of legitimacy in the country took place yesterday. A report which the Constitutional Court press service has circulated mentions this.

Many of the legislative as well as the executive authorities' actions have caused the judges great alarm. In particular the adoption of amendments to the Law on the Press, the Decree of the President on Merging the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Security Services, the state of the economic reforms' normative base particularly in the area of privatization, and also the procedure of renaming the state, etc.

The Constitutional Court's members agree that the reforms are inevitable and, of course, the Constitutional Court does not intend to get in their way. Quite the opposite. But any changes in the life of the state, even the most beneficial ones, should occur within the framework of the law. The press service report said that the Russian Constitutional Court does not intend to share the sad fate of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, and being the supreme organ of the legal authority intends to take a series of steps to defend the constitutional system in the country and prevent dictatorship and tyranny from setting in, no matter from where they may emanate.

Chairman Interviewed

PM0801120992 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 1, 5 Jan 92 p 2

[Vladimir Orlov report: "There Is A Supreme Court..."]

[Text] On 26 December the Russian Constitutional Court unanimously adopted a sensational statement, declaring that it would "stand in the way of dictatorship and tyranny, whatever their source." A year after Eduard Shevardnadze's prophetic speech, the "third power" [the judiciary] has assumed a similar role and has warned its fellow citizens about the threat to democracy.

In an interview with a MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent, Professor Valeriy Zorkin, chairman of the Constitutional Court, called both the Russian executive and legislature supporters of unconstitutional methods. He was particularly alarmed about the decree merging the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the security services. As is well known, the monster now being created has always given rise to a totalitarian state. When special services are unified there is just one reason for their continued existence—the struggle to get stronger. "This system works independently of and contrary to politicians' good intentions," Zorkin said.

He cited as unconstitutional the renaming of the RSFSR as the Russian Federation: "I was one of the first to suggest it. But we should not have acted so unceremoniously. Something that only a congress was empowered to decide was decided overnight by the Supreme Soviet."

When Valeriy Zorkin was elected chairman of the "Russian third power," doubts started being expressed about its viability. Back in November the professor stated that the court was prepared to "prevent any slide into the quite real threat of despotism, rejecting any illegal directives." The court has now taken over from the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee: It seems that it has taken account of that body's sorry experience and does not intend to make the mistake of producing half-baked verdicts. It examined the case of Boris Yeltsin's decree and in the next few days will tackle other illegal acts, using not so much the statement method as the "full force of its powers."

For the time being Zorkin is pessimistic: "It seems as though current leaders have undervalued historic experience. Their legal nihilism puts us on our guard. Their attempts to reinvent the wheel could give rise either to anarchy or legal excess [pravovoy bespredel]. And that will lead to just one thing—a neo-authoritarian regime."

Market Laws Begin To Affect Price Formation

LD0801025392 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2200 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] The change to free prices in Russia in the first week of January has not yielded any surprises. As TASS correspondents report from various towns of the republic, an abundance of goods is so far not being observed, even at high prices. But the first indications of the effects of market laws on price formation have appeared.

In Lipetsk the prices for meat, butter, and sour cream remain excessively high, but trade does not risk lowering the prices of the goods. In markets, prices for goods are almost 1.5 times cheaper than in state shops. Prices in markets in Yoshkar-Ola are half those in state shops. One kilogram of beef costs from 50 to 65 rubles, whereas in state shops the price is up to 108 to 112 rubles. Commenting on these facts, many workers believe that one should not be slow in privatizing shops.

Future Industrial Goods Supplies Assessed

PM0701113492 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Viktor Tolstov report: "Prices Change, But Nothing Changes in the Stores. If There Are Things To Buy at These Prices, It Will Not Be Until Midsummer"]

[Text] On the first working day after price liberalization the majority of Moscow's stores selling industrial goods were closed for stocktaking. In those that were open 3 January, nothing had changed compared with last year: There are still no goods.

The shelves are empty in the shoe stores. Shoes are on display only in the corners usually leased by cooperatives in trading premises. This is the usual cooperative output—crudely made and expensive. You can buy women's boots for 1,500-2000 rubles [R], shoes for R800, and light summer shoes for R200.

In the radio goods shops they are selling handles for furniture. In the television shops they are taking orders for a small black-and-white "Rekord" at R1,920.

The situation experienced by the industrial goods stores in these first days of the reform was described to me by Natalya Nikiforova, director of the "Antey" lease store. Muscovites used to know this enterprise in the past as the "Svet" brand-name store near the Belorusskiy Station. At one time there was a good choice of electrical goods here, but now the store has acquired autonomy along with its new name and sells any product it can manage to obtain from the suppliers.

The manufacturers are completely the masters of the situation today, N. Nikiforova believes. The stores are forced to agree to any terms they set, first and foremost as regards prices. When the store opens after finishing its stocktaking, a baby carriage, for instance, will cost some R700 here. That price, dictated by the suppliers from Kiev and Moscow, shocked the store director. And now Natalya Nikiforova says that although she does not yet have information on all types of goods, she will not be surprised if the price of an ordinary enamel casserole is set at R100 by the manufacturers.

The approximate level of refrigerator prices is known. Small ones, the "Saratov" type, will cost approximately R1,500-2,000. More capacious ones, with a volume of 180 liters or more, will cost R5,000-7,000 upward.

It is now difficult for a store to argue with a monopolist enterprise, but the "Antey" director believes that the present situation with high prices and commodity famine will last not more than six months. According to her information the output of popular goods will increase this year because of enterprises that are beginning to work autonomously for the market. And then the situation could change radically. The store will deliberately set different suppliers' goods against each other, so as to force them to compete and ultimately reduce prices.

Natalya Nikiforova, who has been working in trade for about 30 years, is optimistic, and is confident that the prices of electrical consumer goods and the comparative filling of shelves will take place by midsummer, provided, of course, that no extraordinary factors intervene in the course of reform, such as a shortage of metals or plastics. And the potential for the production of electrical consumer goods in Russia is sufficient, in her opinion.

Economic Expert Comments on Yeltsin's Reforms

AU0701174392 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Jan 92 pp 113-117

[Interview with economic expert Oleg Timofeyevich Bogomolov by Joerg R. Mettke; place and date not given: "The People Will Defend Themselves"]

[Text] [Mettke] Oleg Timofeyevich, the USSR lived to the age of 69. How long will the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) survive?

[Bogomolov] At the moment the CIS is unstable, fragile. Any form of change seems possible—through accessions, departures, and, not least, through changing the principles and founding statutes. It will not exist for long in the form in which it was founded.

[Mettke] An obituary before the end of the first month?

[Bogomolov] No, I am convinced that sooner or later integrating processes will take place among these states, just as in the West. At some time in the future there will be transrepublican coordination, perhaps even a common currency and closer ties than even between the EC's Benelux countries.

[Mettke] First of all, everything in common is being destroyed. Even the railroads are now threatened with being divvied up into a dozen autonomous state railroads.

[Bogomolov] There have been many such stupid things done throughout history. New democracies are very naive, but, just like children, they must make their own mistakes after they have been suppressed by an all-powerful center for such a long time. Of course, this property mania is an anachronism; after all, there are multinational concerns everywhere.

[Mettke] Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to preserve the positive aspects of the Union and to reform it were long supported by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, at least verbally. Was this only a tactical maneuver?

[Bogomolov] Yeltsin's conflict with the center was programmed, because Gorbachev did not show any understanding at all for the legitimate desire of the republics for greater independence.

[Mettke] But a looser economic union, which was supposed to be followed by a political one, was agreed on under Gorbachev's patronage, even with the Ukraine.

[Bogomolov] In reality, Gorbachev had already gambled away the chance for an economic union a year ago, when he decided in favor of the so-called stabilization plan of then Prime Minister Ryzhkov. This was his most fateful mistake, because the central issue of the alternative plans by economists Yavlinskiy and Shatalin, which were thrown out at that time, was the economic community of all republics.

[Mettke] How do you assess the balance sheet of perestroyka as regards economic policy?

[Bogomolov] In political terms this period helped us make progress, but in economic terms these were lost years, even more than that—the path toward disaster: Productivity continued to decrease, the financial system was completely destroyed, working morale went down to zero. No one wants to work for worthless money; not even the companies sell their products, at the moment they only engage in barter trades. After all, it is the most noble task of the state to ensure a stable currency—and it is precisely this that was awfully neglected during Gorbachev's term of office.

[Mettke] Is Yeltsin's team better at that?

[Bogomolov] In his government there are qualified young people. But just like Gorbachev, Yeltsin unfortunately is not an economist, either. He depends on advice. However, for each expert he asks, he gets a different piece of advice. This is where the quality of a great politician is demonstrated—finding the optimum solution by combining knowledge, experience, and intuition.

[Mettke] Is Yeltsin better suited for this task than his predecessor in the Kremlin?

[Bogomolov] Both like to ask for advice, just as a man consults with his wife and then does exactly the opposite from what she recommends. Both are strong personalities; Yeltsin is probably the stronger politician—with more courage, more frankness, and greater self-confidence. However, as important as all that is, the dilemma of the entire old party nomenklatura remains: Personal loyalty is still more important than technical knowledge and critical judgment.

[Mettke] Are you satisfied with Yeltsin's economic policy course?

[Bogomolov] No, on the contrary, I am extremely worried. What is being done is an experiment again. The organizers of this experiment show determination—this is praiseworthy. However, at the same time they keep expressing doubt that their plans can be carried out at all, and our press compares them with mine-sweepers, whose first mistake would also be their last.

[Mettke] The experiments are again carried out with millions of people, who would be far more affected by such an explosion than the senior lab technicians.

[Bogomolov] Quite correct, we feel like guinea pigs, in particular since we have been the victims of several experiments. And we do not want to be the subjects of another experiment, in particular of one with such uncertain prospects of success.

[Mettke] Is it not helplessness that characterizes the economic policy of the Russian leadership?

[Bogomolov] This is precisely what I suspect. Prices cannot be kept in check anyway, they keep increasing steadily. State bodies, which regulated prices in the past, are dissolving; new ones are not in sight. Companies are holding back their goods. Economic life is threatened with a complete standstill. Of course, the easiest thing to do is to lift restrictions, to announce freedom, and to see what will happen.

[Mettke] Your government gives the impression that the path toward the market economy has been thought out exactly and will be followed like in a textbook.

[Bogomolov] Unfortunately, this is not true in any way.

[Mettke] Does the release of prices and wages lead to hyperinflation?

[Bogomolov] Prices will not—as the government promises—stabilize in about half a year and then start to fall. I also do not see any incentive for the companies to produce more—on the contrary, production will continue to decline. By the way, this happened in all the places where prices were released before privatization—in the CSFR and also in Poland.

[Mettke] Will scarce goods at least turn up in the shops again?

[Bogomolov] Perhaps there will be a few goods more on the shelves, but what does this mean? The shops were completely empty. Because of our enormous deficits and the monopolies in production and trade it is not probable that more goods will be produced but that their prices will be driven up.

[Mettke] Thus you confirm the criticism of Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy that the hasty liberalization of prices benefits only the mafia members and the bureaucrats.

[Bogomolov] Let us take an example from last fall. There were enormous amounts of watermelons on the Moscow peasants' markets, but the prices remained constantly high. Those who tried to sell at lower prices were immediately punished by the trade mafia: Cars were burned, people were beaten, goods were destroyed. These criminal structures continue to exist, and thus normal competition cannot develop.

[Mettke] But any organized forcing up of prices must end if the people are simply unable to pay.

[Bogomolov] Therefore, the wage-price spiral will turn more and more quickly. Wage demands are becoming increasingly massive, and in particular a weak government will have to give in. On the other hand, I fear a rapid rise in crime: There will be more and more crimes committed on foreign property, above all on state property. The people, who have been plundered by the governments for years, will defend themselves with the same methods.

[Mettke] And still the Russian Government expects these plundered people without property to buy the ruined state companies. This year 93 billion rubles are expected for the budget from privatization sales; in 1993 already 300 billion are expected. Where is this money supposed to come from?

[Bogomolov] Privatization is not only a fiscal process, at the same time it means also a social change. For decades we have been indoctrinated that everything that has been created in this country belongs to everybody. And nobody understands why we suddenly are supposed to again pay for our property, for which generations have already paid for with corresponding wage reductions—for housing construction, for commuter traffic, for recreation homes, and everything else. What kind of personal property was the individual citizen able to acquire, apart from household equipment and perhaps a small savings account?

[Mettke] How do the people get the people's property?

[Bogomolov] I have long advocated a different model of privatization: A small part of the state property would be sold—evaluated in line with world market prices in foreign currency. The largest part is to be distributed for free among all adult citizens in the form of certificates.

[Mettke] You want to give the national economy to the people?

[Bogomolov] The most important thing is not to demand sacrifices of the citizens again but to finally give them property: their apartments, land, a share in factories, natural resources and raw materials, and all this for free or for a symbolic price. Otherwise, explosions, mutinies, uprisings, and lootings are unavoidable.

[Mettke] Yeltsin now wants to return the land to the peasants, for individual lease.

[Bogomolov] This is not enough. His steps have become too careful in the meantime. Mostly old people work in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, whose members are now supposed to get land for private use. However, we must bring the young people, young families, back to the villages and to agriculture. This is the only way to develop a new stratum of owners, who will then also become a social pillar of the market economy.

[Mettke] This is a process that spans several generations. What leeway does the Russian Government still have to give the people who live today hope and patience?

[Bogomolov] It does not have any leeway at all. The people's standard of living has decreased by one-third as a result of the price manipulations by Prime Minister Pavlov. The majority of the people live below subsistence level today. Minimum income would have to be 500 to 600 rubles now, but only 12 percent of the population earn that much or more. The others survive because they have provisions or something to sell. There have already been the first deaths from starvation, bread factories have been stormed, shop windows and showcases have been smashed in plain daylight...

[Mettke] ...and everybody is waiting for a miracle.

[Bogomolov] Somehow we are all waiting for that, but it will not happen. In reality, the West cannot help us either; only our own, unconventional, wise solutions can help.

[Mettke] You have been the adviser of both presidents, first of Gorbachev, then of Yeltsin. How did you feel about Gorbachev's resignation?

[Bogomolov] I feel sympathetic about the tragedy that this man has had to live through. Of course Mikhail Gorbachev will keep his place in history as the biggest reformer of our time. However, at the same time, it seems to me that he resigned far too late.

[Mettke] When was the strength of the reformer Gorbachev exhausted, in your view?

[Bogomolov] After the first two or three years of perestroyka had given rise to enormous hopes in our country, doubts cropped up among many people in 1987, after the Central Committee plenum in October. At that time Yeltsin was condemned and relieved of his function as Moscow party chief—all this was so similar to the old behavior of the apparatus that Gorbachev's course of renewal lost a lot of credibility.

[Mettke] Do you think that a political comeback by Gorbachev is possible?

[Bogomolov] No, at least not in the way that Boris Yeltsin managed one. Yeltsin was able to rely on widespread sympathy among the population after he had been humiliated by the old party nomenklatura. Gorbachev, on the other hand, lost the people's sympathy long ago.

[Mettke] Nevertheless, the Western democracies have always considered Gorbachev as the more predictable politician, compared with Yeltsin.

[Bogomolov] This is true. But Gorbachev began his reforms in the position of an omnipotent ruler. The situation in the country was controllable, and as long as he restricted himself to the modernization of foreign policy, for instance, and did not touch the foundations of the system, developments were predictable. Yeltsin, on the other hand, enters the political arena at a time when events have already developed their own dynamism, when many things are no longer under control, and a leader needs much courage, determination, and wisdom.

[Mettke] Can the reform process in Russia be continued in open, democratic forms and without renouncing the state based on the rule of law, pluralism, and freedom of the press?

[Bogomolov] Our democracy is primitive, weak, and unstable. Any relapse into authoritarian behavior can only cause concern, and there are enough examples of that. In addition, we do not have an efficient administration.

[Mettke] Advocates of a strong executive power in the Russian Government, but also the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg, would prefer to dissolve their parliaments tomorrow and send the deputies home.

[Bogomolov] This is true. I was present when Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov suggested to Yeltsin's political advisers that the City Council should suspend its work for the time being. We were all against that. Popov's democratic views are not doubted. However, what happens if tomorrow somebody else turns up, who proves to be a tyrant and a dictator? One must always ask this question in Russia.

[Mettke] Oleg Timofeyevich, thank you for this interview.

Article Views Need for Private Owners

PM0601160992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Dec 92 p 2

[S. Razin article: "On Certain Measures To Further Improve the Whole Country's Privatization"]

[Text] Capitalism is coming to Russia in the New Year. There are no particular doubts about this, because at a recent session the government approved the state privatization program for 1992.

On the whole the document gives hope for speedy reforms, but for now blanket privatization threatens small stores, cafes, catering establishments, motor vehicle depots, motor vehicle workshops, and enterprises like "Selkhoztekhnika." The program's authors have promised that privatization in the capital will proceed at a "Stakhanovite rate." By summer almost all wholesale trade, large enterprises in the service sector, motor vehicle servicing, "unfinished construction," and—very importantly—light industry and the food industry will go under the hammer.

Within a year the sell-off of the state sector should give the treasury 92 billion rubles [R], which will mainly go on social security for the population. Will it be possible to obtain this money? Ministers are in decisive mood. The state program has defined mandatory privatization tasks for all sectors and all regions. The figures make pleasant reading: Within a year 60-70 percent of light industry and the food industry, 70 percent of motor vehicle transport, 60 percent of trade, and 50-60 percent of public catering and provision of amenities will pass into private ownership.

To my mind the main danger threatening the reforms comes not so much from bureaucrats as from the population itself, especially in small settlements where for all purposes for all people there is one "Food Store," one bath house, and one hairdresser. And who will these and other currently "ownerless" facilities go to?

The state program for 1992 does not, alas, give a comforting answer. Soviet businessmen who have managed to get rich in the perestroyka years will surely be the first to taste the forbidden fruits of capitalism. Together they are rushing at breakneck speed to auctions where almost all of trade, the service sector, and so on will go for cash to the highest bidder. Personally I am not against such private business owners—hey, presto, there will be less boorishness behind the counter. However, in small cities we must think about competition in the same trade right now.

But the fate of capitalism in Russia will be decided not at auctions but in industry. The main form of privatization—the setting up of joint-stock companies—is occurring here. How will the process proceed? Under the law, the initiative must come from labor collectives, but are they going to stir themselves soon? As the experience of the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant, the Kama Truck Plant, and other flagships shows, the working class is not against getting rich either. The process will evidently proceed apace, especially as Chubays has figured out how to divide the "bone of contention."

Let me remind you that last summer terrible passions were seething in parliament: If the controlling block of shares is given to labor collectives, they may get through it all quickly, as happened in Yugoslavia. But if the workers are done out of their share, they will surely be out to get Yeltsin—who will want to sell himself into "slavery" to millionaires? Privileges for workers have been defined: They receive 25 percent of the shares free and another 10 percent at a discount. True, these shares will be privileged, that is, profit can be made on them, but they do not carry voting rights in production management. There are also other, purely financial benefits for labor collectives, which enable them to acquire full-price shares at the auction price.

True, the lion's share of industry will work in the socialist way for now. Most likely not very large plants and factories producing consumer goods—including those in the military-industrial complex, where production facilities providing the country with almost all its video and radio equipment have long been desperate for freedom—will pass into the private hands of shareholders. Big privatization on a big scale will begin from 1993, when Russian citizens will be provided with the promised investment savings books.

Evidently this is why the "reform cabinet" was forced to include two special lists in the state program. One lists facilities which will not be privatized, at least not in 1992. Along with minerals, timber and water resources, nature reserves, architectural monuments and other national property, the list also has on it jewelry workshops, training establishments, roads, television, and other organizations which are privately owned in many countries. The second list is of the largest enterprises—those with over 10,000 people—and monopolists, which can pass into private hands only with special permission from the government or local authorities.

And maybe the most critical question is entirely clear now: Won't we be selling Russia to foreign capitalists? We will not! But foreign investors too can acquire property in Russia. With no particular obstacles Western businessmen can obtain the right to buy loss-making businesses, "unfinished construction," and also enterprises which either are crippled without imported raw materials or process agricultural products. In the remaining cases if, say, the entrepreneurs are setting their sights on trade, motor vehicle depots, or small industrial enterprises (of up to 200 people), they can make a planned purchase in a commercial competition between investors—whoever's reconstruction plan is the best will win. And in the remaining cases foreigners are allowed into "Soviet capitalism" only by decision of the government or the Committee for Foreign Investments.

Life, of course, will put everything in its place, but I read this state program with as much excitement and hope as a love letter. Free prices could quite easily turn into another putsch if the economy does not become free very soon. Shareholders and private owners are desperately needed now—they will not go to rallies of "hungry waiting lines." They will be working...

Forecasters Expect Short-Term Deterioration

PM0601110992 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Dec 91 p 1

[By Vyacheslav Gerasimov, leader of the PRAVDA Public Opinion Study Group: "Forecast: Where To Look for Optimism"]

[Text] A way out of the crisis can be found at the cost of a catastrophic drop in living standards for the population—this is the Russian Government's belief. At the same time, society is reassured that this shock therapy "will not last long." The first thaw should set in no later than Spring 1992, and by the end of the year a general improvement in economic matters is envisaged. However, a comparative analysis of government expectations and the opinion of specialists and practical workers reveals significant differences in the forecast.

A questionnaire completed by participants in the international forum "World Experience and the USSR Economy" (November 1991) revealed no common view in defining the immediate future. For most of our own specialists the coming year—1992—does not look as inspiring as it does to the government. Out of the small number (12 percent) of those confident of an improvement, a large proportion (83 percent) believes that even if an improvement does come about before the end of the coming year it will be minimal. The majority of those questioned are convinced that the economic situation will deteriorate further. A continuation of negative tendencies is predicted not only by those who interpret the accelerated transition to market relations as meaning the demise of their enterprise's efficient operation, but also by the majority of those hoping to preserve or even improve former positions. Senior production specialists, women, and people aged 31-50 are by far the most pessimistic here.

Foreign specialists also express negative forecasts.

[Note—The article is accompanied by a small bar chart entitled "Economic Forecast for 1992" which compares Soviet and foreign specialist forecasts and reads as follows:]

Deterioration: Soviet Specialists—65%
Foreign Specialists—80%

No Change: Soviet Specialists—15%
Foreign Specialists—15%

Improvement: Soviet Specialists—12%
Foreign Specialists—5%

Brighter prospects are linked with 1993. Forty-seven percent of our own specialists and 26 percent of foreign specialists point to possible positive changes for that period.

At the same time, while expressing confidence in positive changes for the given period of time, 93 percent of those advocating this opinion believe that such changes will not be all that significant.

One-third of the Soviet specialists questioned do not reflect such optimism in respect of 1993, and 37 percent believe that matters will either remain unchanged or deteriorate further. Senior production specialists, young people up to the age of 30, and people in the 41-50 age-range are the most pessimistic here.

Great hopes are linked to 1995. An improvement for that year is forecast by three-quarters of the Soviet and two-thirds of the foreign specialists questioned. Meanwhile, one in two of the said category of optimists is already convinced of imminent and fundamental positive changes.

It is this glowing forecast which should please people above all. At the same time, a comparative analysis of the results of the May (1991) forecast—by participants in the All-Union Conference on "Stabilizing the Economy and the Market"—and the current forecast shows, on the one hand, a deterioration in the economic situation and, on the other, a determination among the people to constantly maintain hopes for better times to come. The more distant the forecast, the more numerous the optimists.

So judging from the results of the sociological forecast, it is most likely that by the end of 1992 the economic situation will deteriorate further. In 1993 it will improve marginally. In 1995 there is a 50-50 chance of either fundamental or insignificant change. Time will tell whose was the more accurate forecast—that of the government, the Soviet specialists, or the foreign specialists. However, it would do no harm in any case to specify the cost of shock therapy for the people over a longer period of time than a year.

Prospects for 1992 Budget Assessed

PM0701165992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Dec 91 Union Edition p2

[Unattributed report on the Russian budget, followed by I. Demchenko commentary, under the general heading "Deficit Not Planned But Assumed"]

[Text] The Russian Government has drawn up its budget plans for 1992. For the first time in ages, a deficit-free budget for the first quarter of the new year is now on paper. The document has been submitted to the Russian Supreme Soviet for approval.

It is impossible to draw up a traditional Russian budget for the whole year because of the high rate of inflation. It makes all preliminary calculations meaningless, and an annual budget would need to be constantly amended. According to A. Ulyukayev, economic adviser to the Russian Government, inflation is expected to run at 50-60 percent per month in January and February, after prices have been freed, falling to 10 percent by the summer. The economic adviser presented no calculations in support of this but assured us that such calculations have been made.

The revenue and expenditure sections of the Russian state budget for the first quarter each amount to 258 billion rubles [R], or 40.6 percent of gross national product (GNP). The government does not offer a guarantee that the budget will indeed be free of deficit by the end of the quarter.

The budget is based on projected 1992 prices, allowing for a 6.5-fold increase in the price of oil (a fivefold increase plus value added tax)—as much as R450 per tonne at the beginning of the year. A. Ulyukayev pointed out that, although energy prices will be set by the state, they will not necessarily be static. The government believes that they should be brought up to world prices over the next two years.

In the expenditure section of the republic's budget, subsidies to maintain fixed prices are reduced; subsidies for output and centralized investments are likewise reduced.

There are substantial cuts in defense expenditure. Resources allocated for arms purchases are reduced by 50 percent; military building—by 25 percent; and scientific and design work in this sphere—by 30 percent.

As expected, the revenue section of the budget is substantially augmented, primarily thanks to value added tax (it is planned that this will give the treasury 17 percent of GNP, or approximately R107 billion). A further 3 percent will be obtained through excise duty and 9 percent by taxing enterprises' profits.

The government does not intend to cut any of the social programs already launched, A. Ulyukayev said, with the exception of the Law on Indexation, which cannot be implemented in full due to a lack of funds. No new social programs will be introduced.

Our Commentary

Although Russia has planned a deficit-free budget for the first quarter—a mandatory condition of aid from the international financial organizations we have joined, incidentally—there is virtually no chance of it being implemented.

The government will probably be unable to withstand social pressure from the population, especially if the latter is backed by parliament and trade unions. This is suggested by the fact that, in its very first disagreement with parliament—over the minimum wage and pension—the government made concessions and agreed to legislators' materially ill-founded decision, although it was under no serious pressure at that point in time.

The demonstrations by "hungry waiting lines" last weekend are the start of pressure that is obviously going to be very strong. The level of social consumption is already extremely low and the population has no reserves. It also has no opportunity to protect itself independently: That would require fundamental wage reform, particularly in budgetary respects, a new approach to pension legislation, and so forth.

The problems caused by radical cuts in arms purchases will add to the general social pressure. Hundreds of thousands of people employed by defense industry enterprises will be left without work and livelihood. These problems can be solved in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but in the Urals and the Far East whole cities built around "secret" plants will die. Unable to move elsewhere because of housing problems, the people who live in these cities are essentially trapped.

Moreover, the Russian state budget is planned along the lines of the government's original policy, which was based on the factor of total isolation from the other republics. Now the situation has changed. I. Karimov's response at an Alma-Ata news conference is typical in this respect: Uzbekistan will free prices on 2 January on the condition that full compensation of the population's losses is guaranteed. Russia will obviously have to be the one to guarantee compensation for the Uzbek people. After all, although the republics are now fully independent in budgetary respects, the only bank in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] with the right to issue money comes under the Russian Federation's jurisdiction.

The introduction of reusable coupons in some of the Commonwealth's major states, such as Ukraine and Belarus, is bringing even greater destabilization. In some respects, coupons are even worse for a unified financial system than various national currencies. As borders are nonexistent as far as commodities and the population are concerned, they allow people from Ukraine and Belarus to freely spend their excess rubles on goods in other states but do not allow "outsiders" to go shopping in Ukraine and Belarus. This will only aggravate inflation processes.

It will also be virtually impossible to implement the revenue section of the republic's budget. There will probably be little success in collecting value added tax—to which such great importance is attached—because of the shortage of qualified tax inspectors and the tax payer's natural desire to evade payment. This desire will obviously have very critical consequences for trade.

At the point of "price liberalization," trade is still controlled by the state: There has been no privatization or demonopolization, and the system of supplying goods to the trade network remains unchanged. Consequently, many prices freed from regulation will continue to be set by state structures. These structures have an enormous interest in selling goods through the "black market," which allows them to evade tax and, at the same time, play on the great difference between wholesale and "black market" prices.

I should remind you that the last state budget, prepared by Pavlov's government, also had "only a small deficit" on paper but proved catastrophic when implemented—which many specialists predicted, incidentally. On this occasion too, Russia will obviously make up the inevitable budget deficit by means of nonrepayable bank credit—for all the republics in the CIS.

Economist Opposes Regional Currency Moves

LD0601201892 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Economists representing the Yekaterinburg Oblast authorities have examined proposals for introducing a regional currency. The group of economists developed a plan for introducing Ural francs [Uralskikh frankov]. The local franc would not be the equivalent of the French unit of currency but the provisional name for a check which guarantees receipt of goods. It is the originators' opinion that this action will, to some extent, protect the domestic market, even though it will not help reinforce the ruble. The idea has gained support, but the plan has been sent back for further work.

Here is what Aleksey Ulyukayev, economic advisor to the Russian Government, said about this:

[Begin Ulyukayev recording] We are constantly receiving reports about such plans, from the Urals, Siberia and other areas of Russia. Our attitude toward such instances is decidedly negative. In the opinion of the government it is impossible to protect local consumer markets in this way, and it is inevitable that the stabilization of the ruble will be damaged. No doubt the local authorities do not have great hopes of the ruble stabilizing rapidly. In these conditions it is the task of the Russian Government to prove by its stabilizing activities—and to do so very quickly, within two to three months—that the ruble will pick up. The Russian Government has grounds for a certain optimism in talking about the problem. It remains to add that the introduction of regional checks and coupons is, apart from anything else, a serious technical problem. It will achieve nothing but the creation of panic and the raising of unfounded hopes. Moreover, the president's decree on a single economic space, which unequivocally prohibits such operations by local authorities, is in force throughout Russia. [end recording]

New Ruble-Dollar Exchange Rate Viewed

PM0701144992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Dec 91 Moscow Edition p 2

[Article by I. Zhagel: "Russian Central Bank Prepared To Give 110 Rubles for a Dollar"]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the Russian president's decree "On the Formation of the Russian Federation's Republican Currency Reserve in 1992," the Russian Central Bank has established that as of 1 January it will buy and sell foreign currency on the internal market at 110 rubles [R] for one U.S. dollar. This New Year decision on the new exchange rate looks like an attempt to take a sober look at the present situation in the economy.

Unfortunately, so far the state has pursued a not entirely honest policy on our currency market, so that eventually, like a gambler who has lost, it become completely confused in its business. The exporting enterprises had the lion's share of the funds they had earned confiscated from them, which was compensated after a fashion in rubles, but at a blatantly reducedexchange rate. It is not surprising that with time sources of currency began to dry up and many enterprises and firms began simply to leave the dollars they had earned abroad.

The ruble's new exchange rate against foreign currencies is entirely attractive for enterprises and some specialists even assess it as risky for the state. But at certain moments one obviously has to make concessions to master the situation.

It is true that the Russian government is pinning hopes not only on economic leavers, but is also partly retaining administrative measures. Basically they affect only those enterprises which export with a low proportion of added value—raw material, oil, timber.

These enterprises must put 40 percent of their currency profits into the Russian Federation republican currency reserve and they will be compensated at a special commercial rate which is half the market rate, that is R55 for each dollar. This currency will go to service the foreign debt and to buy food and medical supplies but in no way to keep the weak afloat.

In addition the Russian Government will oblige raw material exporters to put a further 10 percent of their currency profit into a stabilization fund. These assets will be compensated for at the full market rate—R110 per dollar. And the fund will be used for the intervention of currency on the free market and the maintenance of the ruble exchange rate.

It may seem to some people that the compulsory currency deductions are extremely high. But to be fair it must be said that a number of sectors—for instance those exporting machinery and equipment—are completely relieved of this "obligation" and can use the dollars they earn as they see fit.

Naturally, if the measures adopted in Russia lead to the consolidation of the ruble on the free market, the Russian Central Bank exchange rate will also be reviewed. We shall hope that we do not have long to wait for that.

Central Bank Abolishes USSR State Bank

PM0701144592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 92 Union Edition p 8

[Unattributed report: "For the Information of USSR State Bank Clients"]

[Text] The Central Bank of the Russian Federation reports that in accordance with RSFSR Supreme Soviet Resolution No. 1917-1 of 22 November 1991 "On Financial and Credit Support for the Economic Reform and the Reorganization of the RSFSR Banking System" the USSR State Bank has been abolished and a corresponding liquidation commission has been set up, which is examining claims and other demands from creditors.

Claims are received for two months following the date of publication of this information.

All demands should be addressed to:

The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 12 Zhitnaya Street, Moscow 117049.

Bank Raises Interest Rates for Depositors

LD0401221692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Russia's inhabitants have some good news at the start of the new year. Interest rates have been increased on the population's deposits in the republic's Savings Bank (Sberbank). On average they have gone up by 60 percent. The bank's specialists say that the interest rate for deposits on demand has been increased from two to three percent. For longer-term deposits, where the money has already been deposited for over a year, the increase is from five to seven percent. Where it has been already deposited for three years it is increased from seven to 10 percent, and for over five years from nine to 15 percent. Moreover, in each instance this increased rate is paid for each year the money is kept on deposit. The same applies to special deposits. If they are for a term of five years they will receive 15 percent, and, if they are for a shorter term, seven percent.

Savings Bank To Handle Soviet Securities

LD0601180592 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 6 Jan 92

[By correspondent Viktor Petrenko]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The Savings Bank of Russia assumed the duty of handling Soviet state securities from January 1, 1992, the Bank's President Pavel Zhikharev told TASS on Monday [6 January].

This has been done to ensure the normal functioning of the entire system of the savings business on the territory of the former Soviet Union, he said.

Zhikharev is also heading an Association of the Savings Banks of Independent States. The association, set up in Moscow, was formed by 12 savings banks of the former republics.

"The association is not a successor to the Savings Bank of the USSR but is a non-profit organisation whose decisions are of recommendatory nature," Zhikharev said.

State Counselor Delivers New Year 'Message'

PM0301155592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jan 92 Single Edition p 3

[New Year "message" from Sergey Stankevich, Russian Federation state counselor and first deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, carried as part of a feature under the general heading: "Is Our Train Going Full Speed Ahead?": "We Must Endure, Stand Firm, and Not Lose Control...."]

[Text] Last year's high points are easily discernible, and you do not even have to strain your memory to recall them: January—the tragic events in the Baltics; March—the dangerous confrontation on the streets of Moscow; July—the elections of the first Russian president; August—the absurd coup d'etat whose result marked the final chapter; and finally December—the collapse of the Union and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Which of these events is most important? Probably the last. The demise of a great state, a power that has lasted for many centuries, does not, to say the least, enrapture me. At the same time, it is clear that the Union has had its day, and it is pointless to argue with history: You will not convince anyone of anything and will not stop anything. The madness that has gripped many of our fellow citizens should peter out on its own, after which life and time will take their course.

I see the coming year as the year of Russia, rising in all its stature. Russia is not a geographical concept but a spiritual one. How many times has the course of events driven it to the brink of going under, but it has always found the strength to get up off its knees and make the breakthrough. It will be found this time too.

The most important thing that we should do in the New Year is to form a strong and effective state. To realize that we are a power. To endure, stand firm, and not lose control in an outburst of righteous indignation. To not suddenly become blinded and dull one's senses in a fit of hysterics. To well and truly "get going."

Society should boil and bubble from the millions' daily supreme efforts. We should pit our indestructible, our victorious collective enthusiasm characteristic of Russians and residents of Russia against the whole accumulation of paradoxes and decay.

In this New Year of 1992, the voice of new performers, the calm and firm voice of Russia's nurturers and guardians, will break through the chorus of complaints and regrets and appeals to salvage this or avenge that.

Deputy Urges 'Shadow Government' Creation

LD0601191492 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1648 GMT 6 Jan 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] People's deputy of the Russian Federation Yuriy Sidorenko supports establishment of the shadow government of Russia. The shadow cabinet, believes Sidorenko, is necessary in order to achieve consolidation of honest people in the parliament, to draw up alternative proposals and to criticize the government programs. I don't see another, more efficient, way to counter the bacchanalia which has begun, Yuriy Sidorenko stated to PF [POSTFACTUM]. The present course of the Russian Government, believes Sidorenko, bears the stamp of the nomenclature-type pathology. Yeltsin has been destroying the Union by criminal methods which would backfire at the unity of Russia. Yeltsin has begun the reforms without any clear program as well as a remote idea of where they would lead. The reforms in the present form would bring forth the final pauperization of the people without a slightest hope for the improvement of life. The government and a considerable part of the deputies of Russia are thinking only about strengthening of their own authority and improvement of their financial situation, alleges Yuriy Sidorenko.

We've made an idol out of Yeltsin, continues people's deputy of the Russian Federation Yuriy Sidorenko. He came to power thanks to the broad support of the democrats and now he's betraying those who brought him to victory. Yeltsin doesn't communicate with deputies, doesn't make reports on his activity and is moving away all the time from the principles of democracy. The underlying reason of all this is that Yeltsin is a creature of the party nomenclature and cannot overcome the bolshevik in his soul.

Emerging Left-Wing Parties Profiled

PM0701130192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 92 pp 1-2

["Comments on Political Opposition" by Boris Slavin under the "Parties and Movements" rubric: "What's on the Left Wing?"]

[Text] When I analyzed the August putsch and its consequences in an October edition of PRAVDA, I mentioned the possible emergence of various forms of political opposition to the current government course. Today we are witnessing the birth of this opposition.

Two Forms

Following the relevant statements by A. Rutskoy, N. Travkin's departure from the "Democratic Russia" Congress, and G. Popov's sensational statements at the Movement for Democratic Reforms Congress, we can talk about a split within the ruling coalition of right-wing political forces and the formation of an opposition within the ruling class. This is not opposition to the essence but to the forms and methods of implementing Yeltsin's reforms. In many respects it has been brought about through fear of the people, who instinctively reject unrestrained privatization, which they call "piratization," and the liberalization of prices that has rendered them utterly poverty-stricken. Aware of this and fearing a social explosion, the opposition will strive to keep power for its class even at the cost of the fall of B. Yeltsin and his team. M. Gorbachev could quite possibly head this opposition.

The opposition of left-wing forces, whose emergence culminated in the formation of the Russian Communist Party [RCP], which has filled the central niche in the spectrum of new parties, is a different kind of opposition, opposing the essence of the ruling political authorities. Unlike the former, this opposition directs its attention not to business or national and Western capital but to working people—that is, to the largest sector of society, that most afflicted by the "shock therapy" policy. What are these new parties that have filled the left wing of our society's political life, deserted since the CPSU was banned and left the political arena?

When answering this question we immediately encounter complications: Whom are we to regard as left-wing parties, where is the line between left-wingers and right-wingers? On the basis of classical European tradition, bourgeois and prebourgeois parties are generally regarded as right-wing and those organizations that share to varying degrees the ideals of socialism and that are linked with the interests of hired workers and those who primarily bear the burden of the radical economic transformations are regarded as left-wing.

From this viewpoint, for instance, foreign social democrats, socialists, and communists are regarded as left-wing and the broad spectrum of democratic, republican, monarchist, and other parties are regarded as right-wing. However, this does not always work for our society, not only because we succeeded in the recent past in considerably obscuring the concepts of "left-wing" and "right-wing," but also in terms of the essence of individual parties' program statements and practical activity. Thus our present national social democracy (led by O. Rumyantsev), barring its small left wing, should not be ranked among the left-wing spectrum of parties. Not only because it is afraid of using the categories of "socialism" and "capitalism" to analyze reality, but because it unequivocally and consistently supports the liberal or, more precisely, neoconservative reform put forward, as we are now accustomed to saying, by the "professional and competent" government of B. Yeltsin, which has already posed a grave burden for working people while promoting the incredibly rapid initial accumulation of capital and the fantastic enrichment of the top 100,000.

Our Social Democrats

In my view, two parties in our country can aspire to the role of national social democracy. They are the vice president's People's Party of Free Russia [PPFR] and the Socialist Party of Working People [SPWP]. These parties form the right wing of the political spectrum of left-wing forces today. Following the logic found in recent speeches by its leaders A. Rutskoy and G. Vodolazov, the PPFR will constantly waver between cooperating with B. Yeltsin's government and opposing it. This is the classic party of the national bureaucracy, small business, and the privileged section of the working class. Since these social strata may suffer as a result of the coming reforms we will watch this party's behavior and if, on the contrary, the reform is relatively calm, the party will swing to the right and gravitate toward classic gradualist tactics. This is a party of wavering and compromise. It is no coincidence that its theoretician V. Lipitskiy is developing so intensively the idea of a bridge or, more accurately, the idea of sitting on two stools as the basis of political maneuvering between right-wingers and left-wingers. We already know the results of these tactics from the fate suffered by the president of the former Union.

As for the SPWP, it has still not proved itself in practice as a new political force. However, it may express not only the interests of hired workers and "collective and individual producers," as its statutes say, but also the interests of the former partocracy that wants to revive and to voice its views legally. It is quite possible that some war and labor veterans, members of the technical and humanitarian intelligentsia, and some qualified working-class groups could move toward this party. This party's main ideas are consonant with Western social democracy. One of this party's leaders, People's Deputy Anatoliy Denisov, believes, for instance, that exploitation and private ownership cannot be eliminated altogether. It is only possible to ease the barbarous forms of these phenomena. In his opinion, Western social democracy has been successful in this and we can learn a great deal from it. Judging from his interview with PRAVDA, Denisov is extremely loyal to Gorbachev. People are saying that this party was virtually set up for the former president. It is to this in particular that people attribute its rapid registration. However, there are hardly any serious grounds for this talk. I will quote the opinion voiced by one of the leaders of this party, the well-known cosmonaut V. Sevastyanov, who told the author of this article: "Gorbachev is the only president in the world to have destroyed the party that brought him to power."

Given the drastic deterioration in the overall position of working people within this party, more left-wing currents close to the reformist views held by R. Medvedev—a consistent and staunch socialist—could gain the upper hand. This party will then in fact live up to its name. However, at present you get the impression—and it was confirmed by the first SPWP Congress—that many of this party's leaders, alarmed by the putsch, are more afraid of left-wingers than right-wingers and more afraid of Communists than liberals. Because of this I do not think that this party will become a mass party in the near future.

Left Center

The Labor Party which emerged from B. Kagarlitskiy's Socialist Party and individual representatives of the former Marxist Platform within the CPSU (A. Buzgalin, A. Kolganov) and mass trade union organizations could quite possibly become that kind of party. This party has already made its presence felt not only by its declarations overtly championing the ideals of socialism and criticizing the ruling regime, but also by practical actions. It was under its leadership that the first rally of worker's trade unions was held on Manege Square demanding an end to the policy of privatization and price liberalization. The Labor Party made concrete demands promoting an increase in workers' standard of living and the easing of the social position of women, young people, and pensioners. One of the main slogans adopted by working people following this party is this: "Market pay for market prices!" Although this slogan does not stand up to scientific criticism in every respect, its social thrust is obvious given the drastic lag in the wages of many population groups as a result of uncontrolled price increases. I must point out this party is led by young politicians—possibly those with the best education—who have extensive contacts with left-wing parties and trade unions in the West. Ahead of the others they realized the danger of emergent totalitarianism and fascism in our society and vigorously opposed them. Unlike the SPWP, this party is open in essence rather than form to joining many left-wing movements and parties, including alternative movements.

The Labor Party completes the spectrum of parties of a socialist orientation and begins the spectrum of left-wing forces that have not abandoned the Communist idea.

The newly created RCP is close to the Labor Party in terms of its ideological and political positions. The core of this party was formed by supporters of the centrist current in the former Marxist Platform within the CPSU led by A. Kryuchkov. The content of the reports heard at this party's constituent conference shows that there is considerable creative potential within this party, capable of providing both an all-around assessment of the current political situation and outlining clear strategic guidelines. Assessing the current situation, the RCP believes that the events of August culminated in an antisocialist coup that sparked off rapid capitalistization in society, plunging the country into an even graver crisis. It sees the way out of the crisis in reorienting society on the socialist path of development and in asserting the power of the working person. At the same time it admits the market and the possibility of private ownership in areas where they increase production efficiency and the supply of goods and meet the needs of working people. It associates future development with the primacy of social ownership, which is, in its opinion, in principle diametrically opposed to state-bureaucratic ownership. This party is committed to the ideas of real democracy, social justice, and freedom. It allows the existence of various platforms within its ranks, accepts freedom of opinion and criticism, and recognizes no privileges for party members. While criticizing the CPSU for its concessions to neo-Stalinism and its bureaucratic degeneration during the years of stagnation, the RCP does not renounce its democratic and socialist traditions. This party was the first to advocate the creation of a bloc of left-wing forces. It sees that its social base lies among those who live on wages, grants, and subsidies. The organizers of the RCP took an active part in the November demonstration. Delegates to the constituent conference condemned the persecution of PRAVDA and spoke in defense of the oppressed national minorities in the former union republics. This party's first congress is scheduled for spring 1992.

Communist-Radicals

Another current in the Marxist Platform (led by A. Prigarin) has promoted the creation of a communist party called the "League of Communists." This is perhaps the smallest of the new communist parties. In terms of its ideological views it is very close to the "orthodox" communists of recent times. However, its natural desire to join the Russian Communist Worker's Party [RCWP] that sprang up in Yekaterinburg in November as a faction has borne no fruit.

The latter's choice of that city for its constituent congress was evidently no coincidence. It is the home ground of Russian President B. Yeltsin, whose policy the RCWP considers hostile to the working class and representatives of intellectual and physical labor. The RCWP considers itself the heir to the Leninist revolutionary traditions within the Communist movement. Like the Bolsheviks under Lenin it eschews the existence of factions within it and takes an adverse view of the ideology of social democracy. The party's October manifesto is evidence that the RCWP opposes private ownership and the absolutization of market relations. It thinks that it is only possible to escape from the crisis by reverting to a centralized planned economy. The present situation is regarded as a counterrevolutionary coup, making our country utterly dependent on national and Western capital and turning it into a supplier of raw materials for developed capitalist states. On this point the RCWP is close to the country's patriotic movements.

The RCWP sees the working class as its main social base—which is reflected in the party's name. In its policy it advocates the revival of the soviets as representative organs of the working people. This party was set up by the organizers of the Leningrad initiative congress and the Moscow leadership of the United Front of Working People. R. Kosolapov, M. Popov, and others were elected to the party leadership. VOLYA could be this party's press organ. There are already radical currents of varying degrees within the party now. The latter are developing the idea of creating a federation of communist parties. At present this idea has not met with support from other parties. The RCWP is the most representative of all the communist parties. It will quite possibly enjoy increasing support from workers, particularly if the crisis in the country deepens and plants and factories shut down. Despite its communist fundamentalism this party is rapidly mastering contemporary forms of political struggle. Its supporters could regularly be seen among the defenders of the V.I. Lenin Museum and Mausoleum and the participants in the November demonstration, the December hunger march, and the newly created workers' soviets in Moscow and other cities.

We have briefly described the main left-wing political parties. Quite small organizations or parties like the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) led by Nina Andreyeva have been left out. Official propaganda tries to identify the entire left-wing movement with the neo-Stalinists of the past. And that is far from being the truth. The new emergent left-wing movement is unequivocally opposed to Stalinism, it sees the latter as the outright distortion of communist ideology and the practice of socialism.

There Is Always an Alternative

Time will tell whether left-wing parties are able to impart an intelligent character to working people's growing social protest. Only one thing is clear now: Some equilibrium has developed in the contemporary alignment of sociopolitical forces within society. The parties in power have proved impotent: Their laws and programs are not being carried out and there is an unending series of reshuffles in various organs (anarchy is typical of our times). In turn the political opposition cannot take power owing to its own weakness. I have already said that, on the one hand, we have broad political representation for the ruling class of entrepreneurs that has still not fully formed and, on the other, we have the incipient formation of political entities among the various strata of working people who form the overwhelming majority in society. That situation cannot go on for long.

The main question is this: Will the as yet small left-wing parties be able and have time to take control of the people's growing uncontrolled protest so as to direct it into a civilized political channel? Otherwise we will have two possible scenarios for social development: an all-consuming, uncontrolled grassroots rebellion or a switch to the fascist methods of government by the bosses. There are already elements of both, and the lives of most of the population are rapidly deteriorating because of the coming shortages; the authorities are encouraging and even forcing the creation of various combat groupings, using propaganda to fuel hatred of workers and communists, calling them nothing but lumpenproletariat; instead of internationalism being preached, interethnic hatred is being overtly kindled under cover of hypocritical phrases about increasing national self-awareness. In this connection many political analysts think that the Yugoslav scenario is quite possible, given the collapse of the Union.

In my view, it is not only the government but also the opposition in all its forms that should be allowed freedom of action so as to extricate the country from the crisis. At any rate the anticommunist hysteria that is turning the many millions of communists and their supporters into inferiors must be stopped. They must, on the contrary, be integrated into society and not alienated from it. The country must not be stabilized by transforming its best-trained and best-developed elements into outcasts. Our country's history has provided us with good lessons of that. Last, it is time to do away with political intrigue in politics and arrive at responsible, long-term political solutions that restore economic ties between major state enterprises not just verbally but in actual fact; encouraging, before it is too late, the development of fundamental science and productive rather than speculative capital; and strengthening the system of social guarantees for working people, young people, and pensioners. It must be understood that politics is not so much the art of the possible, as has been claimed so often in our country, as the art of the essential. It is time to stop inflicting on society the implementation of new liberal utopias and models. During hard times it is necessary to trust in the thousand-year experience of the masses and those of its spokesmen who, relying on their professional knowledge, seek least to realize their own personal ambitions.

Real politics exists where the interests of millions rather than the personal pretensions and populism of various political leaders are interwoven. Disregard of the masses' interests transforms politics into political intrigue and adventurism. Real politics is always open and courageous, while political intrigue is covert and cowardly and inevitably bankrupt. Everyone knows examples of this: Suffice it to recall the political games over the 500 Days program, the single economic space, the illegal confiscation of CPSU property, the new Union Treaty, and the figure of the country's former president. There is no social progress without alternatives: There is always an alternative. It is time to try a new alternative for extricating the country from the crisis. The emergent left-wing movement may suggest such an alternative if it channels its efforts into a single direction and creates a united bloc of left-wing parties.

Social Democrat Fears 'National Bolshevism'

PM0701160592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jan 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Boris Orlov, "one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Russia," by correspondent Pavel Anokhin and Social Democratic Party of Russia press secretary Alla Struchkova, under the "Parties and Movements" rubric; place and date not given: "Brownshirt Bolshevism: Split Inevitable"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Boris Sergeyevich, a statement issued by the Social Democrats talks of the mounting danger of national Bolshevism in the country. On what are such conclusions based?

[Orlov] The actions of nationalist groups working in collaboration with Bolshevik splinter groups from the collapsed CPSU have increased of late. Their appeals are becoming increasingly outspoken and their actions increasingly brazen. Analysis of the opinions and actions of these groups indicates that we are dealing with a new phenomenon in our sociopolitical life—the formation of national Bolshevism, which is strikingly reminiscent of National Socialism in Germany during the period of its formation. This is happening against the same background: A crisis situation, impoverishment, lack of success by politicians in establishing even normal life, and an attempt to rely on semi-lumpen strata. And the same behind-the-scenes maneuvers of incitement by structures which have no interest in establishing a healthy market mechanism or strengthening democracy.

[Correspondent] But today's Russia is not the Weimar Germany of the twenties. While the Germans believed the reckless promises of Hitler and his entourage, Russians already know through their own experience what the prescriptions of demagogues promising quick, easy fixes cost the people...

[Orlov] I agree with you. And the activity of the Bolshevik forces, which have brought the country to such a humiliating state and which now, grown bolder, are again trying to foist on the people a past hallmarked by mass shootings and total hysteria in society, is particularly dangerous.

It is therefore essential to put a resolute stop to the rampant national Bolsheviks. The complacency of politicians, experts, and cultural figures of culture who regard such actions as a manifestation of political pluralism is unacceptable. They fail to realize that pluralism is a phenomenon of a political culture and democracy where all kinds of political action and all views are possible, but only within the law and when they are not designed to undermine democracy.

We urge all sensible people to firmly resist every manifestation of national Bolshevism and to explain to the population the perniciousness of its historical demagoguery. The authorities both at the center and at local level must strictly implement Russian laws, which prevent the propagation of national chauvinism, racism, and a return to totalitarian practices.

The slogan "Fascism shall not pass!" was often repeated in the thirties; it is essential for us to act right now before it is too late!

[Correspondent] Social Democrats describe the Movement for Democratic Reforms [MDR] as the party of that section of the nomenklatura which is trying to adapt to market conditions and representative democracy.

[Orlov] The MDR was conceived in the offices of the former CPSU Central Committee when the latter was still a going concern. While leading MDR figures resorted to social democratic phraseology in their arguments prior to the MDR's constituent congress, they now no longer talk of social democracy. The MDR leaders have stated that they will rely on businessmen.

[Correspondent] But they no doubt have their own businessmen in mind, do they not?

[Orlov] Yes, most likely those formed from that part of the nomenklatura which, enjoying a privileged and uncontrolled position during the period of rule of the now-collapsed CPSU, has gotten its hands on enterprises, turning state establishments into private concerns.

[Correspondent] This is known colloquially as "piratization."

[Orlov] Yes, the people always know how to recognize things for what they are. The nomenklatura bourgeoisie has no objective interest in developing democracy or supporting the reforms drawn up by the Russian leadership, but it does have an interest in restoring a semiauthoritarian regime, where the activity of the postnomenklatura bourgeoisie will be ensured under the formal label of democracy.

We hope that Russians will be able to perceive the true essence of the MDR leaders' policy and evaluate it properly. In the Social Democratic Party leadership's opinion, the MDR is bound to splinter and ultimately fade away. That is why we must carefully analyze the actions of the MDR leadership and the forces backing it, which are ready to resort to any steps to maintain their position.

Chairman on Socialist Workers' Party Goals

AU0801085992 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Jan 92 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Rybkin, cochairman of the Socialist Workers' Party, by Laszlo M. Lengyel; place and date not given: "We Continue What Gorbachev Started"]

[Text] Ivan Rybkin was a people's deputy in the Soviet Union. After the banning of the CPSU, he and his associates, Roy Medvedev and Anatoliy Denisov, started to organize a new left-wing party that now has 50,000 members and is a considerable party in Russia.

[Lengyel] At the inaugural session, I saw a large Lenin portrait behind the presidium, but already at that time, I heard from respected politicians like Roy Medvedev that your party wanted to break with orthodox communist ideas. What can you say about this after the first congress?

[Rybkin] The party's symbolism and political image have changed considerably. Conservative communists understood that they had a different road to follow, stayed away from our congress, and formed a new party. From the outset, our organizing committee consisted of politicians with social democratic views, like Roy Medvedev, Anatoliy Denisov, Mikhail Lapshin, Lyudmila Vartazarova, Gennadiy Shklyar, Aleksandr Maltsev, and me.

The Socialist Workers' Party is the name of the party, and the red carnation is its symbol. We said that we wanted to move the party in a socialist and social-democratic direction; in other words, we want to continue the process that Mikhail Gorbachev started.

[Lengyel] I feel this is important because you have clearly determined your ideological relation to Gorbachev; however, who are your members?

[Rybkin] We already have more than 50,000 members. Some 70 percent of them are former members of the CPSU, but 30 percent are newcomers and, fortunately, young. Our sphere of influence is broad; 65 out of the 78 area units of the Russian Federation were represented at our congress. Local organizations elected 298 deputies, and 254 of these people managed to turn up. (There were problems with canceled flights or train tickets that could not be bought.)

The 169 guests also indicate certain importance or interest. Some 85 deputies of the congress are representatives or council members on some level, and 25 deputies are people's deputies of the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation.

[Lengyel] What about their political views?

[Rybkin] Our aim is the establishment of a humane and democratic society. Within that, we support a mixed economy. Our ideas are somewhat similar to those drawn up by Rutskoy, deputy chairman of the People's Party of Free Russia, but we definitely want to operate as a constructive opposition to the current Russian leadership. An important point of our program is the protection of interests of workers, salaried people, and wage-earners.

[Lengyel] What were the highlights of the congress?

[Rybkin] There were three reports. I made the first one on the economic and social situation of Russia. Aleksandr Maltsev from Nizhniy Novgorod spoke about our program of activities, and Gennadiy Shklyar held a lecture on our organizational and structural work.

The congress recognized the need for fundamental economic and political reforms, maintaining at the same time that "alleviation of social pain" was also necessary. We also support the creation of the new Commonwealth, but we see this as a stage in the renewal of the Union.

We want the peasantry to be able to freely choose the form of ownership for its activities. Agricultural farms should not be forcefully maintained or disbanded, either.

We reject all political extremism and all ideas that would only sweep the country into chaos; we only recognize the framework of parliamentary democracy as a means for fighting political battles. We are concerned that new bureaucratic structures have already been formed in Russia; the centralized and autocratic leadership may be revived in a new form.

[Lengyel] What is the structure of the new party?

[Rybkin] We have problems. Some places refuse to register our local organizations, and they are not given the necessary conditions to operate. We do not receive our due share from the property of the CPSU, which is considered to be our predecessor in certain respects, that would ensure our minimal operating conditions. We do not have a printing press or a newspaper, either.

The congress elected seven cochairmen, the members of the preparatory committee. Our general committee consists of 105 members, and its leadership has 18 members. Generally, we aim to support the Russian intelligentsia, but we do not need to be ashamed of the intellectual level of our leadership, either. Six cochairmen and 10 members of the leadership have scientific degrees while three laborers also work with them. I can assure you that they did not get there for statistical reasons.

New Union Formed To Help Servicemen

PM0801105192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

["Is 'Shchit' Cracking Up?"]

[Text] A group of members of the "Shchit" Union, including persons belonging to its executive committee and coordinating council—S. Kudinov, A. Terentyev, V. Kuznetsov, V. Panichkin, and V. Licharda—have issued a statement that they are leaving this organization and setting up the Russian Defense Patriotic Union. They base their decision on the claim that the "Shchit" Union, which was set up to resolve the noble tasks of servicemen's social protection, is not resolving those tasks.

The statement emphasizes that careerists and political timeservers have come into the leadership of this public organization who attach paramount importance in their activity not to the interests of the cause but to the satisfaction of their own ambitions. This applies above all to "Shchit" Union Chairman V. Urazhtsev, through whose efforts the organization found itself drawn into political intrigues which leave no room for concern about the military man and his problems. Many officers and ensigns who were on the point of believing in the fine words of "Shchit's" leaders about social protection for people in uniform now realize that this was nothing more than speculation.

Convinced of the impossibility of changing anything in V. Urazhtsev's position and conduct, the statement reads, we have reached the conclusion that we must leave the politically bankrupt "Shchit" and set up in its stead a new organization which will really tackle servicemen's social protection and educate the rising generation in the spirit of love for the homeland.

The authors of the statement urge all officers, ensigns, soldiers, sergeants, and servicemen in the reserve to follow their example and join the newly organized Russian Defense Patriotic Union. They express hope that the Ministry of Defense and other Russian Federation organs of state power will understand and support their intentions.

Yeltsin Attends Christmas Eve Service

LD0701172792 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1653 GMT 7 Jan 92

[By correspondent Igor Bekov]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 7 Jan (TASS)— Russia's President Boris Yeltsin marked the joyous festival of the birth of Christ by attending the night service at the Church of the Birth of Christ. The service was led by Patriarch Aleksiy II of Moscow and All Russia, who congratulated the believers on the great festive occasion. [passage omitted]

New Produce Market To Fight State Monopoly

LD0401115592 Moscow TASS in English 1053 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Moscow January 4 TASS—A new Russian agricultural produce market is competing with the state monopoly to provide farmers with machinery at free market prices.

"We trade various types of agricultural machinery and equipment, as well as grain, seeds, wood, petrol and construction materials", Aleksandr Yafarov, co-chairman of the agricultural market, told TASS on Saturday [4 January].

Deals worth 70 million rubles are struck at the market per trading session, but as the ruble devaluates, bartering is most popular, he said.

Yafarov is confident farmers will prefer his market to the state distribution system, which proved inefficient in the past 74 years of Soviet history.

Government To End Monopoly on Metals Mining

OW0301132492 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1115 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Transmitted by KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Magadan administration, Mr. Viktor Mikhailov, said at a press conference on January 2, that the Russian government was planning to demonopolize the mining of precious metals and stones. Judging from a recently drafted decree, Russia will give all the juridical entities and private individual the go-ahead for mining precious stones. The Russian Federation's territories and regions will be allowed to give out licenses for prospecting and developing deposits of precious stones and metals.

Mr. Mikhailov said, however, that the Russian government still objected to the involvement of foreign capital and know-how in the development of gold mines. In the absence of hard currency and efficient and ecologically clean know-how only 50 per cent of the prospected gold is being mined in the Magadan region. The volume of gold mining has dropped by 10 per cent over the past three years.

Unemployment Exchange Official on Statistics

LD0501031592 Moscow Teleradiokompanii Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 4 Jan 92

["Novosti" report by correspondent N. Chernyshova from the Employment Center-Labor Exchange]

[Summary] I. Ye. Zaslavskiy, general director of the Labor Exchange, noting the strange nature of the employment market in Russia, says that of 6,000 party officials, only 466 have applied to the Labor Exchange seeking alternative employment. The rest have found niches for themselves. The preliminary unemployment forecasts of 125,000 in Moscow alone, and up to 16 million in the country as a whole have proved unfounded.

Zaslavsky says: "As of the new year in Russia, about 70,000 people were receiving benefits. In the capital, just over 11,500 people were receiving benefits. Job vacancies in Moscow have remained stable at 80,000 to 100,000, with 90 percent of these being manual labor jobs. The hopes for white collar workers switching to the production sphere have not been fulfilled, just as the hopes for intensification of labor have not been fulfilled."

[The video shows the staff at the exchange working at computer terminals, tables of figures, a diagram showing 88.1 percent of people in the category of specialists and office workers, and 11.9 percent in the category of manual workers.]

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Notes Price Rise

PM0701120792 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed "message": "To the Newspaper's Readers"]

[Text] The harsh laws of the market are painfully affecting not just the budget of virtually every family of our compatriots—unfortunately they are also encroaching on the financial relationship between newspapers and their readers. It is with chagrin that we are forced to report that the retail price of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA is going up with this, our second issue of the year [from 30 to 60 kopeks]. This is our common misfortune: The overwhelming majority of other publications have also been forced to raise their price.

Do understand us correctly: There is no other way to survive at present—paper, printing expenses, and communications services have gone up excessively. This is a forced measure, and please believe us, it distresses us no less than it does readers. We are cutting items of expenditure to the utmost possible. Many readers and friends of the newspaper have been contributing to its survival fund out of personal savings. Our enormous thanks for this. However, the onslaught of the general price increases is so great that there is no way of avoiding increasing the retail price.

We promise that, despite the difficulties, we will remain loyal to the truth of life and the spirit of an independent newspaper of the people.

Youth Paper Explains Editorial Credo

PM0601125392 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jan 92 p 1

[Editorial Collegium "Manifesto"]

[Text] Today the 20,301st issue of the newspaper is published. Renunciations are never easy. And we have not changed our name since 1925.

Like a tree in the fall, our newspaper's proud masthead, indication of affiliation, and what is nowadays called our logo has been shedding things in recent years.

The slogan "Proletarians of All Countries Unite!", which had seemed cast in tablets of stone, was swept away by the still fresh wind of changes. The slogan "Organ of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee" took sick and passed away quietly, without leaving a mark. Now we are no longer "All-Union" (there is no Union). And are we still a daily newspaper (after all, daily—that means at a minimum Sunday as well)? You, readers, and we are in some embarrassment over that orderly line of medals as well.

Not to mention the very name which our "sixth floor" [the paper's offices are located on the sixth floor of the PRAVDA building] has born for the past 66 years... If you break it down into its component parts, there is an inherent absurdity: the truth [PRAVDA] of something which does not exist?

But not everything is subjected to cold analysis, or, more importantly, needs to be. The name KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA not only encapsulates the history of the league of young people whose main task was to study hard, when not working on the Dnepr Hydroelectric Station or the Baykal-Amur Railroad. It also also encapsulates the lives of millions of people, old and young, who see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as a newspaper which has always tried to be intelligent, honest, and good. Its journalists have made mistakes and also won recognition, known sorrow and also joy, and always shared the same destiny as their readers. In this name—as in any name given at Christening—there is something independent of the social structure, of circumstances, of even the freshest of winds.

But you understand all this, dear readers, so why get involved in lengthy explanations? After all, neither we, nor you intend to renounce anything—neither the past, nor the newspaper, nor ourselves. We retain the right to ponder all this, to agonize over confounded questions, scoff at idiocies, irrespective of their perpetrators' party affiliation or length of service, to rejoice in life, good deeds, and children, to perform our own moral duty—this was true in the USSR, and will be true in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and in each of the republics where there remains even one of our readers at least one issue of our newspaper is received.

As for what our paper should be like (and what name it should have), we would like to ask your advice, reader-92, and only then to make a final decision.

Therefore, for us the question "Whose paper are you now?" is not a real question. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was and will be a paper for readers in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, Ukraine—in fact, in any independent, democratic, rule-of-law, humane state, where people want to read us.

This year will really be a new year for all of us—perhaps the most difficult in the life of a generation. Everything is changing: prices, views, presidents, the country.

This is normal: Life must become different and new.

But in it, some things should remain as they were before.

And perhaps, who knows, they should be eternal...

Gostelradio Chairman Views SEM DNEY

LD0601205592 Moscow SEM DNEY in Russian 30 Dec-5 Jan p 2

[Text] On the eve of the new year, a meeting was held in the SEM DNEY [Seven Days] editorial office between the staff of the weekly and Yegor Yakovlev, chairman of the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, who expressed his ideas on what a weekly newspaper for viewers should be like. In Ye. Yakovlev's view, the present SEM DNEY is "a second grade newspaper." "A newspaper in which there can be no sensations, a newspaper where the top people in the country do not appear" is doomed to be a second grade publication, the Television and Radio Company chairman thinks. And so as to emerge abruptly "from the second grade to the first," Ye. Yakovlev expounded a concept consisting of five principles, or more correctly of five verbs. These were the following: "To forestall, to influence, to continue, to unite, and to study." To forestall—this means to create a political body of material forecasting the development of political events in the country for a week or two ahead. This body of material block should, to a certain degree, determine the direction of Central Television's sociopolitical broadcasting for the week ahead.

Analyzing the internal processes taking place on Central Television, SEM DNEY should influence television's development and the formation of program policy. Ye. Yakovlev allocates a special role in this to wider publication of letters from television viewers on the pages of the newspaper. To continue what has been begun on the air, or by raising a problem in the newspaper, "to continue" it on the air—this is in the chairman's view one of the major tasks of Central Television's television and radio program publication.

SEM DNEY should aim to unite Central Television with local and republican television companies. "Today a link with the republics, uniting with the republics, is a condition for the television company's survival." To determine the state of public consciousness and analyze the way the country's population perceives the televised information flow: this will give the newspaper the opportunity of becoming a unique barometer of the public's mood.

Ye. Yakovlev said that the way programs are advertised needs not only to be improved but needs completely different and surprise methods. The chairman's evaluations and wishes in many respects back up, develop, and add to the plans of the editorial staff.

Speaking about the newspaper's future, Ye. Yakovlev announced that a publishing company, the "RT-Pressa" is being set up in the television and radio broadcasting company, of which the SEM DNEY weekly will be a part, alongside the KOLOBOK and KRUGOZOR newspapers. A new publication TV-REVYU is also being set up, and 15,000 dollars has already been allocated to organize this and to establish "RT-Pressa."

How are relations between SEM DNEY and the Russian Television and Radio Company to be built? Yegor Vladimirovich replied to this: "I am rather a mean person and I have no desire to give up what I have ... we are now transferring to the jurisdiction of Russia, and therefore I do not intend to share with anyone a newspaper with a good circulation and its own trademark."

It was on this problem that subsequent discussion flared up. The thing is that the editors of SEM DNEY have for some time now been trying to break loose from departmental guardianship and to serve the interests of readers rather than the management of Gosteleradio. We believe that Russian Television, together with Central Television and the paper's editorial staff, should become equal co-founders of this publication. Only under such conditions can the paper become truly independent and free and overcome its "secondary rating." After all, only a genuinely independent paper can both forecast sociopolitical events and, by analyzing the television process as a whole, influence the work of television companies and the formation of their program policy. The editorial staff submitted these proposals to the management of the Union and Russian television and radio companies back in September. The editors' stand was supported at the Russian company and also by lawyers, economists, and a number of Gosteleradio deputy chairmen. But...

Journalists of SEM DNEY saw Ye. Yakovlev's negative reaction to the proposal that the paper be founded jointly with Russian Television as a manifestation of departmental egoism. And departmental egoism is not creatively, politically, or economically productive. It can only intensify the already confrontational relations between the two television and radio companies. The Russian Television Company will be forced to set up its own publication and then, instead of one independent television paper, readers will get two departmental papers. Furthermore, each of them will give information only about programs of "its own channel." One asks if listeners and viewers benefit from this?

The present Gosteleradio chairman has stated many times in the press that the opinion of viewers is for him the ultimate authority. So we suggest, dear readers, that you be the judges in our dispute with Ye. Yakovlev.

[Signed] V. Verin, section editor

Correction: Decree Issued on Security Ministry

WA0701181092

The following corrections pertain to the item headlined "Presidential Decree Issued on Security Ministry," published in the 31 December Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 32-33:

Page 32, column two, paragraph seven, only sentence, should read: 2. Within one month the RSFSR Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs will draw up and submit for approval provisions on the ministry and its structure, establishing a service, as a separate subdivision, which will ensure the state security of the RSFSR. (rewording sentence)

Page 33, column one , paragraph one, only sentence, should read: The RSFSR minister of security and internal affairs... (changing ministry to minister)

Supreme Soviet

Deputies' Letter Demands Government Resign

PM0701112592 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 3

[Letter by N.A. Pavlov, V.B. Isakov, S.N. Baburin, and V.N. Khayryuzov, peoples's deputies and members of the Russian Supreme Soviet; dated 28 December: "Stop the Antipeople Experiment!"]

[Text] Embarked on a path of political and economic recklessness, the government and the ruling majority of the Russian parliament are engaged in carrying out another experiment on the peoples of Russia, plunging them into poverty, chaos, and anarchy. The chosen economic course, which is rejected by the majority of the people, is not only preventing the implementation of such essential economic reforms but also causing deepening crisis.

The government's hysterical criticism of Ryzhkov and Pavlov in the radical press, on the squares of the capital, and in the Russian Supreme Soviet for their 30-70-percent increase in prices for certain kinds of goods was replaced by deafening silence in the same mass media and among the people's deputies when the plans for a general 500-600-percent price increase were promulgated by the present government.

Yes, the people are in favor of the reforms and the dismantling of the administrative edict system. People were delighted by the removal of the dictatorship of the party bureaucracy, the abolition of censorship and telephone tapping, the opportunity for the open expression of their ideas, and hopes for free productive labor and decent earnings. However, this delight proved short-lived. Instead of the promised economic prosperity and civil accord, we have deepening economic collapse and mounting confrontation in social life. Instead of developing democracy, the government has denied the majority of Russian citizens the right to elect their own rayon, city, and oblast leaders. They are all appointed from Moscow on the recommendation of the completely unknown V. Makharadze. Only the inhabitants of former autonomous republics have for some reason retained the right to elect their own leaders. Instead of freedom of expression and glasnost, overt pressure has begun to be applied to awkward newspapers, even elements of serious criticism of the present course have been driven from the television screen and are not allowed, with attempts even being made to stop television programs that do not suit the authorities. An attempt has been made to merge the organs of state security and internal affairs, which is bound to cause special alarm, because the peoples of Russia are only too well aware how such "improvements" ended in the recent past.

Finally it is imposible not to see that the way in which the Union was dismembered is beginning its destructive work in the Russian Federation, and the current economic course will drastically accelerate this process.

Seeing all this and mindful of our responsibility, we people's deputies, finding ourselves in opposition to the course of the Russian Government and the radical majority, urge citizens, political parties, and trade unions to seek—guided by the supreme interests of the people and within a strict constitutional framework—the earliest resignation of the government. We appeal to the president to form a government capable of carrying out economic reforms in the interests of the **majority** of Russian citizens—a **government of national confidence**. If this is not done in the near future, mounting social tension, further disintegration of Russia's economy and statehood, and, as a consequence, a return to a totalitarian system under new slogans are inevitable.

Khasbulatov on 'Perceptible Changes' for '92

PM0701120192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Jan 92 First Edition p 1

[Article by Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet: "You Will See Changes for the Better Before 1992 Is Over"]

[Text] On the threshold separating the old year from the new, it is customary to look back so as not to repeat past mistakes in the future. Following this ritual, I must mention the bitterness with which I recall the time wasted in endless discussions with the Union leadership and in attempts to convince one another that this was simply inevitable if we really wanted to change people's lives for the better—which is the responsibility that we assumed toward them.

This is the main thing—the mutual understanding the Russian parliament previously hardly managed to achieve in relations with now former Union President M.S. Gorbachev. Even though we did everything possible to try to persuade him of something which life itself ultimately resolved. Mutual relations with the republics could not be formed by the method of diktat.

Of course, I do not like the disintegration of the USSR. After all, no matter how bad the memories of the past were for each of us, this was still our country, and people of any nationality linked the concept of the motherland with the Union. However, there is a limit to everything. Russia, which remained faithful longest of all to the idea of the Union treaty, was forced under pressure of circumstances to take the only step possible to preserve, in the new form of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], the historical unity among the majority of former Union republics, now independent states.

What changes has this innovation brought? I think that we have to give priority to the degree of responsibility. It is no secret that when there was a "center," many people automatically presumed that it ought to be answerable for everything. At best they limited their role to "playing at opposition." However, those times have gone forever. It would seem that there is no longer anyone to switch the responsibility to. We ourselves must bear the responsibility for what we do or do not want to do.

We have already spoken about this at the Supreme Soviet. I must say that, despite the incredible difficulties they work under, the Russian parliament and Russia's elected representatives in the legislature are showing themselves to be increasingly professional statesmen. Thus I can only be proud of the fact that on many complex questions I meet with their support and can think of only extremely rare instances when our opinions differ, as for example on the question of the status of Union deputies: Colleagues in the Russian parliament did not support my "mild option."

Henceforth, we are acting in a new and more responsible capacity, having renounced the "lightning conductor" that was the notorious center. There now exist in Russia indissolubly interconnected power structures: a legislature embodied in the Supreme Soviet and an executive headed by the president. Two equal (I would like to stress) forces, each of which should reinforce the other's decisions by its authority, because the existence of the presidential structure is inconceivable without a major parliamentary reinforcement, just as all legislative acts are inconceivable without their realization and implementation by the executive, presidential structure.

It is this misunderstanding that recently has been providing a pretext, not very helpful to any of us, for the mass media to literally "manipulate" the most important matters when the problems facing us all are at their most acute. The press, of course, is entitled to its own opinion. How much we respect that right is best demonstrated by the recently adopted Law on the Press with a broad range of journalists' rights attached to it. This is quite just. But on one essential condition: Justice must be reciprocal.

What is happening now, however? In the public mind, an image is being created of a conservative Supreme Soviet "that has betrayed the ideals of democracy" and that allegedly works against the progressive actions of the government. Forgive me, but this is apocryphal, to say the least, and therefore unprofessional, because the professional is not hooked by even the most "appetizing bait" but tries to unearth the truth and find out the "source" of this or that "rumor."

For quite a long time I worked directly with B.N. Yeltsin when I was first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and we neither had nor can have personal differences, much less differences of principle, on the need to raise Russia from its knees, as Boris Nikolayevich accurately put it when taking office as president. Nor are there any doubts here on the part of the parliament, which invariably supports B.N. Yeltsin in the most extreme situations. However, between the Supreme Soviet and the president there is the government. Now all sorts of journalistic interpretations of mutual relations between the parliament and the president are beginning over the position of this structural subdivision of the executive.

The two state institutions—the Supreme Soviet and the president—are accountable to their electors and all the peoples of the Russian Federation. None more so. People may ask, and quite rightly so: What about the government? The point here is that a professionally trained government, which is well qualified economically, socially, and in other respects, must work on specific matters in the national economy and not on politics. It is only for specific areas of its work, not for "general political discussions," that it is accountable—also "not in general" but specifically—to the president.

An understanding of this "subordination" would have long ago removed all reason for either far-fetched "conflicts" or indeed mutual dissatisfaction.

After all, the people are indifferent to all these psychological subtleties of the mutual relations between two wings of the same power. People quite rightly expect what they see as a single power to move, finally, from promises to real actions that will ease their human life—which is short, after all. That is why the parliament, which is adopting laws and sanctioning the government's activity in fulfillment of them, cannot deny its own responsibility for the results of these actions.

It is quite deliberately that I mention aid. I am talking about professional consultations not only when doing further work on documents prepared by the government and regarded as "substandard." The Supreme Soviet is ready to give such assistance even with the so-called "groundwork." It has the professional resources for that in committees, commissions, and officially approved councils. In addition, this can also be done using enthusiasts from the scientific intelligentsia and production specialists who offer parliament their highly skilled services. This truly selfless assistance, similar to the unparalleled feat voluntarily accomplished during those days in August by the thousands of defenders of the White House, is the best guarantee that the Supreme Soviet is on the right track and is capable of overcoming any obstacles to achieve ultimately the only aim—creating truly human living conditions for its fellow citizens.

When thinking about this on the eve of the New Year, which will not immediately begin in a land of milk and honey here, I would like to say how often I mentally ask your forgiveness, my fellow countrymen. Neither past scientific experience nor a citizen's heart overflowing with grief for the fatherland's fate has helped make life happier for each of you today. But then I did not expect miracles when I left my customary work and place in science to put into practice what I see in theory to be not only just but also attainable. It is that which has become the meaning of life not only for me but also for my colleagues in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and which has forced us to work to the limit of our ability. And not in vain, I think—despite the first steps of the economic reform, steps that frighten you all by their unfamiliarity and which the parliament has tried to alleviate by a series of social protection measures, believe me. We will begin to see perceptible changes for the better before 1992 is over....

The Russian state has existed for over a thousand years. A number of times in its history there have been difficult periods when there seemed to be no way out. But we survived and overcame the times of troubles. We shall overcome them now, too, relying on the support of our people, on you, dear fellow countrymen.

I wish you a happy New Year and the realization of our common hopes!

Regional Affairs

Sobchak Says City Has Food for 'Hard Winter'

PM0701114392 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 2

[TASS report: "Sobchak's Secret Weapon"]

[Text] St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak has told France's LA TRIBUNE DE L'EXPANSION that his city has prepared for a hard winter and for the price hikes and that adequate food stocks have been established in warehouses. In the interview, which appeared in yesterday's issue of the paper, he stressed that the city authorities did a great deal in advance with regard to supplying the population with produce and goods. In particular, back in November St. Petersburg was visited by the leaders or representatives of many former Soviet republics, and numerous contracts were signed with them for the delivery of meat, grain, sunflower oil, and wine to St. Petersburg residents.

Then, A. Sobchak disclosed, "we held talks with a view to directly purchasing foodstuffs abroad and also securing food aid this winter, in particular 10,000 tonnes of potatoes from Hamburg." "Finally, we have warehouses in the city and a plan of action in the event of an emergency," he said. "But that is my secret weapon."

Moscow Communist Defense Group Registered

PM0601102992 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Dec 91 p 2

[Nikolay Barvenkov report under the rubric "In Parties and Movements": "Legalized"]

[Text] The Moscow City Administration of Justice has issued to Professor V.S. Martemyanov, well-known academic jurist and cochairman of the "In Defense of Communists' Rights" public association, a certificate registering its articles of association, No. 619.

The certificate says that the association's basic aims are "defense of the civil, labor, social, and political rights and freedoms of persons holding communist convictions or sympathizing with them."

Therefore the public organization's activity has been juridically legalized.

...Three months ago 47 representatives of the Moscow public, among them people's deputies, academic jurists, political scientists, philosophers, historians, economists, journalists, workers, technical engineers, and pensioners, set up an organizing committee to form the public association "In Defense of the Rights of Communists."

In the process of preparing for registration of its articles, the public association acquitted itself well in its "trial" period. It not only limited its activity to statements of protest and appeals, but also responded to calls to help people who have fallen into hardship or are being persecuted for their convictions. First of all, funds were collected from the voluntary contributions of members of the public association, and many Soviet citizens sharing the association's tasks and aims to help the families of unlawfully arrested People's Deputy Alfreds Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, and Sergey Parfenov, one of the leaders of the Riga OMON [special purpose militia detachment], Andryusha, the five-year-old son of the leader of the Lithuanian "Unity" movement, and other comrades [sentence as published].

Increases in Draft Evasion Noted in Moscow

PM0701144392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Dec 92 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under "Over the Wire" rubric: "The Number of 'Dodgers' Has Increased"]

[Text] The prestige of military service among young Muscovites is falling, and the number of incidents of draft evasion is increasing. A statement to this effect has been made by Colonel Vladimir Dobrovolskiy, Moscow deputy military commissar. In his opinion, the reasons for this should be sought in the political and social instability, the decline of military-patriotic education, and young people's lack of confidence in the future.

This fall the number of "dodgers" in the city has passed the 3,000 mark. Only recently the picture was different: In 1988 there were 75; in 1989—275; and in 1990—about 1,000.

Ingush Elders Urge Vaynakh Republic Creation

PM0701113992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jan 92 First Edition p 1

[Report from roundup of RIA and TASS reports: "Ingush Suggest Unity"]

[Text] The participants in a meeting of elders of Ingushetia have urged their fellow countrymen to create a single Vaynakh Republic for the Chechen and Ingush.

The Ingush elders are convinced that the attempts to rapidly create an Ingush autonomous body within the Russian Federation and to set up borders between the Chechen and the Ingush lead to confrontation and catastrophe.

Troops Face Attacks, Desertion in Chechen

PM0701170792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 92 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel N. Astashkin and Lieutenant Colonel M. Smyslov report: "Law on Defense Comes Into Force in the Chechen Republic"]

[Text] Groznyy—The Law on Defense and Security [ob oborone i zashchite] adopted by the Chechen Republic parliament has come into force. According to the law, the defense forces of the Chechen Republic include the national guard, the border and customs service, the special purpose troops, the labor service, and the reserves. The commander in chief of the defense forces is the president of the Chechen Republic.

Service in the republic armed forces is divided into active service and service in the reserves. Active service includes compulsory basic service and service by contract. A citizen not wishing to serve in the armed forces because of his religious convictions is obliged to undergo labor service instead of basic service. The length of service is 18 months—12 months for those having higher education. The draft is to be carried out once a year in April.

As a law it is all very well, but it is only for local consumption, so to speak. Unfortunately, the status of Soviet Army servicemen in the republic has still not yet been determined. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that units are being subjected to attacks from criminal elements. A week before the New Year, persons unknown—evidently in search of weapons—penetrated the territory of an Air Defense radiotechnical regiment's headquarters [upravleniye], a rocket troops subunit, and other units. The sentries had to use their weapons to drive the bandits away.

In these circumstances, instances of desertion are by no means accidental. In one individual electronic support communications battalion alone, 14 soldiers recently went on the run. They were brought back with difficulty.

One of us met the soldiers of this subunit. They launched at once into a volley of questions, requests, and reproaches:

"Why is our pay five times lower than in the Transcaucasus, even though the service is no easier?"

"Local drug addicts come to us when we are on duty, shoot up, drink, and smoke hashish, take our things, and beat up those who oppose them."

"Locals have wrecked the remote gear."

"The stores don't even have any smokes."

They concluded by proposing that the paper carry the text of an ultimatum, signed by all the basic service servicemen remaining in the subunit. One of the demands was that the status of the Soviet Army in the Chechen Republic be determined within the month. Soldiers should sign contracts; those who do not sign should leave and do their service in their own regions. If this is not done, then "we will leave on our own."

It should be said that the airfield where the electronic support communications battalion is located is guarded by the Chechen National Guard. Attacks are also being made on this subunit. Incidentally, even the national guard's position has not been defined clearly, despite the Law on Defense and Security adopted in the Chechen Republic. For the umpteenth month guardsmen are not receiving the pay they were promised.

Dzharimov Elected Adygeya Republic President

LD0601124292 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Jan 92

[From the "New Wave" program]

[Text] The results of yesterday's repeated nationwide election for president of Adygeya were summed up this morning. The appointment goes to the 52-year-old candidate of economic sciences, Aslan Dzharimov, with 69.4 percent of the votes. Aslan Dzharimov recently held the post of chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Adygeya Soviet Socialist Republic.

Official Denies Nuclear Test Site in Magadan

LD0701162292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] There was never a nuclear test range in Magadan oblast, and radiation levels on its territory do not exceed permissible norms, according to Boris Sergeyev, an official from the Kolyma board of hydrometeorology and the environment, said in the pages of TERRITORIYA, the Magadan newspaper.

He denied press reports that have alarmed northerners that say that at one time there was a nuclear test range in the oblast that had left serious radioactive pollution.

National Affairs

Trade Union Protests Over Legislation

LD0701031792 Kiev Radio Kiev Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Excerpts] The Federation Council of the Trade Union of Cooperative Employees and Other Forms of Free Enterprise in the Ukraine has sent an open letter to Ukrainian President Kravchuk. This letter notes that individual legislative acts by the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet and normative acts being adopted by the government and some of its ministries are clear testimony to the anti-entrepreneurial tendency in the actions and decisions of the old command power structures that the Ukraine's governmental complex has not rid itself of to this day. [passage omitted]

The appeal to the president comes in the hope that the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the Ukrainian Government will adopt decisions aimed at the progressive development of the economy and all of its structures. If not, the Trade Union Federation of Cooperative Employees and Other Forms of Free Enterprise in the Ukraine reserves the right to demand by legal means the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers and the dissolution of the present composition of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet.

Strikes Begin in Ternopol Over Price Increases

LD0301151192 Kiev Radio Kiev Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Spontaneous strikes took place on the first working day of the New Year in workshops of the Ternopol combine plant. They were provoked by the prices in catering establishments. For example, a jar of sour cream which still cost approximately 60 kopeks on 31 December now costs 11.8 rubles, i.e. 20 times more. The cost of other foods has also gone up steeply. Workers cannot understand why 3-4-fold price increases promised by the government have turned out to be such a 10-fold robbing.

Belarus

Shushkevich Interviewed on CIS Evolution

PM0701153992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet, by Nikolay Matukovskiy: "'We Have No Alternative'"]

[Text] He never dreamed he would be a politician. He wanted to be a physicist and that is what he became. Although it took him six interviews with the rector to get into the Belarus State University Physics and Mathematics Department. Although he was a prizewinner, they would not accept him—he is the son of a writer who was a victim of repression. Incidentally, his mother was a writer too, while all his grandparents and great-grandparents had been tillers of the soil. He became a major specialist in the sphere of radiospectroscopy, a doctor of sciences, and corresponding member of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences. He attracted attention when he embarked on political activity—he was elected republic people's deputy and first deputy chairman and then chairman of the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet.

His wife is also a physicist and works at the Academy of Sciences. His daughter is a graduate of the conservatory and a composer. His son is still at school and "turns everything upside down at home." Home is a two-room apartment, as it was when he was university prorector...

[Matukovskiy] The main event of the year, if not of the century, was the USSR's departure from the world stage and the birth of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. Tell me, is it the logical end of our "socialist path" or someone's mistake—that of the former leadership, the former party?

[Shushkevich] Can the wretched, primitive thing that existed here for seven decades be called socialism? It collapsed under the pressure of history and the development of world civilization. It was bound to happen. In fact, our existence, protected from the entire civilized world by an iron curtain, was largely artificial. Essentially, for more than 70 years our "socialist" life was in artificial opposition to world progress. And those who do not understand and do not accept this, treated what happened as a tragedy. This delusion will soon go away, and when that happens we will all sigh with relief: We are civilized people at last!

[Matukovskiy] Was there any alternative to the Commonwealth?

[Shushkevich] Eighteen months or two years ago there was an alternative—a confederation. But we missed the opportunity—centrifugal processes were gaining ground and deepening and the republics were moving further and further away from the center and from one another. Until a confederation became impossible. The former center is entirely to blame for this. It was reluctant to relinquish even a tiny fraction of its power and its rights. It was reluctant to give the republics even a taste of freedom in a confederative form.

It is too late to talk about that. At the moment the most acceptable and promising way of uniting the peoples and states is the Commonwealth. That is why nearly all the republics of the former Union accepted it so unanimously.

One could question the wisdom of this kind of integration, when, for instance, 800 enterprises in all the former republics are working for the Minsk Tractor Plant. One could find hundreds of examples of this kind in any state of the Commonwealth. To ignore these realities would be to paralyze economic life in all the states, which could be seen as a crime against one's own sovereign peoples.

[Matukovskiy] In what direction will the Commonwealth develop—integration or, on the other hand, disintegration? Could Western Europe's experience be useful?

[Shushkevich] I do believe that integration is the most likely prospect. You can find confirmation of this throughout world experience. But I admit that at some stage common links could weaken and bilateral and trilateral relations strengthen. For example, I believe that Belarus and Ukraine could become extremely close, for historical and geographical reasons. It would be natural, of course, for the Central Asian republics to do the same. Time will tell what kind of links offer the best prospects and are most essential to peoples and states.

As for Europe's experience, it is acceptable to us only in part. It must not be forgotten that the EC is made up of independent, sovereign states. Experience tells them what should be integrated and what should be kept under "national lock and key"—inviolable. For instance, they spent years sizing up the European market. We, though, have no coherent notion yet what sovereignty is.

[Matukovskiy] It seems to me, Stanislav Stanislavovich, that these fears arise because many people, including the opposition in the Belarus Supreme Soviet, have only a very vague idea what the Commonwealth is. Hence all the doubts and fears. And the suspicion that a new totalitarian state might appear in place of the CIS.

[Shushkevich] Well, the Commonwealth will not have the structures, the power to pressure anyone. But if something like that happens, any of the states can leave the Commonwealth at any time. States are absolutely free to join and to leave the CIS. It is this freedom that is the chief advantage over the former Union.

But I realize that there is a once bitten, twice shy factor. We are so ground down by the former center's diktat that it seems to us all but immortal. But that center does not exist! We have to get used to that and we must also recognize freedom. It is not said for nothing that the strongest fortress is the human brain.

As for the opposition.... The opposition is there to object, to criticize and thereby aid correct, unerring decision-making. The opposition in our parliament is pretty progressive and constructive. When we were ratifying the agreement on the Commonwealth only one person voted against it. The leader of our opposition, Zenon Poznyak, was with us in Alma-Ata. He fully agreed with the principles we appended our signatures to.

[Matukovskiy] You said that in the Commonwealth there would be no structures to pressure, to restrict the rights and sovereignty of independent states. So what kind of "governing" bodies should there be? I fear that none of us has the slightest idea what the coordination center will look like. Who will be part of it? How will it operate?

[Shushkevich] We unanimously agreed on the creation of the main coordinating bodies—Council of Heads of States and Council of Heads of Governments of the CIS, that is, the structures that will determine Commonwealth strategy and tactics. The very complex and extremely important question of unified strategic forces and a single command was also resolved. The whole world sighed with relief following that decision.

It is hard to say at the moment what other coordinating structures will be established in the immediate future. There are the problems of the energy complex, social protection for the population, the economy, transport, communications, finance, and, of course, the fight against crime. Before joining Interpol we have to decide what kind of structure is going to join. We will have to create arbitration and legal structures to monitor the implementation of the accord and impose sanctions on anyone who violates the accord.

Given the recognition of our sovereign rights in the international arena, some states are obviously going to open their own embassies in a number of countries, and some will instruct Commonwealth partners to protect their interests. All this has to be agreed in advance, amicably decided, so that no one is offended.

[Matukovskiy] Stanislav Stainislavovich, can you tell us, why Minsk?

[Shushkevich] I was not asked that question in Alma-Ata. Well, in the first place, it was clear from the outset that it had to be anywhere but Moscow, where the liquidated structures had metastasized so powerfully that they might have choked the tender shoots of the emerging Commonwealth. Furthermore... I don't want to appear immodest... The Belorussians are a very easy-going people, their character shaped by history.

I realize that what you are asking is where the CIS coordinating structures will be located. Well, in the first place, they will be very small. Second, many premises, formerly occupied by the Belorussian Communist Party and CPSU have been vacated. There are plans for a special building in the future. it is now a matter of honor not only for Minsk, but for the whole of Belarus, to create the most favorable conditions possible for the Commonwealth's work.

Trade Union Cautions West Against Cooperation

LD2912111191 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 2037 GMT 29 Dec 91

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Belarus Confederation of Independent Trade Unions plans to caution Western investors against cooperation with present leadership of the Belarus Republic. On December 26 Belarus Confederation of Independent Trade Unions sent telegrams to 10 presidents of the republics—members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], who are to meet in Minsk on December 30. The telegram, in particular, points out that the government of Vyacheslav Kebich transformed privatization in the republic into distribution of property among state officials. Leader of the workers movement Mikhail Sobol told PF [POSTFACTUM] correspondent that the confederation prepared a package of documents on the activities of the Belarus Government, which will soon be sent to embassies of 30 foreign countries. According to Sobol, mass actions of workers' protest against the government's performance should be expected in the beginning of 1992.

First Housing Units for Soldiers Completed

LD0701155592 Hamburg DPA in German 1319 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—The first German-financed housing for former Soviet soldiers who are being withdrawn from the former GDR is ready for occupation. The housing complex will be handed over 8 January in the Belarussian town of Borisov, Enno Barker, head of the German Embassy's press office in Moscow, told DPA on 7 January. The cost of the housing complex was about 200 million Deutsch Marks, he said. The estate, with 725 homes, was completed by a Turkish firm in nine months, he said.

The estate will be officially handed over by Helmut Schaefer, minister of state at the Foreign Ministry, and Klaus Beckmann, parliamentary state secretary at the Federal Economics Ministry. According to Barker, homes for former Soviet soldiers, who are to leave Germany by 1994, will be built in 33 other towns in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Moldova

Officials Favor, Oppose Unity With Romania

President Rejects Union

PM0801102192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Moldovan President Mircea Snegur by Yu. Zhbanova; place, date not given: "Mircea Snegur: There Can Be No Question of Joining Romania"]

[Text] [Zhbanova] Mr. President, your convincing victory in the election demonstrates that people are relying on you. So how do you intend to get Moldova out of the crisis?

[Snegur] My year as president has clearly convinced people that I have kept my promise to be the guarantor of Moldova's independence. Yes, Moldova and Romania are states whose citizens speak the same language. But there can be no question of joining Romania or any other country. I am in favor of Moldova's territorial integrity. Without this there will be no peace, and the leaders of Gagauzia should realize this. The Right and Left Banks [of the Dnestr river] have satisfied themselves through bitter experience that even in the most tense situations it is possible to achieve peace and harmony.

[Zhbanova] But a section of the Moldovan People's Front is supporting the idea of unification with Romania as before...

[Snegur] Right now a group pursuing what is in my view an antipeople policy has assumed the leadership of the People's Front. Its present leaders Druc and Matey have pushed aside the former leaders, declared themselves the official opposition, and drawn closer to Interfront in a number of their demands. Not so long ago in parliament 27 deputies headed by Druc set up a committee for unification with Romania. But I think this is a matter for their conscience.

[Zhbanova] Which of the structures of state power (the police, the government, the parliament) is worrying you at present?

[Snegur] All of them are worrying me. The parliament and its chairman are working extremely unproductively. But the government is worrying me even more. New people are coming into the leadership who are often unaccustomed to organized work. Not all the ministers are suited to their status and position. Changes will soon be made to these and other state power structures.

[Zhbanova] Has your team taken shape? If it has, are you pleased with it?

[Snegur] Unfortunately it has not taken shape yet. And the team I do have is nothing to boast about. I had a good team during the election campaign—it would be nice to have that team again, but that is unlikely to happen...

[Zhbanova] In this troubled time the Dnestr region and Gagauzia have gone their own way. No matter that people have declared this path unlawful, it is a fact nonetheless. Can you see what form mutual relations with them will take?

[Snegur] I am constantly on the lookout for these. Moreover, I cannot say that I am getting a lot of support in my entourage. However, everyone must work toward this; mutually acceptable forms can always be found through conciliation commissions. We are prepared to make changes to the time frame for the Russian-speaking population to learn Moldavian, for example. And in conditions of free market relations, policy will be dictated not by the language of one nationality or another but by freedom of economic enterprise.

[Zhbanova] What have you learned in the past year?

[Snegur] I am going to disappoint you and myself: There has not been enough time to look back and reflect on the path we have taken. However, I have probably learned to recognize my mistakes, especially in choosing cadres.

[Zhbanova] You mean you are disappointed in the people around you?

[Snegur] In many of them, yes. I do not understand those who are afraid to talk with people or go out onto the streets. Some of our ministers do not leave their offices for weeks. We shall be saying good-bye to them. Moreover, I cannot abide toadying, and unfortunately there is plenty of that about. However, among my entourage there are also those who seek no favors for themselves.

[Zhbanova] You signed the Alma-Ata communique in the summer, but you did not go to Novo-Ogarevo once. How did you react to the idea of the establishment of a Commonwealth of Independent States?

[Snegur] The Novo-Ogarevo process went on too long and eventually reached a dead end. At the first meeting they made a decision to establish a reformed Union, they then got together and decided there would be a federation, and at their third meeting they were talking about a confederation. The Treaty on the Commonwealth of Independent States envisages new mutual relations between them. This, as I see it, is the attractive feature of the new union that does not encroach on Moldova's sovereignty or independence.

Eventual Unity Seen

PM0501220792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 92 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, TASS, RIA orrespondents' "Direct Line" column: "Minister's Opinion"]

[Text] Kishinev, 2 Jan—Border troops stationed on Moldovan territory will finally be transferred to the republic National Security Ministry's jurisdiction in the very near future, Anatol Totugaru, its leader, has told the weekly LITERATURA SI ARTA [LITERATUTE AND ART]. According to him, those border troop officers who have already been provided with accommodation or who are married to Moldovans and who demonstrate their loyalty to the policies of the Moldovan Government and are good professionals will continue to serve on the republic's territory.

As far as the question of the reunification of Moldova and Romania is concerned, the Moldovan national security minister said that it will take place sooner or later. This is an objective process that does not depend on anyone's likes or dislikes. The situation in Moldova, its geopolitical position, and the international situation insistently dictate that questions of Moldovan reunification with Romania not be accelerated at the present time, the minister stated.

Turcanu Rules Out Unification

AU0701194792 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 3 Jan 92 p 3

[Telephone interview with Moldovan Parliamentary Secretary Ion Turcanu by Csaba Szerdahelyi in Kishinev; date not given: "In Moldavia They State Resolutely That They Will Also Remain Independent of Romania"]

[Text] Bucharest is just dreaming about a possible unification of Romania and Moldova in the near future, but there is practically no realistic basis for this today, Ion Turcanu told NEPSZAVA over the telephone.

[Szerdahelyi] Romania was disappointed by Kishinev's position on this issue, but how did the people in Moldova react to all this?

[Turcanu] Together with the Baltic states, our republic was among the first to press for a separation from Moscow and the fight for independence. We did this a long time ago. At the time, many people actually considered forging closer links with Romania. We do not want to change this now, either, but there is no realistic basis for dismantling our borders. I think I am expressing the majority view, although it is undeniable that some extremist elements disagree with this. You have to be aware, however, of the fact that these are isolated efforts and they can hardly be seen as serious.

[Szerdahelyi] It is no secret that you are talking about the Moldovan Popular Front's ideas....

[Turcanu] I would be more specific, because there are different orientations within the Popular Front movement. Nevertheless, the idea itself was actually born in the minds of a few Popular Front members.

[Szerdahelyi] Do most people believe that it is not worth joining a Romania that is struggling with serious economic difficulties?

[Turcanu] I do not think people are guided by such considerations. Furthermore, our first goal is to establish real economic links between Kishinev and Bucharest at long last. I do not deny that socialist development ruined a lot of things, but that does not mean that this is cooperation between beggars. Nevertheless, political realities only allow for this orientation in cooperation today. Moreover, in itself, the collapse of the Soviet Union is making everyone face a difficult task. We must not add to this by disturbing Europe's borders.

[Szerdahelyi] You have probably heard the argument that if Moldova is unified with Romania, this will bring on the question of Hungary and Transylvania.

[Turcanu] I have heard this argument, but I do not think that the people who spread it actually believe it. In any case, the two problems are of a different nature, but I have already told you that unification is not on the agenda. Naturally, one can incite nationalist conflicts through such announcements, but we have to take resolute measures against this because it is precisely nationalism that has brought our region into such a tragic situation. I think that we can discuss all this with our Hungarian partners. Indeed, it is our definite intention to establish good relations with Budapest as well.

[Szerdahelyi] How do you visualize Moldova's role in the new Commonwealth of Independent States?

[Turcanu] We will only take part in the activities under equal conditions and with the strict application of the rules of democracy. If within the next few weeks Russia and the Ukraine agree on everything, this could fundamentally determine the union's future. If anyone tries to dictate from a position of strength, they can only lose. I hope that we can avoid conflicts by negotiating.

Mosanu Favors Cooperation

AU0101153592 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 1 Jan 92

[Text] In an interview granted to Bucharest radio station, Mr. Alexandru Mosanu, president of the parliament of the Republic of Moldova, reviewed the year 1991. He expressed the desire to intensify and diversify cooperation with Romania's parliament or even unite our legislation.

He urged his parliamentary colleagues in Romania to contribute with all their strength to developing the country on the road to democracy and to raising it to the levels of modern civilization. He stressed that Romania's progress and prosperity represent the best and most effective support for the Republic of Moldova in the struggle for achieving our decades-old wish—unification.

Laws To Ease Transition to Market Economy

LD0501030292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1740 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Kishinev, 4 Jan (MOLDOVA-PRES-TASS)—The Moldovan parliament today adopted two vital laws to ensure transition to a market economy: "On Foreign Economic Activity" and "On Bankruptcy." It also passed a law "On Leasehold" in the first reading.

Placing the drafts of these legislative acts before parliament, Konstantin Tampiza, deputy prime minister and economics minister, commented that the government had price liberalization forced upon it before other measures enabling a free market economy to be introduced in Moldova could be enacted. He stressed that last year economic entities, through contracts and transactions that they concluded, had brought to the republic losses exceeding 100 million rubles. In a planned economy, all this is underwritten by the state, but once the law "On Bankruptcy" is passed enterprises will be liable for their own performance, financial included. The law also defines the procedures for recovering money from bankrupt businesses and transferring their assets to the state.

The law "On Foreign Economic Activities" governs the creation of joint and small businesses and exports. It also envisages a number of perks for producers of goods in short supply in the republic.

Dnestr President Advocates Federalization

PM0301112292 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jan 92 p 3

[New Year's message to readers from Igor Smirnov, president of the Dnestr Moldavian Republic, under general heading "Is Our Locomotive Steaming Ahead?": "I Would Very Much Like To Say That People's Lives Will Improve"]

[Text] The new year, 1992, will be marked by the formation of a future... unified state. I have no doubt that such a state will appear. But the process will entail certain difficulties and mistakes, which will have most effect on people who are far removed from politics. Small republics like ours will find themselves in a particularly difficult position.

Will it be possible in the coming year at last to stabilize the economy and bring about at least some improvement in people's lives? I would very much like to say yes. But let us be realists. We have not yet closed the loss-making plants and enterprises, economic links have become very deformed, and we have not learned to work properly in the new conditions. Therefore in 1992, unfortunately, we must expect a deterioration in the economic situation.

At the same time positive changes will also take place in our economy, in connection with the granting of greater freedom to entrepreneurs, which in turn will make it possible to do good groundwork for the future and substantially change our mentality.

People often tell us that we want to break away from Moldova. All this is nonsense and lies. The Dnestr region's economic and ethnic links with Moldova, and, incidentally, with Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and other republics are such that they cannot be broken today. Ukrainians, Moldavians, and Russians live here and live there, too.

We advocate the preservation of economic links, territorial unity, immutability of borders, a federal system, and self-government, but unfortunately we have yet to meet with understanding. That is why we have begun to create our own statehood, on the basis of the people's expressed will. People are constantly trying to tell us how we should live. They even use force. Legislative initiatives in the Union parliament and repeated appeals to the leadership of Moldova and other republics on preventing bloodshed went unheard, as is clear from the recent tragic events in Dubossary. We were forced to take steps ourselves to prevent a repetition. It was the interests of security that dictated the emergence in the Dnestr Republic of the guard, the "Dnestr" battalion, and the Cossacks

We have advocated and will continue to advocate the resolution of all questions solely by parliamentary means, and we will seek to ensure that the rights of the individual, not the nation, are placed first. Common sense suggests that in our situation there is simply no alternative to federalization. And whether Moldova likes it or not, it will have to admit it.

As for the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union, I do not rule out the possibility that in the course of their reorganization and division into national compartments many servicemen and their families will find that no one wants them. Take the 14th Army, stationed on the territory of the Dnestr Republic. Who will resolve its problems? The Union government? It no longer exists. Moldova? But it has declared its territory a demilitarized zone and has declared Soviet troops to be occupying forces. Ukraine, Russia?.. It is worrying that the dispute over the division of the army is not about people and their problems, but about property, equipment, and weapons.

Tajikistan

No Enriched Uranium To Be Sold Abroad

OW0701203992 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1912 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the 8 January "Soviet Business Report"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tajikistan, one of the republics of the now defunct Soviet Union, has no intention of selling enriched uranium abroad. This was announced in the Tajik parliament on Tuesday [7 January], where it was also reported that this and similar government plans appeared in certain printed publications. The head of the republic's Economic Committee also said that enterprises belonging to the former Ministry of Defence did not possess the equipment necessary for uranium enriching.

Earlier (in September, 1991) Tajikistan announced that a secret uranium enrichment plant, built during the 1940s for the production of the first Soviet atomic bomb, had been taken over by the republic. Recently new and even larger uranium deposits have been found in Tajikistan. The price of such uranium as is found in Tajikistan could fetch, according to some estimates, more than $100,000 per kilogram on the world market.

National Security Committee To Replace KGB

OW0701145092 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1400 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted by KYODO]

[Text] The KGB of Tajikistan will cease to exist as of January 25 and be replaced by the National Security Committee. An appropriate decision was made by the Tajik Supreme Soviet, and President Rakhman Nabiyev signed a special decree.

The decisions say that the purpose of the transformation is to step up efforts to defend the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Tajikistan.

According to unofficial reports, the current KGB chief Anatoliy Stroykin is to resign by January 25 and move to Russia. One of his deputies, a Tajik, is most likely to become the head of the new agency.

Turkmenia

Leaders To Sign Defense Treaty With Russia

LD0701174192 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1317 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Turkmenistan intends to sign a defence treaty with Russia. According to some local experts, the leaders of Turkmenistan have come to the conclusion that a military union with Russia will stabilize the overall situation in the region. The office of President Niyazov reported on January 7 that the issue of such a treaty with Russia was raised by Major-General Nikolay Kormiltsev, commander of the Army corp in Turkmenistan, and other senior officers on January 6 during a meeting President Niyazov had with commanders of Army units. The president of Turkmenistan said though a defence ministry will be created in the republic, this will not lead to the immediate creation of independent armed formations, for their upkeep requires great expenses. President Niyazov said that at the Minsk summit on December 30, 1991 he persuaded the heads of the other independent states to jointly finance by all the members of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] the Army units located on the territory of Turkmenistan.

According to some military authorities, the creation of a Defence Ministry in the Republic will do away with the dependence of the commanders of Army units situated on the territory of Turkmenistan on the headquarters of the Turkestan Military Region (Central Asia) in Tashkent and on recently declared himself the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Uzbek president. [sentence as received]

Trade, Economic Agreements Signed With PRC

LD0701204192 Ashkhabad Radio Ashkabad Network in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] An agreement on trade and economic cooperation was (?signed) [words indistinct] between the governments of Turkmenistan and China. In accordance with this agreement, it was decided to set up in Turkmenistan [words indistinct] factories, including weaving and food factories, as well as factories for processing agricultural produce. It is also planned to construct a hotel in Ashkhabad. At the beginning of the meeting, a decision was adopted to open trade representations in Turkmenistan and China.

Saparmurad Niyazov accepted with gratitude the invitation of the PRC Government for him to pay an official visit to China.

President Interviewed on CIS, Economy

PM0801095592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov by Vladimir Kuleshov; place and date not given: "We Will Learn To Be Equal"]

[Text] [Kuleshov] Saparmurad Atayevich, you were one of the first to insist on the need to continue to develop the initiative of the "three" by assembling the leaders of the sovereign republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Ashkhabad. But just two or three months ago you were in favor of signing the Union treaty as swiftly as possible. Indeed, you were not the only person advocating this....

[Niyazov] We all advocated the Union until the very last—not the Union that had existed, but a renewed Union of equals. We favored a Union without rigid diktat from the center and without constant edicts "from on high," which continued despite perestroyka. After all, even the new structures began to issue edicts in the old way: Ministries issued instructions, directives, and circulars telling, ordering people to make such-and-such in such-and-such a way. This was done under the guise of concern for the country's fate—everything is falling apart, the argument ran, we are in a hole, and diktat still exists. Principles for relations between the center and the republics were not defined. We even had doubts whether the USSR Supreme Soviet would recognize the declarations on republics' sovereignty, and we did not know how it would regard republic parliaments. At every step, we could feel the center tightening the reins and trying to retain all the main functions and to preserve a unitary state.

[Kuleshov] Do you think that the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] is the most viable formation in the existing circumstances?

[Niyazov] I think that the Commonwealth may change its form, but the principle of our association must remain unchanged—this is a union of equal independent states in which everything is decided on a basis of parity. From time immemorial, all the present civilized powers have sought to act autonomously in the light of their people's national features and their region's economic potential.

Why should we not borrow experience accumulated over the years? After all, it was no longer possible to live the way we were living. At the same time it is impossible to break all the links—we have indeed become interlocked together, and we will have to live alongside each other for a long time to come.

[Kuleshov] How can the consequences of more than 70 years of integration and interdependence among republics be combined with the factor of the present independence of the states forming the CIS? How is a balance of interests going to be observed?

[Niyazov] We discussed these questions in Ashkhabad, and we also debated this topic in Alma-Ata. This is a complex problem. The division of labor and the interlocking of one economy with another led to structural distortions in the republics' national economies: Some supplied raw materials and others processed them without developing their own infrastructure. A balance of interests will be restored if we switch to market relations, to equivalent exchange, and bring prices into line so that, for instance, some of the surplus value of products or raw materials returns to the place where they were produced. This must be the main thing during the first stage of economic cooperation. Otherwise we will never have mutually advantageous economic cooperation. Then Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the other "raw materials" republics should construct enterprises with a complete cycle of processing so as to produce finished output.

[Kuleshov] If you recall, at the news conference in Ashkhabad a question was put to Uzbek President Karimov: "Won't the raw material interests of the CIS make for one-sidedness in the development of the Central Asian region?...."

[Niyazov] Of course I remember that. The journalist was referring to the continuing infringement of the economic interests of the Central Asian republics, which are still oriented toward raw materials. You know what this led to recently. The sharp increase in prices of finished output while unprofitable raw materials prices are retained, the refusal by a number of republics to pay certain sums into the Union budget and the country's stabilization fund, and the collapse of integration links within the Union were a painful blow to the economies of the Central Asian republics and sharply lowered the population's living standards. For instance, in terms of the per capita distribution of national income, the region is lagging behind the Union-wide indicators by a factor of 2-2.5.

Take Turkmenistan. We received almost 70 percent of our consumer goods and food from other regions. In exchange, to our own detriment, we supplied them with, in value terms, 5-7 times more fuel and energy resources, cotton, agricultural produce, and chemical industry products. When free prices are introduced for goods, food, and metalworking products, it transpires that the republic loses about 7-8 billion rubles [R], because we are mostly dependent on imports.

How can we cover this huge difference? Union structures are not functioning, there are no subsidies or any additions to the budget. As a result, the population's living standard began to fall sharply. What were we supposed to do? Continue to hand over fuel and energy resources—petroleum, gas, chemical raw materials, and cotton—for next to nothing? We were forced to raise raw materials prices. Of course, they are still a long way short of world levels, but even what has been done will enable us to reduce the budget deficit. In the future, we will have to organize relations within the economy according to mutually advantageous laws. This is the only path that will save us. It is clear that one sovereign state cannot and must not exist at the expense of another, and that second state must not exist at the expense of yet another.

[Kuleshov] More than enough has been said about the center's shortsighted policy. But are you, the leaders of the sovereign states, now ready to say how the country can be extricated from the impasse?

[Niyazov] We are elaborating our own model for emerging from the crisis. While developing our own economy and making maximum use of our own potential and the region's great wealth of resources, we want to become integrated into the international market, and we are relying substantially on cooperation with foreign countries.

Today, interest in Turkmenistan is higher than ever before, and not only because of its extremely rich natural resources. Right from the start of perestroyka, we embarked on economic reforms, and we did this gradually, adapting to national features and the people's mentality and traditions. We have succeeded in preserving stability at the enterprise level and maintaining rhythm and order in industry and agriculture despite all the supply difficulties. We have proven our worth as reliable partners. Our aim is, while integrating ourselves into the world economy, to accumulate our own capital and gradually become investors ourselves.

We have embarked on the creation of a firm material and technical base that will protect us from any market cataclysms, and for this purpose we have concluded a whole series of contracts with foreign partners—Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Germany, Italy, and other countries.

We are acting vigorously to develop entrepreneurship, private ownership, and privatization. We have begun to distribute land to people for free and to sell enterprises. In order to ensure that the economic reform goes more successfully, we intend to use state budget funds, to grant credits to entrepreneurs, and to give them tax breaks—but in such a way that there is a return over two or three years.

[Kuleshov] I think that people in the independent states are now most concerned with not actually where they are living but with how they are living and what lies ahead for them. The rapid increase in the cost of living is making people feel wary about the price liberalization.

[Niyazov] Yes, the situation is tricky. It is changing daily in the goods and food market. This is oppressive. The important thing is to alleviate the situation.

An important place among the normative acts defining the price reform and movement toward the market belongs to the documents on creating a state social protection system. We referred them for discussion by an extraordinary session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. These documents contain provisions making the switch to free prices easier for pensioners, disabled people, and students. The new minimum pension on Turkmenistan's territory will be R350, the student grant will be R315, and the one-shot maternity allowance will be R525. A system for indexing citizens' deposits in the savings bank has been elaborated. In short, a broad complex of social protection measures that will enable the population to survive with the fewest problems the switch to free prices, which have been introduced as of the start of January 1992 in our republic.

Just as they have in Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, and throughout the Commonwealth.

Armenia

Georgian President's Fate Still Undecided

Georgian Delegation Expected

LD0701131892 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1200 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" Newscast]

[Text] The (?Amis) news service has reported that at 1130 on 7 January the Georgian Government informed the Government of Armenia that a delegation of the Georgian Supreme Soviet is due to set off for Armenia's Idzhevan Rayon for talks with the Armenian side on the question of granting [ousted Georgian President] Gamsakhurdia temporary political asylum in Armenia. The Armenian Government is forming a delegation for the talks.

Delegation Seeks Extradition

OW0701175492 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A mission of Georgia's new leadership has arrived in Armenia to seek extradition of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia who fled Tbilisi on January 6 and remains now in the Idzhevan district of Armenia. According to information IF [INTERFAX] obtained from NORUTIUN Service, a Yerevan-based news agency, the Georgian mission is presently meeting the district authorities of Idzhevan.

Meanwhile, NORUTIUN Service reports the Armenian government has formed a delegation which intends to leave Yerevan for Idzhevan to hold talks with representatives of the new Georgian leadership. According to this report, Mr. Ashot Manucharian, the chief national security adviser of the Armenian president, will take part in the negotiations on the Armenian part.

Decision Not Confirmed

LD0701203192 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] In the last few hours contradictory information has been coming in from Georgia and Armenia. The YPRINDA agency has reported from Tbilisi that an accord has been been reached between the delegation of Georgia's Military Council and the Armenian Government that Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his family can stay in Armenia or leave, but the Armenian and Georgian media have not confirmed this information. According to their information, the talks have not yet taken place.

[Begin recording of David Vardanyan, chairman of Armenian Supreme Soviet Commission for External Relations] A government delegation is coming here, a delegation from the Georgian Supreme Soviet. I think that we should clarify things with them. We are not opposed to Armenia being used as a transit path for Georgian President Gamsakhurdia to the country that he wishes to go to next. But at the moment rumors are circulating that the opposition may demand him, that we should arrest him and extradite him. This cannot be the case. Armenia cannot play the part of some kind of police or something of the kind to interfere in the conflict. I think that everthing should be done with the agreement of both sides. [end recording]

Gamsakhurdia Refuses To Enter Talks

LD0701211492 Moscow Teleradiokompanii Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] We have been told by Georgia's permanent mission in Moscow that President Gamsakhurdia and his family are in Idzhevan, in Armenia. The Armenian permanent mission in Moscow told us that direct talks between the two sides on the fate of Gamsakhurdia are due to start in Idzhevan today.

We were told one hour ago by Armenia's permanent mission that the president of Georgia has refused to enter into talks with a delegation of the Georgian Supreme Soviet that has arrived in Idzhevan.

In two weeks of battles in Tbilisi, more than 90 people have died on both sides, while more than 500 have been wounded.

Refuge Defended

LD0801062292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0500 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Armenia did the right thing when it gave refuge to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, said David Vartanyan, member of the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet and chairman of the parliamentary commission on external relations. He spoke on republican television yesterday.

Vartanyan underlined that at issue is not granting political asylum to the Georgian president, but, in agreement with the provisional government of that republic, to use Armenia as a transit territory for Zviad Gamsakhurdia to leave for a destination of his choice.

The member of the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet admitted that if Gamsakhurdia continues to stay in Armenia, this will become a source of constant tension between the two republics.

Georgian Crisis Viewed

LD0801092992 Moscow TASS in English 0847 GMT 8 Jan 92

[By Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan January 8 TASS—"It is difficult to say now what stand Armenia will assume, and what will be its final decision concerning Zviad Gamsakhurdia, because this depends on dozens of factors, including the stand of the Georgian authorities, as well as that of Gamsakhurdia and his supporters," Ashot Manucharyan, chief adviser to the Armenian president for national security affairs, said in a TV address on Tuesday [7 January] evening. Setting forth the main principles by which the Armenian leadership is guided in tackling this problem, he stressed that the republic's decision should not affect Georgian-Armenian relations, should not destabilise the situation in Georgia and, which is most important, should not run counter to the international human rights standards.

Manucharyan stressed that no official statement had been made so far concerning Gamsakhurdia's intentions.

So far as the present Georgian authorities are concerned, he continued, the Armenian leadership has received the only message from them. It says that Gamsakhurdia may remain in Armenia on condition that he will not leave it, and that the armed people who accompany Gamsakhurdia may return to Tbilisi, where nothing is threatening them.

Manucharyan, who led the Armenian delegation fulfilling the mediation mission in Tbilisi on January 3, stressed Armenia's interest in preserving good neighbourly relations with Georgia and expressed concern over the recent developments in that republic. He said that after the delegation left Georgia, "the situation developed along one of the ways analysed by them, and Gamsakhurdia was given an opportunity to leave Georgia."

The chief adviser to the Armenian president said Gamsakhurdia and his supporters had refused to meet representatives of the provisional government of Georgia, which arrived in Idzhevan on Tuesday.

Azerbaijan

Fighting Continues in Nagorno-Karabakh

OW0701183992 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh remains extremely tense, Lur, an independent information center reports. On Monday [6 January], the Armenian self-defense forces forced Azerbaijani special police units, "OMON", from important positions on heights off Armenian villages of Buzluk, Manashid and Erkech. The Azerbaijanis, according to Lur, have lost 12 people dead, an unknown number of people have reportedly been wounded.

On the night from Monday to Tuesday [7 January] and later on Tuesday, Armenian villages of Karachinar and Manashid of the Geranboy (formerly Shaumyan) district were still under fire.

Meanwhile, the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) continued in Stepanakert (its Azerbaijani name is Khankendi). It discussed candidacies of 5 people running for chairman of parliament, including Mr. Leonid Petrosyan, the chairman of the NKR Soviet of People's Deputies.

Mutalibov Orders Surrender of Illegal Arms

NC0801080692 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1800 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] President Ayaz Mutalibov has issued instructions on mobilizing the military reserves and placing them under a central authority. The instructions also advised citizens and organizations—which are not legally authorized to carry or possess arms—to hand over firearms, military equipment, and explosives to the Azerbaijan Defense Ministry. This does not apply to shotguns.

The Azerbaijan Defense Ministry was instructed to take measures to receive and store the firearms, military equipment, and explosives. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of National Security were instructed to help the Azerbaijan Defense Ministry organize the effort.

Foreign Minister Meets Iranian Official

LD0301220492 Tehran IRNA in English 1541 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Tehran, Jan. 3, IRNA—Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs Mahmud Va'ezi discussed ways to further strengthen bilateral relations at a meeting in Baku on Thursday [2 January] with Azeri Foreign Minister Sadykhov. Va'ezi, in Baku to open Iran's embassy there, congratulated the independence of the Republic and expressed satisfaction with the growing trend of bilateral relations. Sadykhov said, "We recognize the Iranian nation and government a close friend and brother to ourselves." He also thanked Iran for its recognition of the Republic and its efforts for Baku's membership at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Va'ezi expressed Iran's readiness to make new arrangements to facilitate border visits following repeated requests by the officials of Azerbaijan to reopen more border posts to enable enthusiastic Azeris to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran To Cooperate in Oil Exploration

LD0801140292 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0430 GMT 8 Jan 92

[Text] Oil Minister Aqazadeh-Khoi met and conferred with President Ayaz Mutalibov of Azerbaijan in Baku yesterday. According to a Baku television report, in the course of this meeting our country's oil minister announced the Islamic Republic of Iran's readiness to export gas to Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan and to expand cooperation in the exploration and refining of oil. In another meeting between the oil minister and the prime minister of Azerbaijan, Gasan Gasanov, principles for implementing the two countries' recent oil agreements were discussed.

Officials Divided Over Alma-Ata Accord

NC2812193191 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 27 Dec 91

[Text] ARMENPRES's Moscow correspondent has learned from the Azerbaijan Republic's permanent representatives in Moscow that Azerbaijan's interim parliament, the National Council—which includes representatives of the opposition parties—has not ratified the declaration concerning the republic joining the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The permanent representatives think that the emotional speech made on local television by Etibar Mamedov, one of the ringleaders of the opposition, has influenced the council to make such a decision. He has described the Commonwealth of Independent States as a new union center. Mamedov has demanded that Azerbaijan withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States. The permanent representatives believe that this statement does not reflect the views of the majority of the population, which regards President Mutalibov's moves in this direction as expedient and in keeping with the present state of affairs in the republic.

Free Prices Begin; Bread Price Triples

LD0701201192 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] On the day when Azerbaijan changed over to free prices it was impossible to determine which goods had been affected and how much they had gone up in price as shelves continue to be empty. It is only known what has happened to the bread price: it has tripled. This will be a painful blow to families with many children. A lot of bread is consumed in the republic.

Mamedov Appointed Deputy Prime Minister

NC0801094092 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1800 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Text] President Ayaz Mutalibov has decreed that Vice President Mitat Salam oglu Mamedov be appointed Azerbaijan's deputy prime minister. The decree stated: Vice President Mitat Salam oglu Mamedov is appointed deputy prime minister. This decree will be submitted to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet for approval.

[Signed] President Ayaz Mutalibov

[Date] 2 January 1992

National Council Rules on Minimum Wage

NC0801121392 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1800 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text of decision adopted by the Azerbaijan National Council on the minimum wage in Azerbaijan—read by announcer]

[Text] The Azerbaijan National Council has decided that:

1. The legal monthly minimum wage in Azerbaijan be 317 rubles as of 1 January 1992.

2. Compensation paid after retail prices rose in April 1991 be included in the minimum wage. Additional payments and rights, including awards and other incentives, should not be included in the minimum wage. The public sector should pay the monthly minimum wage from the budget allocated, and others from their own income.

3. A tax exemption of 320 rubles be considered in calculating the citizen's income tax.

4. The Azerbaijani president be advised to convey to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet during the first quarter of 1992 his proposals on minimum wage rules, the budget for minimum consumption, and the indexation of citizens' incomes. The Azerbaijan Council of Ministers draw up documents required to approve the minimum wage and consider allocating funds for the [word indistinct] grade payments.

5. The president's proposal that grades of workers employed by the public sector—in health, education, science, and cultural organizations, law enforcement, administrative, and other organs—be raised two steps and doubled wages be approved. Increases take into account the proportion accounted for by past increases and compensations.

6. The legal process establishing the minimum wage must keep in mind that an amount equal to four minimum wages must be allocated for production expenses. The rest of the income is paid from sector profits.

7. The president's decree on social security for retired people and families with children be approved.

8. The president's decree on increasing subsidies to students and postgraduate students and those in secondary, vocational, and technical training be approved.

9. The Azerbaijan State Bank, together with the Azerbaijan Finance Ministry, examine the guarantees that have been given to the 1992 budget and include their proposals when directing their money and credits policy, which they will submit for approval.

[Signed] El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet
[Date] 31 December 1991

Georgia

Reportage on Aftermath of Gamsakhurdia Escape

'Civil Disobedience' Urged

LD0701171592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Confrontation between Gamsakhurdia supporters and the opposition continues in Tbilisi. Today at a rally held in the square outside the railway station in Georgia's capital, appeals were heard to hold actions of civil disobedience to the new authorities and strikes. Some speakers were saying that those who will be working for the junta—I am quoting—will die as traitors. Then rally participants marched through the streets of Tbilisi. Not far from the city center—at Konstantin Gamsakhurdia Prospect, named after Zviad Gamsakhurdia's father—somebody threw smokepots from an apartment building which fell in front of the column of demonstrators. Then short volleys from automatic weapons were heard twice. Fortunately, no one was killed or wounded. Some Tbilisi residents greeted those demonstrating with applause. The POSTFACTUM agency has reported the details about the rally of Gamsakhurdia's supporters.

Casualties Reported at Rally

LD0701173392 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1700 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Reports from Tbilisi say opposition armed units have used live ammunition against supporters of the overthrown Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, causing casualties.

There were reportedly about 4,000 people in the procession. They were chanting slogans in support of Gamsakhurdia. [passage omitted]

No Casualties at Rally

OW0701181792 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Reports from Tbilisi say a demonstration of deposed President Gamsakhurdia's supporters which brought together, according to various sources, from several hundreds to several thousands people came under fire on Tuesday [7 January].

Sources in the Georgian Interior Ministry have told an IF [INTERFAX] correspondent that in one of the streets demonstrators encountered people of the victorious opposition forces who opened fire above their heads. A ministry spokesman said no casualties were reported.

Mr. Georgiy Zunbadze, the spokesman for the National Democratic Party of Georgia in Moscow (NDP), said, citing a telephone conversation with the NDP's leader Georgiy Chanturia, that 300 demonstrators had been fired upon by "unknown persons". He pointed out that the NDP condemned "any violence" against participants of rallies or demonstrations.

Entourage Offered Safe Return

LD0701184692 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Georgia's provisional government has guaranteed the safety of persons accompanying Gamsakhurdia if they decide to return to their homeland. As far as the president himself is concerned, Georgia is not against Armenia granting him and his family temporary asylum until the negotiations between the governmental delegations of Georgia and Armenia have been completed. As has become known, these negotiations are planned in Armenia's Idzhevan rayon where Gamsakhurdia is staying. Foreign news agencies have reported Gamsakhurdia's intention to leave for the West.

Trial Possible

LD0701180492 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1317 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text]—Djaba Ioseliani, one of the leaders of the Military Council, said if Armenia or some other state grants political asylum to Gamsakhurdia, Georgia will work for his extradition and bringing to trial. Ioseliani also told PF [POSTFACTUM] on January 7, that Gamsakhurdia will be accused of crime activity against his people. Late in the evening on January 6, Tenghiz Sigua, who is temporarily acting prime minister of the Republic, made a TV address to the people of Georgia. He informed that in Georgia the popular uprising has won and expressed regret that toppling the dictatorship caused bloodshed. The popular uprising, Sigua said, will take Georgia to a new stage of the national-liberation movement, when we will have to acquire true independence, not just declare it .... This uprising has the aim of real dismantling of socialistic structures and to form the democratic system. Our goals rule out revenge, he said. Nobody will be punished for ideas or mistakes. Those, however, who committed criminal acts will be condemned by the entire nation. This concerns first and foremost the man who became the reason for internal strife and bloodshed. Sigua called for peace and stability, accord and repentance. Automatic gunfire was heard in down-town Tbilisi on the night of January 6. As PF was told at the military commandant's office that some of Gamsakhurdia's armed supporters have probably failed to leave with him and remained in the city. Curfew still works in Tbilisi. Rustaveli Avenue is being cleared of debris. Citizens are requested to stay clear of the damaged buildings because of its danger condition. A fund has been organized to collect money to restore Rustaveli Avenue.

President Said to Take Money

LD0701184992 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Tbilisi, 7 Jan (TASS)—Georgian Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua stated that President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who has fled the republic, took more than 200 million rubles with him.

Talking today at a news conference, Tengiz Sigua reported that representatives from the Georgian Procuracy went to Armenia today to decide on the question of returning the stolen money. According to Tengiz Sigua, during the two weeks of fighting more than 90 people were killed on both sides and more than 500 were wounded. Many inhabitants of Tbilisi city center are left without a roof over their heads as a result of fires and artillery attacks. The government has decided to house them in government dachas in the priviledged suburbs of the Georgian capital.

Answering the TASS correspondent's question about the attitude of the new Georgian leadership toward the Soviet Army units in the republic, Tengiz Sigua reported that it would be premature to withdraw these units beyond the boundaries of Georgia. He stressed that during the whole period of the bloody confrontations in Tbilisi the Soviet Army detachments maintained strict neutrality.

Public Reaction Muted

LD0701145192 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1200 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" Newscast]

[Text] The fate of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia continues to capture the interest of journalists, although they are coming to speculate on how the fate of the new government—one that toppled a legally elected president—is shaping up.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia is turning into a tragic hero of our troubled times, a figure worthy of both artistic and historical research. It would be premature to speak of the Georgian people's present attitude toward him, since the people themselves are saying nothing for the moment. They did have their say, however, at the presidential elections. Has there been a reevaluation of Gamsakhurdia in the popular consciousness? Are the Georgian people today ready to define their political allegiances? What is their attitude to the new government, which came to power through the illegal means of violence?

For the moment, the military council is the sole authority on the territory of the republic. Tengiz Sigua is working actively on the formation of a cabinet of ministers. Some political prisoners are being freed, but their places are being taken by others. There is talk of the institution of the presidency being replaced by a constitutional monarchy. Criminal proceedings are being pursued against supporters of the president and suspects are being detained. According to Georgia's procurator-general, however, investigations are being conducted in accordance with the republic's Constitution.

And so, for the moment the people that once linked their hopes for freedom and independence to the name of Gamsakhurdia are saying nothing.

Tbilisi Returns to Normal

LD0801101492 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0910 GMT 8 Jan 92

[By Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi, 8 Jan (TASS)— The normal rhythm of life is being restored after two weeks of fighting in the Georgian capital. The publication of a number of republican and central newspapers resumed today. Normal publication will be fully restored by the end of this week. Local television is working and the first program from Moscow is again being broadcast.

The inhabitants and guests of Tbilisi were able to use the services of Aeroflot today. The landing and take-off strip of the local airport has been cleared of mines. Regular flights have started on all routes.

Wrecked vehicles have been removed from Rustaveli Prospekt. All armored equipment and missile artillery systems have been taken away from the combat zone.

The overhaul of the trolleybus line, damaged by shooting, started yesterday. Glass is being replaced in the windows of shops and cafes.

Shevardnadze 'Could' Become State Adviser

OW0701183792 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A spokesman for the National-Democratic Party [NDP] of Georgia in Moscow said Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, could be appointed a state adviser of the new Georgian leadership. "Given Shevardnadze's great experience and international reputation, he could facilitate consolidation between various political forces in Georgia and help smooth current differences between them", Mr. Georgiy Zumbadze said to IF [INTERFAX]. He stressed, however, that Mr. Shevardnadze's political future should be decided upon by "all Georgians", and that the former minister himself agreed with this opinion.

Earlier, Mr. Shevardnadze himself, speaking on central television, had expressed his willingness to help the democratisation process in Georgia.

Mr. Zumbadze said also that now that Gamsakhurdia's regime is overthrown, bright prospects open up for the settlement of the South Ossetian problem. He believes the Georgian-Ossetian conflict will be soon over. Mr. Dzhaba Ioseliani, the leader of a Georgian paramilitary group "Mhedrioni" ("Riders"), and the South-Ossetian leader Thorez Kulumbegov may play an important role in the process.

NDP was a leading political force opposing Zviad Gamsakhurdia's regime.

Shevardnadze Appeals for Aid for Georgia

LD0601?15392 Hamburg DPA in German 2115 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Hamburg/Paris (DPA)—Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has been soliciting support for his Georgian homeland this evening. "There have been natural disasters and military clashes. The land is threatened by famine and mass unemployment. It is a small country with an ancient civilization and now deserves support. Therefore, I am appealing to all of my friends to support Georgia now—not just morally but also financially and economically", he said this evening in an interview with ZDF (Second German Television).

Replying to the question as to what his feelings as a Georgian were during the fighting in Tbilisi, He said: "I was frightened about what would happen if the totalitarian regime had been victorious. That would have been a tragedy for Georgia." [passage omitted]

'Peace and Quiet' Returns to South Ossetia

LD0701150392 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 7 Jan 92

[By Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz January 7 TASS—Peace and quiet are returning to South Ossetia. No shooting has been heard outside Tskhinval and in the Znauri district for the past three days, the information committee's press centre confirmed.

Neither Georgian militants in outlying villages nor Ossetian self-defence units are trigger-happy these days. Local observers explain the lull by referring to the latest developments in Tbilisi. The Military Council, that took power after making President Zviad Gamsakhurdia flee the republic, has pronounced itself in favour of democratizing society and easing tensions in inter-ethnic relations.

The Ossetians regard the release from custody of Torez Kulumbekov, chairman of the South Ossetian parliament arrested by the Georgia KGB, as a goodwill act. Kulumbekov had been charged with fanning inter-ethnic enmity between Ossetians and Georgians. His release from captivity opens the road towards peace talks and mutual compromise. Along with this, the South Ossetian leadership and local inhabitants continue pressing for unification with Russia.

The situation around tskhinval is still tense as the transport blockade has not been lifted. But people are already returning to normal life: electric lights can be lit again in many homes, and gas and water supplies are being restored.

No reports are yet available about the situation in remote Ossetian villages of the Tskhinval and Znauri districts, where inhabitants fell prey to punitive actions by Georgian militants. Rare eyewitnesses say everything is quiet there as well.

A convoy of lorries loaded with humanitarian aid has left Vladikavkaz for South Ossetia.

Abkhaz Supreme Soviet Reelects Chairman

LD0801024792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 2200 GMT 7 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] In Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, the first session of the new convocation of the Abkhaz parliament was held.

[Begin reporter G. Bzhania recording] The meeting was preceded by innumerable rounds of talks in the framework of the conciliation committee set up by the previous parliament. Opting for compromise and going back on their principles, members of the conciliation committee have fulfilled their function, as shown by the new deputies corps representing all ethnic communities of the republic.

In a secret ballot, (Vladislav Arzenba), a 46-year-old doctor of historical sciences, has been reelected chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

The session completed its work by making a decision on the transition of the republic to free market relations, something that was supposed to happen as a matter of course. [end recording]

Estonia

Foreign Minister Remarks on Nuclear Treaty

LD0701204492 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 2000 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] According to Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri, Estonia is ready to propose to Latvia and Lithuania a treaty in which the countries would bind themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons. The precondition for making the proposal is that the tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, which are still on the territory of the Baltic states, are first withdrawn. Meri said in Helsinki today that there are still short-range nuclear weapons on Estonian territory. According to him, the existence of the weapons has been confirmed by many quarters. Meri said that they form a security threat to Estonia as well as to the whole of Northern Europe.

Russia To Share Some Transport Facilities

PM0701152192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 92 Union Edition p 2

[Leonid Levitskiy report: "Estonia and Russia Will Share Transport"]

[Text] "The talks began very chauvinistically. But because our side did not falter, the subsequent talk was of mutually advantageous cooperation... The question of ownership has been resolved very favorably for Estonia."

This was how Enn Sarap, Estonian deputy minister of transport, assessed his talks with the Russian Ministry of Transport in an interview with a news agency. All transport property is passing to Estonia. This means 30 aircraft, 80 oceangoing ships, airports, and the railroad. Russia will not receive any part of the New Tallinn Port. This complex for the handling of food freight—the largest on the Baltic—was commissioned near Tallinn several years ago.

Russia initially claimed six dry freighters, but this problem too has fallen away. In all probability Russia will become a shareholder in the grain terminal at the New Tallinn Port. An agreement has been reached on railroad and road shipments. Talks on the airspace are continuing.

We can rest assured that communication between Tallinn and Moscow is not being broken off. True, it will probably become less intensive both on the ground and in the air. This has been brought about both by economic problems and by the changed status of Estonia and Russia. The cost of air and rail tickets is increasing appreciably. At the same time, certain anomalies are also arising. Whereas a compartment ticket from Tallinn to Moscow on a fast train will cost more than 100 rubles, from Moscow to Tallinn it will cost 60... Why? Each of the states evidently proceeds from the interests of its own sovereign economy.

Fuel Delivery Figures From Russia Released

LD0701180592 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] According to ETA [Estonian news agency], Estonian Fuel has now learned about the quotas of liquid fuel to be sent to Estonia from Russia in January. According to Oleg Panfilov, director general of Estonian Fuel, Estonia has been promised delivery of 78,000 tonnes of furnace fuel oil, 35,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, and 13,000 tonnes of gasoline. The furnace fuel oil and the diesel will amount to 70 percent of last January's supplies, while the gasoline will amount to only one-third. If we receive this quantity we will be able to maintain housing and offices at an acceptable level, public transport will be able to function fairly normally, as will machinery working to extract the oil-shale necessary for the production of electricity. The gasoline will of course only be sufficient only for the most essential services and delivery vehicles.

'Severe' Gasoline, Fuel Shortages Reported

LD0701182392 Tallinn Estonian Radio in English 2130 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] Estonia is suffering from a severe gasoline and fuel shortage. Previously about 40 flights departed from Tallinn airport every day. Now this has been cut to only three—to Moscow and to the islands on the western coast of Estonia.

The bus lines in the capital are still operating. According to the minister of industry and energy, Riha Sild, the situation has improved thanks to 3,000 tons of diesel fuel delivered from Russia on 31 December.

Supplies for Neighboring States' Soldiers To End

LD0701183392 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1000 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] The government of the Republic of Estonia intends to end state supplies of flour and groats to the forces of neighboring states. ETA [Estonian news agency] was informed of this by Udo Helme, adviser to the State Chancellery's State and Border Defense Department. Last year Russia short-supplied Estonia by 120,000 tonnes of grain, and in the fourth quarter of the year refused to supply groats altogether. Of the planned food-cereal consignments only 44 percent arrived in Estonia last year. There are no supplies of groats planned for Estonia this year either. At a time when Russia has blocked its supplies of grain and groats to Estonia, the former center has demanded that the Republic of Estonia supply the forces with 2.2 times more flour products and groats, Udo Helme noted. In his opinion, it can be concluded that Russia does not in fact wish to feed its own soldiers. All military units stationed in Estonia will be sent notices about stopping supplies to them, according to ETA.

Bread Stops to Soviet Army

LD0801103792 Moscow TASS in English 0849 GMT 8 Jan 92

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn January 8 TASS—The Estonian Government has decided to stop the supply of bread products to the Soviet Army units deployed in Estonia, the Estonian news agency reported with reference to official sources.

The reason underlying this decision is that Russia is not meeting its commitments on delivering grain to Estonia and in this way is refusing indirectly to feed its own soldiers.

The Estonian Government took this decision in conditions of the acute shortage of bread. The rationing of white bread has already been introduced in some cities. People queue for many hours to buy rye bread. Speculations appear in newspapers that the price of white bread may be increased to reach 10 rubles per kilogram or more.

Bank Plans Draft for Convertibility of Kroon

LD0701193792 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1000 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Summary] Preparations for the introduction of the kroon are becoming more specific. The government and the Estonian Bank plan to hand over a draft on the issue to the Supreme Council, which will open its next session on 13 January. The draft focuses on the stabilization fund which will secure the kroon's convertibility. Vahur Kraft, vice president of the Estonian Bank, says that forest worth $150 million—accounting for about 2 percent of the country's forests—will serve as collateral, in combination with the gold reserves Estonia possesses. He says that strips of forest were used as collateral in the pre-war independent Estonia.

Ministry Reaches Agreement on Milk Prices

OW0801063292 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The deputy minister of agriculture of Estonia Rein Nigul has told BF [BALTFAX] that the ministry has reached agreement with milk-producers that in the near future the purchasing price of milk will be 2,500-3,500 rbls. [rubles] for a ton.

The understanding was reached at a Monday [6 January] meeting of ministry officials and representatives of milk-producers.

Norwegian Defense Commission Visits

LD0701190892 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Excerpts] A Norwegian defense commission has been visiting Estonia since yesterday. Our specialists in the relevant field today introduced to the commission the present political situation in Estonia and plans for our defense forces. Members of the commission include members of parliament, representatives of all parties, employees of research institutes, politicians, and experts. This is the body determines Norwegian security issues.

According to Kaare Willoch, leader of the delegation, ex-premier of Norway, and currently mayor of Oslo and its environs, the commission members are interested first and foremost in security prospects in Estonia (?Estonia being a part of Europe). [passage omitted]

[Begin Willoch recording in English] It seems to us that currently it is a confusing time in the Baltics: The region is very unstable. So it is very difficult to make any predictions. We all hope that you will be able to secure a peaceful development in order to develop your state's potential to the full. We must, however, take all these issues into account and we are here indeed so as to realistically assess the situation and not to reduce our defense forces too soon. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Non-Estonian Immigration Increases

OW0801094292 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the Estonian Demographic Studies Center, currently as many as 45,900 people live illegally in Estonia.

In 1990-1991, for the first time over the past decades, more people emigrated from Estonia than immigrated to the republic. In 1990 the migration (?scale) was 4021 people, in the first ten months of 1991—6283 people. However, the number of non-Estonians who illegally come to Estonia and live at their friends' homes, in hostels, etc. has grown.

Starting from January 15 when visas will be introduced on the Estonian border, the police will be entitled to expel those who have come to Estonia illegally.

Under Estonian laws, foreigners are allowed to stay on republican territory for no more than 1 month. For a longer term they should ask for permanent residency permission. So far, the expulsion of illegal residents has been extremely complicated, since it has been virtually impossible to prove the illegality of residency. From January 15 on all persons living in Estonia without permanent residency permission should have either a visa or a temporary residency permission.

The Estonian Demoographic Studies Center also provides some other statistics: over the first ten months of 1991 the number of native Estonians in Estonia fell by 311 people, while the nueber of non-Estonians increased by 564 people.

Labor Collectives Chairman Released

PM0801112692 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 1

[Untitled report from PRAVDA, TASS, INTERFAX roundup]

[Text] Igor Shepelevich, former chairman of the Estonian United Council of Labor Collectives, who was arrested by representatives of the Tallinn law enforcement agencies shortly after the August events, has been released. The criminal case against him has been dropped due to an absence of a corpus delicti. On the basis of a resolution of the Russian Prosecutor's Office, I. Shepelevich has gained his freedom.

Seeks Reinstatement

OW0801034892 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Igor Shepelevich, the former director of the Poogelmann electrical engineering works in Tallinn, detained between September and December 1991 on charges of assisting the State Emergency Committee, has said he intends to demand a meeting with the Estonian Prime-Minister Edgar Savisaar in the next few days in order to be reinstated at his plant. Speaking at a Tallinn news conference he said he hopes for understanding on the part of the Estonian leadership.

Mr. Shepelevich was released on December 28 immediately after his case was submitted to the Russian judicial authorities and then closed for the absence of crime.

He said he does not consider himself a politician or intend to engage in politics in the future, "or even less so struggle for power." So far he does not plan to leave Estonia, though a year ago he applied for Russian citizenship.

The former director said that he sees himself as a manager or businessman in the future. He is a member of the recently-formed National Association of State Enterprises and the Council of Directors under the prime-minister. He also wants to work for legalizing the United Council of Labor staffs which was opposed to the independence of Estonia.

His lawyer Yuriy Novolodskiy who also attended the news conference said that the charges brought against Mr. Shepelevich were groundless.

Government Nominates Sikkal as Trade Minister

LD0701181892 Tallinn Estonian Radio in English 2130 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] The existing ministries of Estonia are in the process of transition. The Government has nominated the minister of resources, Aleksander Sikkal, also to the office of the minister of trade. This is effective as of 1 January.

Latvia

'Clearing Settlements' With Russia Suspended

OW0701192292 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1843 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a Monday [6 January] meeting in Moscow the Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis and the Russian Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar agreed to suspend clearing settlements for the first quarter of 1992 in trade between their countries. This was reported to BF [BALTFAX] by the press attache of the Latvian embassy in Moscow Peteris Verkelis.

An understanding was reached to organize in the nearest future the supplies of five to seven most vital goods for the two sides. Russia will be getting Latvian milk and meat and Latvia Russian fuel. The two sides agreed to work out within the next three months the mechanism of clearing.

Clearing settlements in trade are provided for by the bilateral agreement signed in Moscow on December 5, 1991. However, according to Mr. Virkelis, it is difficult to introduce them in practice.

The two high-ranking officials also agreed that goods supplied by Latvia to Soviet Army units stationed in its territory will be included in the balance of trade.

It was decided to set up working groups to deal with transportation and military matters. Talks will continue depending on the effectiveness of the groups on January 14 or 18.

Minister on Russian Army Withdrawal Talks

LD0801025792 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Comment by Latvian Minister of State Janis Dinevics on talks with Russian leaders; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] There are several problems about which the government of Russia is not ready at this time to give a full reply. The first problem is as follows: To whom does the Army now in the Baltic states really belong? As is known, the USSR as a state does not exist, but the USSR Army still exists. Now it has been named as a gruppa voysk—an army group—hasn't it? We have the Baltic Military District here, but to whom does it really belong?

I asked Mr. Gaydar about this. To this direct question his answer was rather evasive. He said that in principle Russia is ready to undertake the role of a curator in solving this problem with other states of the Commonwealth.

Another question we spoke about was should we talk about Army property and similar matters with all states of the Commonwealth, or should we talk with Russia? The answer is that we should talk with Russia.

Is Russia taking over completely? Concerning property, we must talk with Russia.

As you know, in Germany there is an army group belonging to Russia. In Poland there is one belonging to Russia. In the Baltic states, for some reason, Russia does not wish to assume such responsibility completely.

The matter of the property of the Army is very complicated. As you know, the Supreme Council has adopted a resolution and the government of Latvia has formed a commission for taking over Army property. At this meeting an agreement was reached that Russia will also form a commission to deal with army property. I think that this commission will have to work extensively. To a certain extent, opportunities occur to connect this problem of the Army property with the problem of withdrawal of the Army.

You know that standpoint the officers in the Baltic states have that Army property should be handled in such a way that the means can be used for social guarantees. I think that these two commissions could solve many things. I think that in Russia a commission will be formed sufficiently quickly.

It is possible that on 10 January I will meet with the chairman of this commission, who has just been appointed. If we tackle these matters of property sensibly, then we might influence the tempo of withdrawal of the troops in Latvia.

Protest Scheduled 13 Jan

OW0801094992 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The extremist Latvian National Independence Movement (LNIM) has decided to picket the headquarters of the Soviet north-western group of forces at the center of Riga January 13 to protest Soviet troops' presence on Latvian territory. The picketers plan to encircle the building with a rope with black and red flags which in Russia is used for bringing wolves to bay in hunting.

LNIM Deputy Chairman Mirdza Vitola told the newspaper "Diena" that the party leadership is unsatisfied with slow resolution of questions related to the Soviet forces' withdrawal from the Baltics.

The LNIM leadership also urges Vilnius residents to join this action of protest. As is known, January 13 will mark the first anniversary of the tragic events in Vilnius when 14 people were killed during the storm of the TV tower by Soviet paratroopers.

Bank Official Rejects Share of USSR Debts

PM0701125992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jan 92 First Edition p 2

[Report from roundup of RIA and TASS reports: "Neither Assets Nor Liabilities"]

[Text] Latvia will take no part in sharing out the assets and liabilities of the USSR Bank, which has moved to Russian jurisdiction, Alfreds Bergs-Bergmanis, vice president of the Bank of Latvia, has said on Latvian television. According to his calculations, for approximately 30 million of that bank's company capital due to Latvia, the republic would be obliged to pay at least 1 billion rubles as its share of the internal debt of the former Union.

Deputy Prime Minister's Resignation Accepted

OW0701195292 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1843 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Tuesday [7 January] the Latvian parliament accepted the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Dainis Ivans.

Mr. Ivans explained his decision to resign by the fact that "a rift has occurred in relations between the parliament, the government and the people." Earlier, Mr. Ivans handed in his resignation in December 1991 on account of "exhausting his potential on this post". He felt that he can do more as a member of parliament and journalist.

Chairman of the Latvian parliament Anatoliy Gorbunovs thanked Mr. Ivans for his efforts on the post and noted that despite some differences they "had not harmed each other's work but tried to help each other in everything."

Mr. Gorbunovs expressed serious concerns about the possibility of creating a new system of parliamentary ruling before parliamentary elections take place.

The Latvian parliament decided to elect a new deputy prime minister as soon as appropriate candidacies for the post are put forward. Mr. Gorbunovs will hold consultations with all the factions to find a compromise solution to this problem.

Fuel Shortage Causes Problems in Riga

LD0801022192 Riga Radio Riga International in English 2130 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] A total shortage of petrol has led to the situation that municipal bus transport has reduced today in Riga to the minimum. Fuel supplies in Riga could cover only the need of the municipal traffic during the rush hours in the morning and in the afternoon. Latvian oil concerns have informed that due to the total lack of fuel, bus traffic in the city could be stopped altogether. Latvian state air company announce that due to the same reason, air connections with cities in the former Soviet Union have stopped, excluding flights to Moscow.

Meanwhile, the following talks in Moscow with the Russian Government's representatives, Latvia's Prime Minister Godmanis had announced that a progress has been reached as to Russian oil supplies to Latvia. It has been agreed that Russia pays in kind for its oil exports via Latvia's ports.

Equally so, the formations of the former Soviet Army, for the time being located in Latvia, are due to pay in oil for food supplies from the Latvian institutions. More than 60,000 former Soviet military personnel is situated in Latvia. No agreement has been reached on similar procedures with regards to supply of Latvia's industrial and agricultural produce in exchange for oil.

Buses Stalled

LD0801062592 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Today in Riga the city and suburban transportation buses operated from 0530 until 0900, and from 1600 until 1900. This is because there is neither gasoline nor diesel fuel. Tommorow the buses will run in the morning and in the afternoon during the same periods, thanks to an organization which, wishing to remain anonymous, lent the bus pool 30 tonnes of diesel fuel. What will happen the day after tomorrow is not yet known.

The Olaine oil base, the chief supply organization for the bus pool, announced that its reservoirs are empty.

Tomorrow a small amount of fuel will also be supplied by an army unit.

'Rapid Response Police Battalion' Formed

OW0801092092 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Latvian Interior Minister Ziedonis Cevers told a news conference in Riga January 6 that currently a new rapid response police batallion is being formed. He said that if necessary it can be quickly sent to any "hot spot" of Latvia. The batallion to be stationed in Riga will patrol the Latvian capital and its suburbs.

Mr. Cevers also said that despite the shortage of arms and transport vehicles a Latvian Interior Ministry convoy regiment has been completely formed. It has already started guarding prisons.

Lutheran Church Protests Border Situation

OW0801063992 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the newspaper "Diena" the Lutheran Church of Latvia has sent a protest to the presidium of parliament against the situation on the borders of the republic. The letter says that a stamp of the non-existent USSR is put on passports when the Latvian border is crossed and the border itself is guarded by "USSR border guards who do not speak the official language of Latvia."

Bishop Karlis Gailitis felt that if the situation "shameful for Latvia" is not changed in the near future, the church will be forced to disrupt its international contacts.

Lithuania

Prime Minister Queries Military Maneuvers

LD0701214692 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Gedimanas Vagnorius has sent a telegram to Colonel General Mironov, chief of the Northwest Military Group. It notes: Esteemed General, information issued by you concerning the planning of maneuvers by the Northwest Military Group on the territory of the republic of Lithuania for 2-10 January 1992 was received too late. Moreover, it fails to give an indication of the location of the planned maneuvers. This might give rise to a negative reaction on the part of the population of the republic of Lithuania and produce some undesirable consequences.

Therefore, the Lithuanian Government urgently requests that you supply detailed information concerning the prospective maneuvers. Following this, it will be possible to decide on the (?concept) of holding them on the republic's territory.

Territorial Protection Minister Interviewed

PM0801113392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Dec 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuanian minister for territorial protection, by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak under the "Political Self-Portrait" rubric; date and place not given: "Audrius Butkevicius: 'We Must Live with Your Army Without Conflicts'"]

[Text] The latest guest of our rubric, under which we give the floor to politicians of very diverse trends and to statesmen of various states, is Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuanian minister for territorial protection. He is 31 years old. He is a physician by training. He is one of the organizers of Sajudis and a deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

In Sajudis he worked on the "civil resistance program." He himself believes that this served as grounds for his appointment as general director of the territorial protection department. Now he is minister. His office is in the building of the former republic military commissariat.

"I smoke a pipe, and I like roast duck. I prefer blondes to brunettes," he said, laughing, at the end of our conversation. This was to relieve the tension. The conversation had been far more prosaic....

[Gromak] Mr. Butkevicius, you granted an interview to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA exactly a year ago...

[Butkevicius] I remember, I remember...

[Gromak] It has not been an easy year for the Lithuanian state. The January events, the August events, the constant growth in prices. At the same time the republic has received independence and been recognized by many countries. But what has changed for you personally?

[Butkevicius] For me this has been a year of hard work. I have had to organize new structures and thereby engage in politics inside and outside the republic.

[Gromak] Then, in order to make our discussion more concrete, please talk about your ministry's tasks.

[Butkevicius] As you understand, the Ministry of Territorial Protection is a civilian department. In the main, it keeps to a political line, i.e. it works on questions of security policy. The ministry also controls resources and controls our structural subdivisions.

I do not think it is worth speaking about the way my aides and my accountants operate. It is not that interesting (he laughs). But I will talk about the programs.

The ministry has four main programs. The first is border protection. A structure dealing with the economic control of the borders is operating at present. Because the border is being reinstated with the Soviet Union (or with what it will be) with Poland and Latvia, the border regime is not yet clear. The structure will be transformed depending on our international accords.

Will there be a border with Latvia or not? Will there be a border with Kaliningrad Oblast? I mean, will this border be protected by a rigid regime or not? I cannot answer these questions at present. Talks will provide the answers.

Further, as you understand, we will protect our economic zone from the sea and control the airspace. Conventional subdivisions are being created for this.

The second program is what we call territorial defense. It includes three components. The first—military administration and mobilization—is already operating fully. We are now conducting the first draft into the army. The second component is the training system. Our armed force in peacetime is a school for training the mobilization reserve and preparing the officer corps, and a whole number of establishments are being created. The third component—territorial protection units—are national guard units, so to speak. If I translate the Lithuanian name into Russian, it sounds like this—the "Skat" voluntary territorial protection service. It and the territorial protection units will guard important state installations.

[Gromak] We did not finish our discussion of the programs...

[Butkevicius] Yes, the third program is the creation of regular army units. The fourth big program is civil defense in its Lithuanian version. We understand it far more broadly than in the former USSR. A rescue service. It is largely similar to analogous structures in Scandinavian countries.

There will also be information protection. As you understand, during any catastrophe people always suffer very much from a shortage of information, from disinformation. The war in the Persian Gulf showed that information on what was happening was presented in a very scrupulously doctored form. I was very interested, for example, in this system's work in the U.S. version, when only carefully selected material was chosen for special television programs. In my view, General Schwarzkopf spoke a great truth—that they lost the war in Vietnam because of television, that during the Vietnam war people in the United States were presented with too much information on the events taking place there. This was taken into account during the war in the Persian Gulf. So, in my view, information protection is important for any state.

[Gromak] You have not yet spoken of the civil resistance system. On what is it based?

[Butkevicius] The essence of the system is that any conflict, any force which wants to occupy another state always has one aim—political control over another territory. Any putsch has the same aim. In order to have power, I believe that five sources are needed. Whoever controls these sources has power.

[Gromak] It would be interesting to know what these sources are.

[Butkevicius] They are the juridical base, the people's support, their consent to dealing with a specific power, the support of specialists, and also resources and a system of sanctions.

What is being done now in Russia, for example, with its leaders? Superimpose these five components on the situation, and all will become clear to you. Is a putsch possible in the Soviet Union? Superimpose, and you will find out.

[Gromak] Mr. Minister, in June I was talking in this same office with Major General A. Visockis, then military commissar of the republic, about the draft of Lithuanians into the Soviet Army. He complained about the difficulties, for he had managed to draft only residents of nonindigenous nationality. How is the draft into the Lithuanian army going?...

[Butkevicius] Things are difficult with the material base. Until recently the republic had none of our own special structures for the draft. This is why the draft is proceeding differently in different places. The beginning was very fine, and the draft developed into a kind of festival. The next day I was obliged to send men home, because they had come to the induction center in their best suits and neckties. We have no place to put these best suits. Then they came back dressed anyhow. The chief thing is that young people are joining the army. They come in the understanding that this is necessary.

[Gromak] In addition to people, much else is also needed for the functioning of any army. Hardware, for example. What do you think about this?

[Butkevicius] The Finnish option, whereby mixed hardware is used and the necessary components are created, would suit us very well to start with. Because I am a physician, I had to take an interest in the opinion of experts on the quality of Soviet weapons and those of other countries. Fine weapons have been made in the Soviet Union. I have applied to the USSR Ministry of Defense and General Staff. Yes, we want to buy weapons from you.

[Gromak] This question will evidently be raised in intergovernmental talks, will it not?

[Butkevicius] I believe that this question can be resolved long before talks. We are not creating an army that intends to attack anyone. We have no territorial claims. I am creating something that will function only in peacetime. What is needed for this is elementary armament.

[Gromak] Soviet Army and Navy units are on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic. How is the minister for territorial protection building his relations with unit commanders?

[Butkevicius] In different ways. I have met and spoken with almost all the commanders. We are setting up a special contact group in the Ministry of Territorial Protection....

It is a fact that Soviet servicemen are and will be here for some time. They evidently will not be leaving soon, although it is my wish that they should withdraw from Lithuania as quickly as possible. But we must live without conflicts for as long as the Soviet Army is in Lithuania.

[Gromak] What must be done to prevent conflicts?

[Butkevicius] You know, there are movements of various Soviet Army units, about which we are simply not informed. I believe that the Soviet Army commanders are not yet accustomed to understanding that they are on the territory of a foreign state and are obliged to behave as is befitting in a foreign country. This means that all actions must be agreed, particularly now that there are no regulating documents. We could have far better communications with servicemen while they are here. It is necessary to resolve in a civilized manner things that do not cost anyone anything. For example, to report courteously a planned movement of hardware. Do you think that we will prevent this? That we are children? For we realize that the Army lives by its own plans.

But there is an old saying of psychotherapists: "Lack of information creates fear." When I was a practicing physician, I knew how much I had to explain to a person to make him feel confident even in a crisis situation. I believe that this must also be done in relations with servicemen. I hope to have a direct link with the commanders of all the units in Lithuania as early as next year.

Departs for Germany

LD0801024292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2230 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] The republic's minister of national defense, Audrius Butkevicius, left today for Germany for a three-day visit. During the visit he is to meet Germany's Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg. In an interview to the RESPUBLICA daily, Audrius Butkevicius pointed out that he intended to negotiate for German assistance to the Lithuanian national defense system.

Industrial Goods at Market Prices From 20 Jan

PM0801123992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Jan 92 First Edition p 1

[TASS report under the "News" rubric: "Their Life Is Not Sweet Either..."]

[Text] All industrial goods will be sold only at market prices from 20 January—this has been decided by the Lithuanian Government.

Liberalization of prices for non-foodstuffs in Lithuania was begun 19 November last year. Until now, however, a proportion of these goods has been sold at the prescribed state prices for general coupons, which inhabitants have received with wages or other payments (lately up to 340 coupons per person depending on the sum being received) or could acquire (prices for one coupon have varied from two rubles to 50 kopeks).

Adult inhabitants will be issued with 80 general coupons each, and children under 16 with 40 each, for the purchase of state-subsidized foodstuffs in January.

In addition, in the first quarter of 1992, sugar, flour, butter, and salt are being sold only for special coupons printed on watermarked paper.

Export Restrictions Imposed on Food, Gasoline

PM0701145992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 92 Union Edition p 1

[Untitled report from IZVESTIYA, INTERFAX, RIA, REUTERS, AP, UPI roundup]

[Text] The Lithuanian Government has set a ceiling on the export or dispatch of goods from the beginning of 1992—to a value of up to 1,000 rubles per person.

It is forbidden to export butter, cheeses, sugar, and vegetable oil from Lithuania. Up to one kilogram of meat or meat products may be conveyed per person. Persons crossing the state border of Lithuania are permitted to have with them no more than 40 liters of gasoline or diesel oil and one liter of automobile oil.

Government Sets Produce Purchasing Prices

OW0801100392 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian government has passed a decision under which the purchasing prices of milk will go up by 50% as of January 8, the purchasing prices of other farm produce will depend on market conditions. Meat and meat products, except smoked sausage and other delicacies, will be sold only for general coupons. Sugar, salt, butter and flour will be sold only for single coupons.

The prices of sugar, alcohol and tobacco are going up by 50% on the average.

The government is setting single retail prices of alcohol and tobacco manufactured in Lithuania for government and private stores.

Prime Minister Meets European Bank Officials

LD0801044192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] Prime Minister Gedimanas Vagnorius today received a European Reconstruction and Development Bank administrators' group, which is visiting Lithuania. It was observed during the meeting that there are no problems preventing Lithuania from becoming a member of this organization. Following the completion of certain formalities, this issue should be resolved positively.

Gedimanas Vagnorius observed that once a member, Lithuania will be able to integrate into the European Community faster and to stabilize its economic situation.

Israeli Envoy Discusses Ties, Cooperation

LD0801044892 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 7 Jan 92

[By Algirdas Usas]

[Text] Arye Levin, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Israel in Moscow, and his wife arrived in Vilnius today. Algirdas Saudargas, Lithuanian foreign affairs minister, received the Israeli ambassador and his delegation.

During the meeting, the initiation of diplomatic relations between Israel and Lithuania and cooperation possibilities were discussed.

Arye Levin will be received tomorrow by Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis. Preparations are under way for a ceremony in which Israel state awards will be presented to Lithuanian individuals who rescued Jews during World War II.

Declaration on Ties With Poland Initialed

OW0801091992 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1830 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry's information and press department reported on Tuesday [7 January] that the Lithuanian and Polish delegations had initialed in Vilnius "the Declaration on friendly and neighbourly relations between Lithuania and Poland."

The Lithuanian delegation was led by First Deputy Foreign Minister Valdermaras Katkus, the Polish one by Director of the Foreign Ministry's consular department Jatsek Chaputovich.

The Declaration is yet to be signed by the foreign ministers of the two states. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas offered Poland to do that "as soon as possible."

Baltic Delegation Okays Presidium, Committees

LD0801044492 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 7 Jan 92

[Text] A meeting of the Lithuanian delegation to the Baltic Assembly was held today. The agenda of the Baltic Assembly's first plenary session, which is to take place in Riga from 24 to 26 January, was deliberated. The delegation presidium and the composition of six committees were approved.